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Abstract 
The process of onboarding a company is characterized by inter-enterprise collaboration 
between the acquiring and the acquired companies. Multiple cross-functional teams are 
formed to assimilate and integrate the processes, products, data, customers, and 
partners of the company under acquisition. Dynamic access control management in 
such inter-enterprise collaboration is the subject of this thesis.  
A problem in inter-enterprise collaboration in onboarding is that information assets 
shared by collaborating teams are not adequately protected. As a result, there is 
potential for accidental or malicious leakage of sensitive business information like the 
intellectual property, product roadmaps and strategy, customer lists etc. Also, the 
statically defined access control policies are not sufficient to address access control 
requirements of dynamic collaboration where there is a constant change in people, 
processes, and information assets in collaboration repository. This research proposes a 
new approach and model to integrate security in onboarding collaboration process. 
Research methods such as, literature review, field studies including direct experiential 
projects in onboarding and interviews with experts in Mergers and Acquisitions, and 
detailed data collection and analysis through surveys are used to identify the issues that 
need to be addressed in the onboarding process. Literature review enabled the 
identification of access control requirements from the perspective of statically defined 
policies and the need to determine access dynamically. From the field studies, it was 
deciphered that there is a need for a well-defined onboarding collaboration process. The 
data analysis and interpretation from the survey results provided insights into the needs 
for integrating security in all phases of onboarding collaboration. All these research 
methods essentially enabled identification of two key issues that this research 
addresses: 1) well-defined onboarding collaboration process and 2) building security in 
all phases of onboarding collaboration.  
A new approach and model called SCODA is developed to integrate security in all 
phases of onboarding collaboration. Onboarding collaboration process consists of four 
phases: create, operate, dissolve, and archive. These phases provide the basis for 
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systematically addressing security and access control when the collaboration team is 
formed, while it is operating, when the team is dissolved after completing its tasks, and 
when shared information assets are archived. The research adapts role based access 
control (RBAC) and formally defines the enterprise, functional, and collaboration roles 
for making access control management decisions. New ideas are developed in trust-
based access control management in dynamic collaboration. The change management 
aspects are also discussed. The SCODA model is validated and the refinements 
incorporated accordingly. 
This research contributed to both theory and practice of information security in general 
and access control in particular in the context of dynamic collaboration. It proposed a 
new approach of building security in, i.e. to integrate security in all phases of 
collaboration. In order to build security in, a new onboarding collaboration process is 
developed that is adaptable and customizable. It has also developed a new approach 
for trust based dynamic access control based on the new concepts of strong and weak 
trust relationships. These trust relationships are also adaptable and customizable. 
Finally, this research has potential for future research work in the design and 
implementation of multi-paradigm based enterprise security frameworks and inter-
enterprise collaboration.  
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1 Introduction 
"Intellectuals solve problems; geniuses prevent them." – Albert Einstein 
1.1 Introduction 
Access control management in inter-enterprise collaboration, in the context of mergers 
and acquisitions (M&A), is the primary focus of this research. In today’s interconnected 
global economy, mergers and acquisitions have been growing rapidly [1]. There are 
many common motivations for mergers and acquisitions such as to increase customer 
base, expand the product offerings, expand global presence etc. [2]. This research 
addresses the scenario where a company acquires another company. From the time the 
letter of intent to purchase is accepted to the time the assimilation and induction of 
people, processes, technologies, tools, customers, partners, suppliers and others is 
completed, both the companies involved go through a series of tasks to manage the 
acquisition smoothly. Many functional organizations such as the engineering, finance, 
marketing, sales, channels, customer support, training, and IT are involved in this 
complex undertaking. In order to manage this complexity, a cross-functional team is 
usually put in place dynamically to manage all aspects of this assimilation which is 
termed as onboarding in industry accepted terminology. Onboarding is also commonly 
used in the industry to discuss employee onboarding from a human resource and 
development perspective. 
 
In essence, there is collaboration between the two companies. From a business 
perspective, collaboration is the act of working together to achieve a business objective. 
The business dictionary defines it as, a cooperative arrangement in which two or more 
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parties (which may or may not have any previous relationship) work jointly towards a 
common goal [3]. In the case of onboarding, a cross-functional team from both the 
acquiring and the acquired company work together to achieve the business objective of 
assimilating the people, processes, technologies etc. of the two companies. When a 
team is put together, there are numerous tasks that would take place such as selecting 
the team members, assigning roles and responsibilities, creating the necessary 
infrastructure to coordinate, communicate and cooperate. A significant component of 
this team dynamics and collaboration is sharing a variety of work artifacts and 
documents spanning engineering, financial, legal, sales and marketing, and IT. In 
addition, these teams share processes, methods, tools, and applications. All of these 
are broadly termed as information assets. 
 
Information security is a key aspect of such dynamic inter-enterprise collaboration 
where business sensitive information is shared among a group of people as well as 
processes. Information security deals with various trust aspects of information. It is not 
specific either to computer systems or to information in electronic form; it applies to all 
aspects of safeguarding or protecting any form of information or data.  The US National 
Information Systems Security Glossary [4] defines information systems security 
(INFOSEC) as:  
the protection of information systems against unauthorized access to or 
modification of information, whether in storage, processing or transit, and 
against the denial of service to authorized users or the provision of service to 
unauthorized users, including those measures necessary to detect, document, 
and counter such threats.  
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There are many different nuances of information security. As discussed in [5], it has 
been viewed as synonymous with computer security, computer and network security, 
information technology (IT) security, information systems security, or information and 
communications technology (ICT) security. Though each of these has a different 
emphasis, the common issue that they address is the security of information. It is 
generally accepted that they are all subsets of information security [6]. In other words, 
information security addresses not just information but all infrastructures that facilitate 
its use — processes, systems, services, technology etc., including computers, voice 
and data networks etc.  
 
In the context of mergers and acquisitions and the resulting inter-enterprise 
collaboration, information security from the perspective of managing access to shared 
artifacts must be addressed because information must be protected against 
unauthorized access, thus preventing either accidental or malicious misuse of 
information. It is this aspect of secure collaboration, access control that is the focus of 
this research.  
 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, onboarding entails assimilation of people, process, 
and technologies. In this process of assimilation there is potential for change in all these 
three dimensions. For example, roles and responsibilities for people may change, new 
roles could be defined, and multiple roles could be merged. The same applies to 
processes as well as technologies. Of particular interest to our research is the change 
management aspect associated with secure collaboration. For example, how would 
access control be managed in terms of setting up and modifying roles, privileges, and 
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trust? The practical nature of administering a variety of systems, frameworks, processes 
etc. requires that one should design and develop these in such a way that they are easy 
to use and administer in terms of changes [7]. Addressing change management is an 
integral component of this research.  
 
1.2 Purpose 
The purpose of this research is to investigate the subject of access control management 
in onboarding in the context of mergers and acquisitions (M&A). Though access 
management in the context of collaboration has been researched in general in [8], [9], 
[10] etc., (note: detailed references cited and discussed in the chapter on literature 
survey and analysis), this investigation has not found evidence that it has been 
addressed systematically in onboarding in the context of M&A. The nature of 
collaboration in this context is that the people who come together to manage 
onboarding come from different functional units, different organizations, and they have 
different processes, methods, and tools that they use. The M&A type of inter-enterprise 
collaboration requires further research compared to traditional inter-enterprise 
collaborations that have been studied because the context of M&A brings with it its own 
nuances such as 1) the transient nature of collaboration – once the merger/acquisition 
is complete, the inter-enterprise team is dissolved, 2) the merger may or may not be 
friendly in which case there is more scope for abuse/misuse of sensitive information, 
and 3) security management is more dynamic - authorization to business sensitive 
information assets may have to be granted in ad-hoc manner (meaning there may not 
be pre-defined authorization rule to determine access). This research also addresses 
change management in the context of secure collaboration.  
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1.3 Overview of Research 
This research will bring four specific aspects together to provide a foundation for access 
control management in onboarding. First, industry experience in participating in 
onboarding activities and literature survey of mergers and acquisitions will provide 
insights into the complex nature of onboarding. Though the process of assimilating the 
acquired company seems to be functional, preliminary investigation shows that access 
control management aspects in the context of dynamic collaboration have not been 
addressed explicitly as integral to the acquisition process. Second, literature review of 
information security field has shown that access control management has been 
addressed in the context of dynamic collaboration. However, this investigation did not 
discover any significant research in access control management in inter-enterprise 
secure collaboration in the context of M&As. In this type of inter-enterprise collaboration 
it is not very clear as to what type of access control management models must be used 
to manage secure collaboration. Third, literature survey of self-organizing systems 
suggests that one can view the inter-enterprise collaboration team in onboarding as 
self-organizing. This observation leads us to further researching access control 
management in onboarding based on the concepts of self-organization. Fourth, the 
literature review of collaboration trust models provides insights into the notion of trust in 
addressing security in inter-enterprise collaboration. This research investigates the 
adaptability of the notion on trust in access control management in the context of 
onboarding. 
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1.4 Research Objectives  
Literature review and analysis show research gaps in the literature on onboarding, in 
the context of M&As. More specifically, the gaps are in access control management in 
inter-enterprise collaboration in the context of onboarding. This research further 
discovered the potential of adapting the concepts of self-organization, and trust models 
developing access control management in onboarding. Based on these preliminary 
results, the research objectives and deliverables are the following: 
 Development of an access control management model for secure 
collaboration in onboarding. 
 Address change management that accompanies access control management 
model in on boarding. 
 
1.5 Thesis Outline 
Chapter 2 presents an overview of onboarding in the context of mergers and 
acquisitions. The term onboarding is used in the commercial and corporate world to 
usually mean a process to assimilate and integrate new employees into an organization 
[11]. The focus of this chapter is to define onboarding in the context of this research and 
to discuss the process of onboarding an acquired company. The focus of chapter 3 is 
literature review and analysis of access control management, self-organizing systems, 
and collaboration models. This chapter will include an analysis of how research 
contributions from these fields will be used in the development of access control 
management model for inter-enterprise collaboration in onboarding. The focus of 
chapter 4 is research methodology and research design used to produce and validate 
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the results. Chapter 5 discusses the data collection and analysis of survey results. 
Included in this chapter are the preliminary survey and the final survey, data analysis 
and interpretation of results which influence the development of access control 
management model. Chapter 6 discusses a new access control management approach 
for secure onboarding collaboration. It adapts role based access control (RBAC) model, 
and proposes new concepts of enterprise, functional, and collaboration roles. A new 
secure onboarding collaboration process model, SCODA (a process of integrating 
Security in Create, Operate, Dissolve, and Archive phases) is developed for addressing 
security across the onboarding collaboration lifecycle. This chapter also discusses 
perspective of self-organization in access control management in dynamic collaboration. 
In addition, it discusses how trust management plays a role in access control 
management in in onboarding collaboration. Finally, in the same chapter, the change 
management aspects of access control management in onboarding are discussed. 
Chapter 7 focuses on model validation with experts and the updated access control 
model. Chapter 8 discusses the research contributions and significance. It will include a 
discussion on future research directions in access control and security management in 
dynamic collaboration.  
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2 Onboarding 
“When you know better you do better.” -- Maya Angelou 
2.1 Introduction 
Onboarding is a relatively new term. It has been used in the literature most often to 
discuss the orientation and socialization of a new employee hire in a company [12]. In 
this context, as discussed in [13], onboarding is viewed as a process of learning, 
networking, resource allocation, goal setting and strategizing. The end goal of this 
process is to have the new employee reach maximum productivity quickly [14]. In the 
context of mergers and acquisitions, one of the perspectives proposed in the literature is 
to view the assimilation of the acquired and acquiring companies as a process of task 
integration and human integration [15]. Traditionally, the research in organizational 
behavior focuses on behavioral implications of acquisitions at both the individual and 
organizational levels. It emphasizes the importance of generating satisfaction and 
eventually a shared identity among the employees of both organizations. This is called 
the human integration. The process perspective is focused on the actions taken by 
management to guide the post- acquisition integration process. It views task integration 
as the objective of the acquisition, measured in terms of transfers of capabilities and 
resource sharing. The success of acquisition is dependent on both task integration as 
well as human integration.  
The employee onboarding is further discussed in the literature by various researchers. 
For example, in [16], the case is made that it is important for a company to make a 
positive impact on new hires because these employees make their decision to either 
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leave or stay with a company in the first six months. The financial impact of lack of 
formal onboarding processes is discussed in [17]. The questions that enable maximizing 
employee onboarding efforts are presented in [18]. In essence most of this literature on 
employee onboarding suggests that formal on-boarding processes positively impact 
new employees in numerous ways: the unknowns are answered, expectations and 
goals are set, they are more easily assimilated into the organization's culture and they 
build strong relationships faster [13].  The key characteristics for successful employee 
onboarding were identified, as shown in Table 2.1. 
Table 2-1: Characteristics of successful employee onboarding 
Characteristics Comments 
Clearly defined organizational objectives [11] vision, mission, product and solutions, culture, 
organization chart, go-to people (people who 
can help) etc. are presented 
Onboarding process begins as soon as the 
person accepts the offer  [14] 
creates the impression that the company is 
caring and supportive 
Define Metrics that Matter (MTM) [11],  turnover rate, productivity, employee 
satisfaction etc. Facilitates continuous process 
improvement 
Leadership buy in and support [14] executive management support in allocating 
time, money, and resources 
Employee expectations and goals defined 
collaboratively [19] 
employees know their role and responsibilities 
Mentors assigned [19] the go to people for an employee to enhance 
his/her career development 
Manager’s performance objectives include 
onboarding [12] 
employee’s immediate manager knows his/her 
responsibilities in ensuring success of a new 
hire 
Technology Innovation [19] adapting technology innovation for providing a 
holistic onboarding experience 
New hire social community [12] providing a community support portal 
throughout onboarding 
Formal training processes [14] blended training and community support to 
enable employee learn about the company’s 
people, products, solutions, customers, 
competition etc. 
Implement formal surveys throughout 
onboarding [19] 
employee satisfaction surveys done 
throughout the onboarding cycle 
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Though employee onboarding is a well-researched topic in the literature, not much 
research addresses acquisition onboarding and its access control management 
challenges. Employee onboarding is one of many important aspects of acquisitions. The 
literature identified is primarily concerned with Mergers and Acquisitions from a 
management perspective whereas very little is present from a technology perspective, 
especially from the viewpoint of collaboration security. In order to address these security 
issues, it is important to first understand the process lifecycle of onboarding companies. 
This provides a reference framework to study collaboration security because it will 
facilitate the identification of objectives, roles, responsibilities, information shared 
among the collaborators, relationships, security risks, and change management issues. 
The next section is devoted to a discussion on understanding acquisitions and process 
lifecycle for onboarding companies. 
2.2 Process Lifecycle for On Boarding Companies 
Acquisitions are considered as a way for implementing a business strategy focused on 
growth [2]. The acquisition lifecycle begins with the business plan and culminates in the 
acquisition and onboarding of the company that is acquired. Researchers have 
identified numerous phases of acquisition lifecycle. In [2], the author proposes a 10 
phase acquisition process:  
1. Business Plan 
Develop a strategic plan for the entire business 
2. Acquisition Plan 
Develop an acquisition plan that is aligned with business strategy 
3. Search Pre-purchase decision activities 
Search for potential companies for acquisition 
4. Screen 
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Short list the potential companies 
5. First Contact 
Initiate contact with the target company 
6. Negotiation 
Agree on valuation of the target; perform due diligence, develop financing plan 
7. Integration Plan 
Develop plan for integrating the acquired business 
8. Closing 
Obtain necessary approvals and execute closing from a legal perspective 
9. Integration 
Implement post-closing integration 
10. Evaluation 
Conduct Post Closing the success of acquisition 
  
Another perspective on acquisition lifecycle is discussed in [20]. The steps of acquisition 
process discussed are very similar to the above. Based on the literature review and 
analysis of various acquisition lifecycles, it is inferred that collaboration security is 
potentially addressed at three process steps in any process lifecycle for acquisitions 1) 
forming an acquisition team, 2) integration planning and 3) forming an integration team. 
These steps come after a company has given a formal letter of intent to acquire another 
company and both the companies have agreed on the acquisition. An acquisition team 
is formed to move the process forward. Collaboration security must be addressed when 
the acquisition team is formed as the team members will be accessing a variety of 
business sensitive information.  The acquisition team will continue to exist until the 
integration is complete. Another milestone that is triggered after both companies agreed 
on the acquisition is the formation of integration planning team. This step also entails 
addressing collaboration security because there will be an inter-enterprise team 
collaborating and sharing business sensitive information. The formation of integration 
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team is another significant milestone where members from both companies form a 
collaborative team to plan and execute integration strategy. Typically, integration team 
size is larger than the size of the acquisition team as well as the integration planning 
teams. This is because in this step, resources from IT, and first level business and 
project members will be involved in looking at merging the IT and the business 
processes [21]. This is perhaps the most critical phase where security must be 
addressed as members have access to numerous business sensitive documents and 
other artifacts that if compromised may pose high business risk.  
2.3 Onboarding Insights 
Though companies like Cisco, GE, and Intel have a fairly well defined process for 
managing acquisitions, the access control management in inter-enterprise collaboration 
is something that could be improved and enhanced. First-hand experience in 
onboarding and interviews with experts suggest that the members of acquisition, 
integration planning and integration teams have access to many documents though 
their role does not entail such access privileges. Furthermore, beyond the usual post-
mortem analysis that comes after the onboarding is complete, there are no well-defined 
feedback loops which are integrated into the process of onboarding, especially in the 
context of security management. In addition, due to lack of collaboration security 
controls at integration phase it is not known if any security breaches occurred which 
were either intentional or unintentional. Research shows that more than 60% 
acquisitions fail to deliver value and often, it is employees who are not happy with the 
acquisition. Lack of security controls in managing access to information repository 
poses significant business risks such as financial loss, IP theft, sales data theft, and 
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other business critical data loss. Chapter 5 (Data Collection and Analysis) presents 
more insights in access control management in inter-enterprise collaboration in 
onboarding. 
2.4 Research Context and Focus 
The context of this research is onboarding acquired companies. The rate of acquisitions 
in the new millennium is steadily increasing while at the same time the global 
competition is increasingly becoming more challenging. These developments create an 
environment in the workplace that demands increase security measures in all aspects of 
running a business. The increasing cyber-attacks are one example of such security 
threat. Security is about managing risks. This implies that at all points of time in the 
existence of a business there must be sufficient access control mechanisms in place to 
safeguard a company’s assets.  
 
Acquisitions have been studied in academia and industry predominantly by researchers 
in management, finance, economics, sociology, and accounting domains. They have 
employed a rich and diverse set of methodologies to examine acquisition phenomena. 
Although this work has uncovered numerous notable findings, few attempts to 
synthesize these insights across fields have emerged [22]. In these domains active 
research is going on in the areas such as Antecedents to Acquisitions, Consequences 
of Acquisitions, and Human Capital Management. 
 
This research adds a new dimension of security to the field of acquisitions. In the overall 
acquisitions process, the focus is on access control management in dynamic 
collaboration in onboarding. An integrated focus is to address change management in 
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the context of access control management. In the next chapter, a detailed literature 
review is presented with emphasis on evolution of access control models, self-
organizing systems, and access control management in dynamic collaboration. 
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3 Literature Review  
“Know what you are talking about.” -- John Paul II 
3.1 Introduction 
Access control management in inter-enterprise collaboration, in the context of 
onboarding, is the primary focus of this research. The process of onboarding acquired 
companies entails people from both the acquiring company and the acquired company 
working together to ensure that people, processes, technologies, partners and 
customers are systematically integrated. This scenario of people working together 
requires cooperation, coordination, and communication among the team members. In 
the industry, this is usually referred to as collaboration between the two companies for 
successful integration. One facet of such collaboration is the need for people to share 
many types of documents and other working artifacts like customer and partner lists, 
financial reports, engineering diagrams, product roadmaps etc. This type of information 
is highly business sensitive and poses a security risk to companies as measured in loss 
of revenue, competitive advantage, reputation, legal, and otherwise . In the realm of the 
onboarding context, one has to also address access control issues pertaining to 
information access. For example, not everyone on the onboarding team requires access 
to customer lists. Perhaps, this is required only for those members whose functional role 
pertains to sales and marketing. Another facet of onboarding is the dynamic nature of 
the team composition. During the lifecycle of onboarding, different cross-functional team 
members play an active role in the acquisition process and once the tasks pertaining to 
that part of the lifecycle are complete, their role ends. Essentially, the team structure is 
dynamic during onboarding collaboration. Access control management in such a 
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dynamic collaboration environment becomes an important element of successful 
onboarding. This research also aims to adapt concepts from “self-organizing systems” 
to study access management in dynamic collaboration. References to the concept of 
self- organization became common place in the scientific literature beginning in the 
1970’s when scientists researched complex systems [23]. Change management is 
another important facet of integrating the people, processes, and technologies in the 
context of onboarding. For example, new roles may be discovered, existing roles may 
be combined, processes could be modified etc. This research aims to address change 
management in the context of onboarding. This chapter first presents an evolution of 
security and access management.  Next, the evolution of collaboration security is 
presented. This chapter also includes a discussion on self-organized systems as it is 
applicable to this research.  
3.2  Evolution of Security and Access Control Management 
Access control deals with controlling access to information. According to Sandhu [24] 
well known for his pioneering research in information security research and Role Based 
Access Control model, the purpose of access control is to limit the actions and 
operations that a legitimate user can perform in a computer system. Ever since the 
development of the first scientific computers in late 1950’s, there has been an interest in 
access control management. The field was known as computer security and it dealt with 
the management of access to computers and the information stored in them. Computer 
security as a discipline began in earnest in the 1970’s [25].  It has evolved with 
advances in computing beginning with mainframes in the 1950’s to the current 
environment driven by distributed computing, internet, collaboration, and social network 
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technologies. The subject area of security has branched off into different research 
directions in the process.  Table 3.1 depicts this evolution. 
 
Table 3-1: Evolution of Security Research 
Time Technology Applications Security Research Focus 
1950s Mainframe Scientific Physical access, Computer 
Cryptography 
1960s Minicomputers Business Data 
Processing 
Operating Systems Security, Access 
Control Matrices, Information Security 
1970s PCs, LANs Database Processing, 
Rudimentary PC based 
applications 
CIA model of information security, 
information flow analysis based 
security 
1980s Client-Server,  
LAN/WAN 
Desktop Applications, 
Client-Server Applications 
Network Security, Database Security 
1990s Distributed 
Computing, 
Internet 
Enterprise Resource 
Planning Applications, 
First Generation E-
commerce Applications 
Application Security, Information 
Security 
2000+ Mobile 
Computing, 
Holistic 
Ecosystem 
Mobile Applications, IP 
Telephony,  Collaboration 
systems, Web 2.0 
Enterprise Information Security, 
Mobile Security, Software Security, 
Risk analysis based  security 
approaches, Collaboration security 
2010+ Social 
Networking, 
Mobile Apps 
Community sharing, 
Smart Phones and Apps 
Social networking security, App 
security 
  
The evolution of computer security can be mapped to the evolution of computing 
technology, beginning with mainframes, progressing to a few networked minicomputers 
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in one office, further evolving into a geographically distributed client – server 
environments, and today spanning global networks of computers connecting 
businesses, partners, vendors, customers, and more. Along with the advances in 
computing environments, the security issues addressed by the research community 
evolved too. A new dimension was added to this picture. As the power of computing 
evolved, the size and complexity of applications harnessing the computing power 
evolved too. Starting with simple scientific applications, we have progressed to data 
processing applications on mainframes in the 1960’s to using desk to applications in the 
1980’s. Today, we are using web enabled enterprise applications that are universally 
accessed by a variety of entities and people including businesses, customers, partners, 
vendors, and others. The evolution of applications has added an entirely new dimension 
to security. In fact, the very nature of computer security has changed dramatically. It has 
resulted in different branches of study including operating systems security, network 
security, database security, application security, mobile security, and software security. 
Figure 3.1 shows the evolution of the branches of security. 
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Figure 3-1: Evolution of Security Branches of Study 
 
The purpose of Figure 3.1 is to depict the evolution of the information security field. It 
can be argued that there are other branches of security as well; for example, 
programming language security. However, for the purpose of this research, these 
branches are shown, as they are relevant to put the research in context in the sense 
that access control management is studied at different levels of abstraction. In addition, 
this depiction closely models the computing paradigm where we have Hardware 
(computers), Operating Systems, Networks, Databases, Software & Web Applications, 
Mobile Applications, and Social Networking. We can clearly see the progress of the 
security branches of study. First came computer security in the 1950’s, where the 
prominent research focus was on cryptography [26] followed by operating systems 
security in late 1960’s [27].  The 1970’s witnessed maturing database processing 
paradigms and the associated database security frameworks in mainframes and 
minicomputers [28]. The advent of PCs in late 1970’s, and the birth of Local Area 
Time 
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Networks expanded the scope of security and resulted in network security branch of 
study [29]. The 1980’s witnessed true client-server distributed applications spread over 
LANs/WANs and the network security field of study expanded rapidly [30] . It was also 
the time that access control issues took on a new dimension as computing was spread 
over a distributed network; security came into more focus in the industry, and the Chief 
Information Officers in the industry began to talk about an information security strategy 
encompassing all aspects of computing.  
The rest of the section presents the evolution of security and access control models 
categorized into 1) Early Phase: Access control and information flow models, 2) Second 
Phase: Access Control Lists, Role based and Trust based Models, 3) Next Generation: 
Innovative Security Strategies, and 4) Most Recent Phase: Social Networking and 
Cloud Computing Security 
3.2.1 Early Phase: Access Control and Information Flow Models 
Most of the initial research contributions in access control came from the operating 
systems subject area. The pioneering research of Lampson [31] resulted in perhaps the 
most intuitive as well as significant access control model using access control matrix. 
This model was later refined by Graham and Denning [32]. Access Control Models 
control access to information. They were first proposed in describing the protection 
features in Operating Systems. The key conceptual elements of the access control 
matrix are the Subject, Object, and the Rights that the Subjects have over the Objects 
(protection state). In addition, these models have a set of rules for changing the 
protection state of the system. Each column in the matrix corresponds to an object, and 
each row corresponds to a Subject. A Subject is an activity entity that corresponds to a 
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user or process, an Object is something that we want to protect. The cell that 
corresponds to the intersection of the Subject and Object depicts the rights that a 
Subject has over the Object. Figure 3.2 illustrates an access control matrix. 
 
Table 3-2: Illustration of access control matrix 
User/Resource File 1 File 2 File 3 
Tom Owner, R, W Owner, R, W R 
Dick R R, W R 
Harry R, W R Owner, R, W 
 
User Tom is the Owner of File 1 and File 2 and he has both Read (R) and Write (W) 
access to his files. The rest of the table is self-explanatory. The HRU model by Harrison 
et. al. [33] demonstrated significant fundamental results in the expressive power of 
models based on access control matrices. Bell-LaPadula model [34] is another seminal 
early research work in the area of access control. This model is primarily based on 
military style classification. In this classification scheme all objects are categorized into 
compartments based on their perceived importance and sensitivity. The confidentiality 
policies are enforced by controlling the information flow. In essence, this model has a 
set of rules that prevent the flow of information from a sensitive object to another object 
at a lower sensitivity level. The Biba Integrity model [35] refines and adapts the Bell-
LaPadula model for commercial purposes. It is important to note that during the early 
days of computer security, it was a primary concern for government and military 
organizations and the proposed research models reflected the security requirements of 
these organizations. 
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In addition to these models, a number of other access control models were proposed. 
Some of the models well known in the literature are the take-grant model [36], SPM 
Model [37], CPD model [38], Types Access Matrix Model [39], and ESPM model [40]. 
Some of these models, for example the take-grant model, answer the safety question: is 
a particular state reachable from the initial state?  
 
Though the access control models are effective in reasoning about protection features 
of operating systems, they are not particularly effective in reasoning about information 
flow. As defined by Denning [41], information is said to flow from object A to object B if 
the value of object B depends on the value of object A. The security models based on 
information have been formalized using the notion of state machines that lead to the 
concept of information flow predicates defined in terms of traces in a system. A trace is 
a possible sequence of inputs and outputs pertaining to the operations of a system.  
 
The basic foundation of information flow analysis is the operations and their effect on 
data. Information flows from one data object to another data object if a change in the 
first object causes a change in the other object. The operation that causes this change 
is said to cause the information flow. Information flows can be explicit (assignment 
statement) or implicit (conditional statements) [42]. Further, the information flows can be 
because of functional dependencies (X → Y), meaning the value of Y is dependent on 
the value of X, or deductive reasoning (knowing the value of X implies knowing the 
value of Y).  In essence, if an information flow exists between object A and object B, an 
input to object A causes changes in output of object B. This concept is captured as 
follows [42]: 
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Axiom 1: Basic Information Flow Axiom 
A flow, X → Y occurs only when the value of Y is updated 
Definition: Flow 
A flow, denoted X → Y, takes place from an object X to another object Y if object Y contains information 
about object X after execution of some program that involves both objects. 
The components of an information flow model are [41]:  
 A lattice 
 A set of labeled objects 
 The security policy that governs information flow between objects 
 
Any information system designed based on information flow is secure if there are no 
illegal flows. 
Though the advantage of information flow models is that they cover all kinds of 
information flow, it has been observed in practice that such systems are hard to design. 
It has also been observed that checking if a given information system in information flow 
model is secure is an undecidable problem [43]. 
 
3.2.2 Second Phase:  Access Control Lists, Role Based Security, Trust Models 
This phase is characterized by the increasing use of computers in business with 
technology innovation that lead to local and wide area networking, desk top computing, 
and databases. It was also the beginning of the internet. As the level of security 
awareness and its impact on business was understood, enterprises considered different 
types of security models and paradigms to manage their information assets. There are 
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many products and solutions offered by Vendors to deal with enterprise security. This 
section focuses on the security models based on access control lists, roles, and trust. 
Models based on Access Control List (ACLs) 
Access Control Lists are a mechanism to implement access control matrices [24]. 
Strictly speaking these cannot be classified as a security model. Instead, these can be 
more appropriately termed as mechanisms to implement permissions modeled by an 
access control matrix. Using a matrix directly has many drawbacks such as the size, 
space utilization, and poor scalability [44]. Access Control Lists have been used widely 
in the industry because of their conceptual simplicity. An Access Control List is defined 
as a collection of pairs including subjects and the rights they have over a specific object 
or a system resource. It also provides mechanisms to aggregate subjects and objects 
into groups. The space usage is effective in ACLs because there is no need to maintain 
all subject-object pairs. The specification of the rights of subjects over objects could be 
either positive rights (Grant) or negative rights (Deny). In other words, ACLs allow us to 
maintain both white lists (focus on grant of access) and black lists (focus on denial of 
access). This makes it possible to specify default rights, thus facilitating further 
reduction in the size of lists. ACLs have also been discussed in [45] where the authors 
propose new forms of access control beyond the discretionary and mandatory models. 
 
As Bykova discuses in [44], ACLs have several drawbacks because of the fact that they 
allow for aggregation and default permissions. Writing the rules could be error prone 
and also maintaining these rules from a change management viewpoint is tedious and 
challenging. This is because of the possibility of conflicts and unforeseen rules conflicts. 
  
39 
 
In spite of its drawbacks, they have been very popular as a security mechanism 
because using these lists one can specify a large variety of security rules in many 
different domains. They are widely used in operating systems and network security 
(firewalls). 
Role Based Access Control (RBAC) Models 
In the 1990s, these types of models began appearing in the security research 
community and enterprises have adapted variations of these models to implement their 
information security strategy [46]. While most of the early models focused on 
Discretionary Access Control and Mandatory Access Control, the RBAC model [47] 
gained wider attention in implementation of enterprise security. This is because of its 
inherent conceptual simplicity in modeling enterprise environments. The foundation of 
the RBAC model is the notion of a Role. A Role is characterized by a set of tasks and 
permissions are associated with Roles [48]. Users are assigned to Roles based on their 
responsibilities, thereby acquiring the corresponding permissions and access rights. 
Users can be reassigned to Roles which can be given new permissions or some of the 
assigned permissions revoked. As new applications are integrated into an enterprise 
system, new roles can be added, existing roles can be modified and user-to-role 
mapping may be modified. Conceptually, the RBAC model provided a foundation well 
suited for enterprise security management.  
Several variations of the RBAC model have been proposed in the literature, each one 
differs in how role hierarchies and constraints are handled. The model has been 
extended to include the notion of time, called Temporal Role Based Access Control 
(TRBAC) [49], Generalized Temporal Role Based Access Control (GTRBAC) [50]. 
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RBAC model’s acceptance and popularity in the industry can be gauged by the fact that 
it has been used to implement various access management solutions in a wide 
spectrum of industry domains such as the health care, financial, network administration, 
and many more. There is an entire conference, ACM workshop on Role Based Access 
Control, devoted to stimulating further research and applications of the RBAC model. 
Though the model is intuitively simpler, one of the disadvantages of implementing 
access management based on functional roles is the effort involved in configuration and 
change management of Roles [51]. In a typical enterprise, users belong to multiple 
hierarchies in an organization. It is not atypical to find more than 20 hierarchies in an 
organization. For example, in a large enterprise, employees can belong to a HR 
hierarchy, Sales hierarchy, Functional hierarchy etc. In such a context it becomes a 
complex administrative process to design, implement, and dynamically manage role 
based access control mechanisms.  
RBAC is very much an active area of research for the many benefits it provides in 
dealing with enterprise security. The section on collaboration security in this chapter will 
present further research on adapting RBAC model in the context of collaboration. 
Trust Based Models 
In the middle of 1990s Decentralized Trust Based Management systems began to 
appear in the security research community [52]. The principle behind these systems is 
the idea of negotiating trust between strangers. It relies on two concepts: security 
credentials, and security policy. An owner is authorized to access protected information 
object (granted trust) if the owner’s security credentials satisfy the security policies. The 
trust based security models research has spawned various branches of research and is 
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also being used in implementing security solutions in an enterprise. Automated trust 
negotiation is discussed in the papers by Winsborough in [53] and [54].  Li discusses 
the idea of discovering credentials in distributed systems for trust management [55]. 
Protecting credentials in trust negotiations is discussed in [53], and [56]. The idea of 
adaptive trust negotiation is presented in [57] in the context of electronic business 
transactions that often take place between entities that are strangers to one another, for 
example in online communities. In this scenario, establishing trust is more complex 
because participants belong to different security domains. As discussed in [57], trust 
management is a key issue in today’s environment of internet-enabled e-commerce. 
The web necessitates decentralized systems that span multiple domains, each one 
having its own set of security policies. Trust management is a framework for providing 
decentralized security related decisions. It brings the level of abstraction to the level 
where the focus is on why trust should be granted in contrast to immediately focusing 
on security mechanisms such as cryptography, Read | Write | Execute access etc. 
 
As discussed in [58], trust management is based on three basic elements: principles, 
principals, and policies. Principles focus on being certain about what privileges will be 
granted to a Principal who is trusted to take actions on some objects.  Principals are 1) 
people, 2) computers, and 3) organizations.  The decision to grant trust is justified by a 
sequence of assertions. All three types of principals stated above make assertions 
based on their particular identity lifetimes: people make assertions with broad scope, 
bound to their long-lived names; computers make narrow proofs of correct operation 
from their limited-scope addresses; and organizations make assertions about people 
and computers because they have the widest temporal and legal scope of all. 
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Credentials describe each kind of principal and its relationships, such as membership 
and delegation. Policies are rules about which assertions can be combined to yield 
permission. In essence, policies can grant authority based on the identity of the principal 
asking; the capability at issue; or an object already in hand. In other words, you might 
be trusted based on who you are, what you can do, or what you have. 
 
The next section presents some of the new directions in the security research and the 
associated models. The ideas and concepts presented in these models could be 
considered innovative though they are not in widespread use in the industry. 
 
3.2.3 New Directions in Security Paradigms and Models 
Trust based models are still a relatively young field and are under active development 
and therefore can certainly be included in this categorization. Nonetheless, the focus of 
this section is to present some of the other innovative research thoughts and techniques 
that are proposed to deal with the ever increasing complexity of computing 
environments and the associated security needs and security management. The 
professional organization, ACM, introduced the ACM New Security Paradigms 
Workshop in 1993. Since then, the security research community has been proposing 
numerous out-of-the-box thinking type security models, mechanisms, and frameworks 
to deal with security. The purpose of this section is to present several interesting 
aspects of this research without going into all the details.  
As stated earlier in the introduction, security requirements have evolved over time as 
the computing environment continued to advance and encompass different types of 
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people, processes, and organizations interconnected through the Internet and Intranet. 
The concept of a boundary has essentially become a moot point. In such a context the 
old security models and paradigms do not scale well. They were good and effective for 
the then intended applications: Military and Government. In today’s diverse 
environment, the old models do not scale and as Blakely [59] points out the lack of 
scalability of old models:  
 Policies do not scale well. They become more complex as systems increase in 
size and complexity, and policy management becomes a challenging task. 
 Achieving strong secrecy is difficult because it depends predominantly on 
people who are not good at keeping secrets in the first place. 
 Achieving system integrity is hard, expensive, and requires trade-offs. 
 
Some of the security research presented here could be considered as potential 
solutions to the growing security needs in the context of evolving computing paradigms 
driven by social networking revolution. The paper by Bykova [44] provides the basis for 
Figure 3.3 which captures the various strategies for addressing security and their 
discussion. 
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Figure 3-2: Security Strategies 
Security as an inherent property 
Application architects and designers are realizing that the right approach to ensuring 
application security is to make security an integral component of their development 
process. In other words, security is considered an inherent property of the system in 
contrast to imposing security after the application is developed. Smetters and Grinter      
[60] present numerous examples of making security transparent in the design of 
application. Several Identity Based Encryption mechanisms and tools follow this 
principle [61]. Some other ideas discussed in the literature on this topic are:  
 Increasing data size proportional to its value [59] 
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o This concept relies on the real life fact that most valuable items are very 
cumbersome and inconvenient to handle. For example, $1 million in the 
denomination of $20 bills is rather large, heavy, and cumbersome for one person 
to carry. Similarly, if we make the digital representation of sensitive data very large, 
then it is rather not very simple and easy to steal the data. 
 Unhelpfulness as a security mechanism 
o Nelson [62] introduces the concept of unhelpfulness as a security mechanism. The 
emphasis is on controlling the flow and rate of information released to a user as a 
way of managing security and ensuring compliance with the principle of least 
privilege. The information in an otherwise classified document or subject area is 
released intentionally slowly in a very unhelpful manner so as to dissuade the user 
from accessing. In essence, many levels of restrictions are placed to access more 
information.  
Security based on survivability 
This approach brings into its fold the notion of business risk into security management. 
Lipson and Fisher [63] proposed that enterprises look at security from the perspective of 
risk management as the goal of security is to protect assets. Enterprise risk 
management addresses protection of assets. These concepts of asset protection could 
be leveraged in addressing security as well. They define survivability from two 
viewpoints: 1) Technical, and 2) Business. The technical aspects of survivability deal 
with ensuring the continuity of services and information is available in spite of the 
accidental or non-accidental attacks and threats. The business aspects of survivability 
emphasize risk analysis and management. Specifically it focuses on the business 
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mission and objectives when quantifying the potential threats and risk to business. The 
goal of survivability model is to protect the most important business assets, its business 
mission, while having some level of tolerance toward failure of non-critical components 
of the business. 
Security based on economics 
The proponent of this approach is Blakely [59]. Blakely argued that security tied to 
monetary value is another effective security management tactic. In his paper, Blakely 
demonstrates this concept with an example from health care applications domain where 
one of the information assets is patients’ health records. The privacy of these records is 
tied to economics. When some user wants to access a patient’s records, some pre-
defined amount of money is transferred from the user’s account to the patient’s account. 
If the user is the same as the patient then the money is transferred from his account to 
his account. If the user happens to be the doctor reviewing the patient’s records then 
the amount he will charge the patient is the same amount of money that is transferred in 
the first place. In the case where the user who accessed a patient’s records is 
unauthorized to begin with, at least the patient has at least some monetary 
compensation. The basic idea of security based on economics is to take away 
something of value from the user and reverse it if the user is determined as legitimate.  
The other facet of economics based security is the scheme of incentives and punitive 
measures. This is a possible approach to thwart social engineering based attacks. Here, 
users are given some incentives so as not to deviate from intended behavior. These 
types of security mechanisms are further explored in areas such as making users 
cautious about their passwords and their protection [64]. 
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Security modeled after human immunology 
Researchers working on security have been studying how security defense 
mechanisms could be modeled much like the immune system of the human body. 
Somayaji and Hofmeyer [65] argue that natural immune system provide a rich source of 
inspiration for computer security in the age of internet because it exhibits properties like 
distributability, diversity, disposability, adaptability, autonomy, dynamic coverage, 
anomaly detection, multiple layers, identity via behavior, no trusted components, and 
imperfect detection. Jeff Williams [66] argues that from a security viewpoint, both 
computers and human exhibit many similarities in terms of architecture, interfaces and 
communication. The question that these researchers raised is: can computer security 
people learn from how an immune system comes into play to deal with any kind of 
sickness of the human body? The human immune system consists of numerous 
imperfect, unreliable, and open systems, much like the internet driven computing 
environments. Immune systems are not perfect either and they do make periodic 
mistakes. Similarly, the computer security people have come to the conclusion that 
security is not foolproof; it has its own imperfections and there is no such thing as 
perfect mechanisms and perfect security. The characteristics of the immune systems 
that show promise and potential in computer security are the following: 
 Multiple levels of protection 
o Just like in an immune system, an enterprise information security strategy 
should adopt multiple levels of protection to safeguard assets. This ensure 
defense in depth of the larger enterprise system. 
 Distributed Control 
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o The decision making process is decentralized much like the immune 
system. Security decisions are localized and each subsystem or node is 
responsible for specific security related tasks. 
 Diversity 
o Diversity of systems makes it harder for vulnerabilities to spread from one 
system to another because a known vulnerability in a system may not be 
present in another. Diversity could also be achieved by making the 
protection mechanisms unique. 
 Adaptability 
o The security system learns to detect new threats, as well as remembers 
previously detected threats and applies its knowledge to recognize these 
threats. Adaptability is a feature that we will address in our research as it 
forms one of the key components of dynamic security management based 
on self-organizing maps. 
 Disposability 
o The essence of this principle is that no system component is vital and that 
anything can be replaced just like how a cell is replaced in an immune 
system.  
 Autonomy 
o  The basic idea is to give a level of autonomy to individual components of a 
network to make their own security decisions. 
 No trusted components 
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o  This is also one of the guiding principles of software engineering 
programming principles. In essence, it implies that no object or system 
should be trusted and everything must be verified. 
 Identity via behavior 
o  In the immune system identity is also verified through behavior. 
Traditionally a user’s identity in a computing network is determined by 
possession of a secret key. By tying identity to user’s behavioral patterns, 
security could be enhanced, as the security management tool would protect 
against unusual user activity. For example, many credit card companies use 
this feature to enhance security and protect the consumer.  
Optimistic security 
Povey [67] argues that sometimes the static nature of authorization can cause 
unexpected risks for users working in a dynamically changing environment. This 
concept is very useful in dealing with mission critical systems such as natural disaster 
emergencies and hospital emergencies. In such situations, we have personnel who go 
beyond their normal duties in order to address unforeseen disasters and emergencies. 
Optimistic security model is built on the notion that it is valid to increase the privilege 
levels for information access dynamically in situations like the above. The other 
underlying assumption of this model is a user rarely attempts to access information that 
they are not privileged to have. It is argued that providing an optimistic scheme 
alongside a traditional access control mechanism can provide a useful means for users 
to exceed their normal privileges on the rare occasion that the situation warrants it. 
Strike Back security 
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In this approach, the emphasis is on aggressively targeting the enemy in contrast to the 
traditional defensive security strategies. When the system detects a cyber-attack, it 
should aggressively go after the attacker and try to identify the enemy’s center of 
operations and destroy it. This approach is discussed in [68] to deal with cyber security 
and the increasing importance of the viewpoint that such cyber-attacks are a threat to 
national security. In such a situation, just passive defense alone would not suffice a path 
of action should be taken to destroy the enemy. Honey Pots based security 
mechanisms could also be classified into this category [69]. A honey pot is a computer 
system on the Internet that is set up for the sole purpose of attracting and trapping 
people who attempt to penetrate other people's computer systems.  
Functional approach to security 
Nelson [70] argues that security issues are primarily addressed in the context of the 
application’s intended functionality and needs. Instead of trying to implement security 
solutions, based on generalized models or formal models, it is important to truly 
understand what a secret is in the application before the security mechanisms are 
defined. In other words, the application semantics and the associated data must drive 
the security decisions. Nelson makes the observation that security cannot be expressed 
accurately using only syntactic notation. A second observation that Nelson makes is 
that functional models that address security from application and data perspective 
capture the required behavior more accurately because they consider the semantics of 
the application. This approach essentially ties very well with best practices in application 
development where the requirements drive the design and development of a system. 
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The focus of the next section is Software Security, which is an emerging branch of 
security. It deals with the design and development of software systems keeping security 
in mind. The aim of software security field is to integrate security across the entire 
software development lifecycle [71]. The section presents an overview of the types of 
attacks and counter measures that are proposed to thwart such attacks.  Any enterprise 
security framework must integrate the software development process lifecycle into its 
overall security strategy because many of the security compromises that have been 
occurring recently and well publicized are the result of poor secure programming 
practices. 
3.2.4 Software Security: Attacks and Counter Measures 
Practitioners and Researchers have realized that the root cause for many security 
compromises lies in the fact that the software has been poorly designed to defend 
against malicious attacks. In spite of a security strategy that includes hardening the 
operating system (access control matrices), hardening the network (firewalls, intrusion 
detection etc.),  many security breaches continue to occur and they are traced to design 
and implementation flaws such as poor error handling design, hard coding secrets in 
code, not validating inputs for size, not documenting assumptions etc. Integrating 
security into the full development lifecycle has become such an important issue for 
practitioners that even large companies such as Cisco and Microsoft have instituted 
processes, methods, and tools in place to ensure that software security is addresses 
thoroughly right from the beginning in contrast to addressing it as an afterthought. 
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In the famous Microsoft memo by Bill Gates [72], he emphasizes the role of software 
security. In his words, software should be so fundamentally secure that customers do 
not even have to worry about it. He goes on to say, “when we face a choice between 
adding features and resolving security issues, we need to choose security.” It has 
become imperative that we design systems that continue to operate reliably even under 
the constant barrage of hacker attacks. Figure 3.3 depicts the code base of Windows 
(up to XP) since Windows NT was first released in the 1993. 
Year Operating System Lines of Code (million) 
1993 Windows NT 3.1 6 
1994 Windows NT 3.5 10 
1996 Windows NT 4.0 16 
2000 Windows 2000 29 
2002 Windows XP 40 
 
Figure 3-3: Windows lines of code  
(Source: [71]) 
The sheer size and complexity of the software makes it vulnerable to attacks. Many 
industry experts have claimed that there is a direct relationship between the number of 
lines of code and the number of bugs [71]. Figure 3.4 shows the critical vulnerabilities 
addressed by Microsoft. 
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Figure 3-4: Critical vulnerabilities addressed by Microsoft 
 (Source: McAfee Avert labs Blog, October 11, 2006) 
The number of critical vulnerabilities addressed by Microsoft in 2006 is greater than the 
sum total of vulnerabilities addressed in 2004 and 2005 (note: this research survey 
includes figures for the evolution up to Windows XP which is still the predominantly 
used Windows OS. Later versions such Windows 7 and 8 are still not widely 
implemented in enterprises) 
The attacks have evolved from simple password guessing in the 1980s to highly 
sophisticated attacks such as the Denial of Service, Cross Site Scripting, and Port 
Scanning. There are several ways to classify the attacks against software systems and 
in this section they are classified based on the classic CIA (Confidentiality, Integrity, and 
Availability) model of security [73].  
3.2.4.1 Software attacks 
Attacks against availability 
These types of attacks attempt to overload a system and its resources with the intention 
of either degrading their responsiveness or making them unavailable for a certain time. 
An example in this category is the Denial of Service (DOS) attacks. A DOS attack is an 
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explicit attempt by a malicious hacker to prevent legitimate users from accessing 
system services or cause severe delays in time-critical operations. PING flood or Sync 
flood attacks are examples of DOS attacks.  
Attacks against confidentiality 
The aim of these attacks is to expose the contents of communication, or leak 
sensitive/confidential information of a system. Network sniffing which lets an attacker 
listen to computer conversations with the help of protocol analyzers is an example of 
such an attack. Data aggregation attack that allows an attacker to deduce classified 
information from unclassified information is an attack against confidentiality. For 
example, a malicious hacker could determine the salary of an employee in a group by 
looking into information like the group’s expenditure before and after hiring the 
employee. Attackers could also indulge in password sniffing to gain unauthorized 
access to a system masquerading as a legitimate user and steal/modify sensitive data. 
Attacks against integrity 
These types of attacks attempt to maliciously modify communication contents and/or 
data. Man-in-the-Middle attacks are an example in this category. The attacker reads 
and modifies messages between a sender and a receiver without letting either one 
know that they have been attacked. Web site defacing and hijacking are examples of 
this category. 
 
In general, attacks against systems impact multiple security objectives. For example, 
the payload for Virus attacks targets both confidentiality and system integrity. These 
payloads can destroy files, reformat hard drive or just degrade performance by 
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consuming storage space and memory. Unauthorized access attacks where an attacker 
is able to bypass a weak or ill-designed authorization procedure could impact 
confidentiality as well as integrity. 
3.2.4.2 Countermeasures 
Practitioners and Researchers have been designing and developing a variety of 
countermeasures to deal with the above-mentioned software attacks. These measures 
increase the security level of software systems. Usually, countermeasures are designed 
such that they protect against many different type of attacks. These countermeasures 
span the spectrum of computing environment and address issues at physical layer, 
network layer, operating systems layer, database system layer, and application layer. 
Some of the categories of countermeasures include the following: 
Authentication 
As a countermeasure, authentication plays an important role toward meeting security 
objectives. This is a process where one object proves its identity to another object. 
There are two types of authentication that are relevant in a distributed computing 
environment [74]. 
o User-Computer Authentication 
Authentication accomplished through a combination of techniques like 
passwords, cryptographic tokens, smart cards, or any biometric features such 
as face scanning or fingerprints.  
o Authentication in Distributed Computing Environment 
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Authentication occurs at multiple places as the user’s request is processed at 
several machines in the network.  
Access Control 
This refers to the set of mechanisms that allows managers of a system to set 
parameters, confidentiality restrictions over the behaviors, usage and data content in a 
system. They can specify what users can do (capabilities), which resources they have 
access to, and what operations they can perform. Access control has also been called 
Authorization. This is an important facet of software security. A correctly designed 
access control may help in prevention of attacks such as unauthorized access attacks. 
Note that access control requires authentication as a prerequisite. When implementing 
access control management solutions, enterprises first have to define access control 
policies that provide general guidelines about how access is controlled and how access 
decisions are determined. There are three commonly discussed access control policies: 
1) Mandatory Access Control, 2) Discretionary Access Control, and 3) Role Based 
Access Control. A complete explanation of these policies can be found in [37]. 
Numerous mechanisms exist that implement access control policies. These include 
access control lists, capabilities, and authorization tables [27]. The access control 
mechanisms facilitate enforcement of security objectives such as availability, integrity, 
and confidentiality by limiting access. 
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3.2.5 Most Recent Phase: Social Networking and Cloud Computing Security 
The most recent trend in computing evolution is the rapid adoption of social networking, 
as witnessed by the rapid growth of companies like Facebook, and Twitter. The other 
trend is the adoption of cloud based service offerings by companies such as Salesforce 
and Dropbox. Smart phones and mobile applications continue to evolve too. Security 
continues to be addressed in these areas. This section presents some of the most 
recent research in social network and cloud computing security. 
Social Networking Security 
Gao et. al. presents a survey of security issues and available defense mechanisms in 
online social networks in [75]. They categorize the possible attacks in social networks 
into 1) privacy breaches, 2) viral marketing, 3) network structural attacks, and 4) 
malware. As the authors discuss, there is significant personal information shared by 
users in social networks including their pictures, birth dates, addresses, and phone 
numbers. This makes it possible for a privacy breach attack because the service 
providers have access to this information and they in turn could use such data to 
provide value to their advertisers. The paper suggests the use of user-defined and 
controlled policies in order to mitigate the leakage of private information. The defense 
mechanisms include encryption of data and its storage location. The authors present 
discussion on other categories of attacks as well.  
Chris Rose [76] argues that massive over sharing of information in social networks 
combined with the prevalence of location based information poses greater security risks 
because the aggregation of all available data will lead to unintended consequences to 
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users. For example, both Google maps, and Twitter have a feature that when enabled, 
makes the users’ location available when they post data to social networks. This in turn 
may lead to unintended consequences such as, for example, letting others know that 
one is not at home etc.  
To deal with security issues concerned with social networking, instead of a centralized 
application based approach to social networking, a prototype of a decentralized, open, 
and trustworthy social networking architecture, called PrPl ( short for Private-Public),  is 
discussed in [77]. PrPl gives the users the ability to keep their data in different 
administrative domains but makes it possible to interact with each other. Users have a 
choice and flexibility in services that offer different levels of performance and privacy. 
For example, the users could store data in personal servers at home, keep it in the 
cloud based data hosting service provider, or host in a free ad-supported portals. The 
prototype system  provides open APIs for building distributed applications across 
multiple administrative domains to perform queries and access shared data. 
 
A new perspective on reasoning about security risks in social networking is discussed in 
[78]. In the paper the authors argue that when a user accepts a new friend in a social 
network site, the user should ensure that the new friend is not an increased security risk 
to the entire friend network. The paper discusses different levels of indices to assess 
vulnerabilities of new friends that guide security based decisions. Each user in a social 
network has individual as well community based settings. The authors argue that 
evaluation of these settings guide a user in assessing the vulnerabilities of their friend. 
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Michael Backes et. al. [79] discuss a cryptographic framework to achieve access 
control, privacy of social relations, secrecy of resources, and anonymity of users in 
social networks. They argue that privacy as well as anonymity are important factors for 
social network security. Esma Aïmeur et. al. [80] identify and discuss three privacy risks 
in managing social network security. These risks are categorized as 1) security risks, 2) 
reputation and credibility risks, and 3) profiling risks. Security risks encompass identity 
theft, phishing, scam, predator and other cybercrimes. Reputation is the social 
evaluation of public of a person or an entity. If reputation is damaged it impacts the 
credibility of a user or an organization. Profiling is the recording and classification of 
behaviors. 
 
The research investigation clearly shows that security in terms of access control, 
privacy, etc. continues to be addressed in the context of social networking. This subject 
area is an active area of research from the perspective of engineering, technology, 
management, economics, and social sciences. Another aspect of technology evolution 
is the concept of cloud based service offerings. The next section presents a brief review 
of security literature in cloud computing. 
Cloud Computing Security  
Cloud computing is a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network 
access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, 
storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with 
minimal management effort or service provider interaction [81]. The essential 
characteristics of cloud computing are: 1) on-demand self-service, 2) resource pooling, 
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3) broad network access, 4) rapid elasticity, and 5) measured service in terms of 
metering the usage. In the cloud, there are three service models: 1) software as a 
service (SaaS), and 2) platform as a service (PaaS), and 3) Infrastructure as a service 
(IaaS). Finally, a cloud computing environment can be deployed as 1) private, 2) 
community, 3) public, and 4) hybrid.  
Brian Hay [82] discusses the security challenges in the context of providing 
infrastructure as a service in which units of computations are allocated as virtual 
machines (VMs) and users access these resources over a wide area network. The new 
critical parameter in this context is the changing perimeter that extends beyond the the 
traditional enterprise boundaries and that which is controlled by external entities and 
users. The security concerns are how to protect the data in transit and in cloud storage, 
and how to ensure that resources are protected from the service providers. A primary 
technical challenge is the level of trust accorded to the resource provider. It becomes 
important to define the levels of operational trusts and to use these levels to perform 
risk assessments. The author discusses the notions of encrypted communication 
channels, computation on encrypted data etc. to address security risks. 
Wayne Jansen presents guidelines in security and privacy in public cloud computing 
[83]. The report discusses key security issues in governance, compliance, trust, 
architecture, identity and access management, data protection and incidence response.  
A security management framework for collaboration based cloud computing is 
discussed in [84]. The paper introduces an approach that tackles loss of trust and 
security control by enabling cloud consumers (CCs) to extend their security 
management practice (SMP) on their cloud hosted assets. In [85], the author discusses 
  
61 
 
cloud computing security in terms of possible network attacks. These include distributed 
denial of service (DDOS), man in the middle, network sniffing, and SQL-injection 
attacks. In [86], the authors discuss the notion of trust in cloud computing security. From 
the traditional viewpoint of perimeter security, the cloud appears outside the trust 
borderline of an organization. If this is viewed with suspicion then it adversely leads to 
not trusting essential business services available in the cloud. This paper discusses the 
use of a Trusted Third Party within a cloud environment by enabling trust and using 
cryptography to ensure the confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of data and 
communications, while attempting to address specific security vulnerabilities. A detailed 
analysis of cloud computing security issues and challenges is presented in [87]. The 
authors discuss the seven security issues that must be addressed in switching to cloud 
computing model: 1) privileged user access, 2) regulatory compliance, 3) data location, 
4) data segregation, 5) recovery, 6) investigative support, and 7) long term viability. 
 
New computing paradigms lead to new ways of working and collaboration which in turn 
necessitate new models of access management. As a result, access control 
management continues to be an active area of research as witnessed by the continuing 
publication of research papers and call for more papers by a variety of conferences that 
focus on addressing security and privacy. The next section presents a survey of access 
control management research from the perspective of collaboration characterized by the 
evolving nature of computing paradigm driven by web 2.0 technologies, social 
networking paradigms etc. 
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3.3 Collaboration Security 
Collaboration is the act of working with another or others jointly on a project. From a 
business perspective, collaboration is the act of working together to achieve a business 
objective. A working definition of collaboration as presented in [88] is: 
“Collaboration is a mutually beneficial and well-defined relationship entered into by two or more 
organizations to achieve common goals. 
The relationship includes a commitment to: a definition of mutual relationship and goals; a jointly 
developed structure and shared responsibility; mutual authority and accountability for success; 
and sharing of resources and rewards.” 
It has evolved from collaboration in the small to collaboration in the large [89]. The small 
vs. large perspective could encompass, people, departmental and organizational 
boundaries within an enterprise or inter-enterprise and massive collaboration on the 
internet in cases such as the open systems development where thousands of 
developers are working on a project. Collaboration has security implications because 
many people, processes, and organizations work together and share numerous artifacts 
and resources. It is self-evident that not everyone needs access to every resource or 
artifact. In addition, there is information that is business sensitive and there must be 
some mechanism of managing access to sensitive information.  So, in essence 
Collaboration security becomes pertinent and has access control management 
implications.  
 
Collaboration security has evolved in step with the changing computing paradigms. The 
simple access control matrices [34] evolved into Role Based access control methods in 
the 1990s [37] reflecting the new ways of inter-organizational interactions. Advances in 
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technology further expanded the scope of collaboration to inter-enterprise as well as 
open systems collaboration on the internet. Collaboration security in the context of 
healthcare is discussed in [90]. In a hospital, patient information must be shared among 
a variety of physicians, nurses, insurance administrators etc. They give an example of a 
medical record of a patient that may contain information about HIV but should not be 
shared with the cardiologist treating the patient. They discuss the role of a “security 
mediator” which monitors the access control in such a collaborative environment. This 
mediator implements the policies set by the enterprise. The use of certificates in f 
distributed management of access rights is presented in [91]. Every resource has 
designated stake holders who impose what is known as “use conditions” on the 
resource. All the use conditions must be met in order to satisfy the requirements for 
access. A policy engine matches the attributes of a user requesting access to a 
resource to the use conditions associated with the resource. Only when all use 
conditions are matched, access is granted.  
 
Caralli and Young [92] discuss a viewpoint that emphasizes process improvement 
approach to secure collaboration. They argue that the new operational environment 
consisting of distributed workforce, heightened threat level, increasing criticality of data 
security and privacy dictate that security must be viewed as an operational risk 
management activity that serves two purposes: 1) prevent disruption to core business 
drivers, and 2) sustain the survivability of the organization’s mission.  
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Pearlman [93] discusses a community based authorization in group collaboration. The 
premise is that organizations have highly controlled sharing rules. The set of individuals 
and /or institutions defined by such sharing rules form a virtual organization (VO). 
Infrastructures that support the creation and operation of these VOs are called Grids. In 
the context of these Grids, how to specify community policies remains a challenge. The 
authors argue that instead of specifying these policies statically which poses an 
administration challenge, resource owners should instead grant access to blocks of 
resources that they own to the community as a whole, and let the community manage 
the fine grained access controls within that framework.   
 
Olmedilla [94] presents a discussion on security and trust in semantic grids that allow 
for sharing of services and resources across institutions. It is argued that existing 
authentication and authorization mechanisms are rigid and they do not have the ability 
to determine how trustworthy the results obtained from a specific provider are likely to 
be. The trust aspects of collaboration are reflected in three questions: 1) Do I (the 
recipient of service) believe what Provider A says is true and factual? 2) Do I agree with 
the answer that is provided by a Provider or Group? 3) Do I believe that the goals 
and/or priorities of a provider/group match mine? The paper also presents related work 
in policy based and reputation based trust management. In policy based trust 
management, the access control decisions are based on specification of detailed rules 
and reasoning based on rules for trust management. The reputation based trust models 
are used in e-commerce type environments (example: eBay, Amazon) and are gaining 
acceptance in ad hoc and mobile networks. The key aspect of the reputation trust model 
is how to model and compute trust.  
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A survey on trust in computer science and semantic web is presented in [95]. In this 
paper, it is noted that trust is an essential trait of interaction and it entails uncertainty 
and risk of negative consequence. In computer science, trust is a widely used term with 
many different definitions given by researchers in different areas. The semantic web 
vision, as formulated by Berners-Lee [96] included the notion of trust. As discussed in 
the paper [95] trust has another important role in the Semantic Web, as agents and 
automated reasoners need to make trust judgments when alternative sources of 
information are available. Computers will have the challenge to make judgments in light 
of the varying quality and truth that these diverse “open” (unedited, uncensored) 
sources offer. The reader is referred to this paper for a detailed overview of trust in 
semantic web. 
As discussed in [10], in scientific collaboration, resource sharing tends to be dynamic 
and often ad hoc which necessitates comprehensive and flexible approaches to cope 
with access control requirements for ad hoc collaboration. The scenario discussed is 
that of digital information sharing. In order to share, originators publish their original 
resource in the collaborative community. Resource discovery leads a collaborator to 
become aware of the availability of the resource. The collaborator must request to share 
the resource through resource acquisition. The originator sends a copy of the digital 
resource to the requester and fulfills the initial resource dissemination. With the consent 
of the resource owner, the resource recipient may further re-disseminate the pre-
obtained resource copy to others. The author states that in a collaborative sharing 
environment, all participants and their capabilities should be clearly defined, and all 
sharing behaviors should be highly regulated. In order to manage the complexity 
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involved in dealing with many individual users in a collaborative environment, the paper 
proposes a role based framework to address distributed access control, delegation, and 
dissemination control involved in resource sharing. 
 
In [97], the authors discuss access control aspects in enterprise system based on 
organization models. In today’s enterprises, there is increasing number of collaborative 
processes which necessitates complex security policies within the confines of 
organization structure. Thy dynamicity of continually evolving software and collaborative 
processes dictate that organization structures are capable of quickly adapting to 
changes. In this context, the authors propose adding a fifth requirement to the original 
list of four basic requirements that a system should have, proposed by Ellis [98], when 
an accesses control subsystem is to be implemented: 
 
1. The mechanism should be simple. 
2. The mechanism must be unobtrusive to users. It should be naturally integrated with the rest 
of the system. The system modeling should not increase the complexity of the modeling 
elements. 
3. At any moment in the system’s life, it should be easy to check authorization for any system 
resource access. 
4. The effects that access control causes on the rest of the system should be clear and easy 
to understand. 
5. Integration of security elements in the models that are used to describe system 
functionalities 
 
The paper [97] shows how the dynamic aspects of collaborative systems are 
represented and further shows the adaptability of role based access control model in 
their system. 
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In [9], collaborative access control is discussed in the context of growth in enterprise 
networks where teams span geographies and are located at multiple sites across the 
world.  They discuss three collaborative access control models: 1) Editing model, 2) 
Space model, and 3) Role based model. In the editing model, users interact with a 
collaborative application by concurrently editing its data structures. In the space model, 
the large collaborative environment is divided into small regions that are manageable. 
Using the concepts of boundaries and access graphs, access control is managed within 
a region and when crossing boundaries. In the role based access control, a user is 
given the access control permissions based on the responsibilities associated with the 
role. In [99], the criteria for evaluating various access control models of collaboration are 
discussed. These criteria include: complexity of the access control model, 
understandability, ease of use, and support for collaboration. An access control 
mechanism based on trust and social networks is discussed in [100]. The paper 
discusses the concepts of fingerprints in the context of e-professionals working remotely 
and collaborating with their peers. Finger prints essentially represent the actions of the 
e-professionals In the process of their work and collaboration. These finger prints 
provide the necessary clues to extract their social network information. Combining these 
with contextual information and trust may yield insights to access control policies.  
 
There is active research on access control mechanisms in the context of cloud 
computing and collaboration as discussed in [101]. In the paper, a case is made that the 
emergence of grid and cloud computing has introduced new security concepts. As a 
result new access control approaches are required. The author proposes a four layer 
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abstract categorization of a grid for defining access control requirements. The paper 
presents an argument that the existing grid solutions do not have a standard 
categorization and that makes it difficult to clearly capture access control requirements. 
 
This section has provided insights into active areas of research to address security and 
trust issues in semantic web, grid computing based organizations, and in general the 
domain of dynamic collaboration where people and organizations are geographically 
dispersed, often assembled together in an ad hoc manner to work on a project, and 
once it is complete disperse. Some of the additional relevant research in access 
management with emphasis on dynamic collaboration, social networking, and security 
management standards can be found in [102], [103], [104], [105], [106], [107], and 
[108]. This research will adapt the appropriate ideas presented in these domains of 
knowledge while formulating an access control management solution in inter-enterprise 
collaboration in the context of onboarding. The next section focuses briefly on the 
concepts of self-organization whose principles and ideas have applicability to this 
research. 
3.4 Self-Organization  
Self-organization is defined as the “Ability of a system to spontaneously arrange its 
components or elements in a purposeful (non-random) manner, under appropriate 
conditions but without the help of an external agency” [109]. It is as if the system knows 
how to 'do its own thing. Examples in natural sciences include planets and galaxies, 
cells and organisms in human body. In [110], the authors discuss the necessary 
conditions under which a system could be called self-organizing. They use the concepts 
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of “entropy” from thermodynamics, the role of the observer, and the property of 
“emergence” to describe the characteristics of self-organizing systems. 
 
Self-organization has been applied in the design and implementation of access 
management solutions in ad hoc networks [111].  The paper presents a self-organized 
mechanism to control user access in ad hoc networks without requiring any 
infrastructure or a central administration entity. Node level access management using 
the concepts of self-organization and trust models is discussed in [112].  In the context 
of huge amounts of distributed data in pervasive computing, a self-organized multi 
agent approach for distributed data management is proposed in [113]. Other research 
papers in using the concepts of self-organization in distributed systems and networks 
include [114], [115], and [116].  
 
A self-organized system design methodology is discussed in [117]. The methodology 
consists of five stages to design and develop complex systems: 1) representation – 
specification of the complex system in terms of components, 2) modeling – specification 
of adaptive control mechanisms to ensure that system does what it is supposed to do 
based on requirements 3) simulation - simulate the model to test different scenarios and 
mediator/adaption strategies, 4) application – develop and implement the system, and 
5) evaluation – evaluate the system from the viewpoint of performance, functionality 
improvements etc. These steps are not sequential but iterative with feedback between 
the stages. A bio-inspired P2P (Peer-to-Peer) framework for self-organizing distributed 
systems is discussed in the context of cloud computing in [118]. It presents a discussion 
on the relationship between peers and the resources through mechanisms based on a 
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set of binary keys and a ring topology through which peers are connected. The 
principles of self-organization are explored in the classic paper by Ashby [119] where 
the author discusses the concepts of organization which includes conditionality between 
the components, the role of an observer in viewing a system as organized or not, and 
the role of learning and feedback in self-organizing systems. 
 
The survey on self-organizing systems shows that it has been adapted in domains such 
as distributed networks and collaboration contexts. This research aims to investigate 
this concept further in the context of inter-enterprise collaboration security in 
onboarding. 
3.5 Information Security Standards 
Standards play an important role in all domains. They enable good practices, 
streamlined processes, manageability, accountability, governance etc. There are 
standards for implementing software quality, software development processes, health 
care, accounting etc. Likewise information security is an area where there are 
standards. The first and foremost goal of information security is to protect information 
assets. The security standards include the ISO27K [120]  standards and NIST 
standards [121]. There are many other non-ISO security standards such as the payment 
card industry (PCI) security standard council which defines standards for enhancing 
payment card data security. The ISO27K standards are used to plan, implement, certify 
and operate an information security management system. They also attempt to define 
the information security related terms and give a comprehensive vocabulary. An 
updated version of ISO27K security glossary was release at the end of 2012 [120] .  
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The standards address several aspects of information security. They encompass 
software development lifecycle and Quality Assurance, systems lifecycle processes, 
OSI reference model, security frameworks, security management etc. The security 
aspects addressed include authentication, access control, non-repudiation, integrity, 
confidentiality, audit trails etc. In addition there are many aspects of network security 
addressed by these standards. An important aspect of security addressed is the cyber 
security framework by the NIST organization to reduce cyber risks to critical 
infrastructure. It consists of standards, guidelines, and best practices to protect critical 
infrastructure. A draft outline of cyber security framework was release by NIST on July 
1, 2013 [122]. Other security standards are defined by organizations such as ANSI, 
British Standards Institute, COBIT, GAISP etc.  
There are in essence a plethora of security standards. From the perspective of this 
research endeavor, the purpose is not to define an overall security standard. Instead, it 
is to study one aspect of security, access control management, in onboarding 
acquisitions. The results of this work may in the future be incorporated in the existing 
security standards to address mergers and acquisitions. 
3.6 Summary 
This literature review summarized the evolution of access control management 
beginning with the first models like the access matrices, access control lists etc., 
progressing to role based access control, and then to innovations like security based on 
immunology, honey pots, economics etc. The evolution of computing paradigms, 
technology innovation, and the advent of internet and web 2.0 brought about different 
models of computation like the grid computing and the associated collaboration 
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frameworks. These advances triggered new ideas and thoughts in collaboration security 
and access control models evolved to those based on statically defined policies 
integrated with dynamically determined access driven by features like digital certificates, 
risk management, reputation based trust, authorization delegation, self-organization etc. 
In the context of this research, a literature review of information security and access 
management from a historical perspective was published in [123]. 
The following observations relevant to this research are made from this review: 
1. The security research field is still an active area of interest, not only to 
governments, military and commercial institutions, but also to the common user 
whose computer is connected to the ubiquitous internet based computing 
environment, where every computer is a potentially vulnerable target. 
2. There is no universally accepted security reference model and framework. 
3. Access Control Management continues to evolve with changing technology 
paradigms such as cloud and grid computing, and changing collaboration 
paradigms like ad hoc networks, mobile computing. peer-to-peer networking. 
4. Role based access control continues to evolve to address new collaboration 
processes and infrastructures. 
5. A combination of organization defined policies and community based trust 
management is integral to dealing with access control management in 
collaboration environments spanning both intra-enterprise and inter-enterprise. 
6. Change management is not necessarily addressed as integral to new access 
control management models. 
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7. Access control management in inter-enterprise collaboration in the context of 
onboarding is not directly addressed 
 
The current research efforts are positively influencing how access control management 
is addressed in the current work environment. This research focuses on access control 
management in inter-enterprise collaboration in the context of onboarding when a 
company acquires another company. The insights from the literature review like the 
needs for having a well-defined set of security requirements, the concepts of dynamic 
collaboration in computing, trust management, and self-organized systems will 
positively impact this research. The expected outcomes include an access control 
management model for secure collaboration in boarding along with addressing change 
management issues. 
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4 Research Methodology and Research Design 
“Research is formalized curiosity. It is poking and prying with a purpose.” 
 -- Zora Neale Hurston 
4.1 Introduction 
Research is about seeking truth. It is a process of using a variety of methods, tools and 
techniques to discover new truths and relationships in the world we live in through 
advanced study. These new truths and relationships further influence how decisions are 
made to further the goals of an individual, a company, a community, an organization, a 
country, and the whole world. Research denotes a careful, systematic, insightful, and 
patient study and investigation in some field of knowledge, undertaken to establish facts 
or principles. Often, it is a structured enquiry that utilizes well accepted scientific 
methodology to solve problems and create new knowledge that is generally applicable 
and useful to solve a variety of problems in the world.  
 
This research specifically is seeking the truth about access control management in 
inter-enterprise collaboration in the context of mergers and acquisitions where a 
company acquires another company. The process of integrating and assimilating the 
acquired company is called onboarding. This is a problem of great interest in today’s 
business environment where mergers and acquisitions are common place for numerous 
reasons as discussed in Chapter 2 on onboarding. This problem is amenable to further 
scientific enquiry because of several reasons: 1) the business models of collaboration 
continue to evolve; 2) current access control management solutions do not adequately 
address the problem of collaboration security; 3) technology innovation is influencing 
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new computing paradigms; and 4) inter-enterprise collaboration security in the context 
of on boarding is not comprehensively explored. 
This chapter focuses on the research methodology and design adopted for investigating 
access control management in inter-enterprise collaboration in the context of 
onboarding. First, Section 1 presents a philosophical overview of research 
methodologies in scientific studies. This will provide a perspective on the type of 
research that is undertaken and the rationale for selecting the methods to explore this 
research further to arrive at the truth. Second, in Section 2, the details of the research 
methodology that is adopted for this research is discussed. The section also discusses 
how the methods adopted facilitate insights into the research problem that this research 
is attempting to address. Third, in Section 3, details of the research design are 
presented. Research design is the conceptual structure within which research would be 
conducted. In the context of this research, it includes the steps that will be undertaken 
to design the appropriate techniques to collect data from a variety of sources, analyze 
the data, propose a model, validate the model, and further refine the model. 
 
The terms: methodologies, methods, and techniques are prevalent in the scientific 
literature. Though these terms are sometimes used interchangeably, it is important to 
clarify these terms in the context of research.  
Methodology 
A set or system of methods, principles, and rules for 
regulating a given discipline, as in the arts or sciences [124] 
 
A system of broad principles or rules from which specific methods or procedures may be 
derived to interpret or solve different problems within the scope of a particular discipline 
[125] 
 
A system of ways of doing, teaching, or studying something [126]  
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Method 
An established, habitual, logical, or prescribed practice or systematic process of 
achieving certain ends with accuracy and efficiency, usually in an ordered sequence of 
fixed steps [127] 
A procedure, technique, or way of doing something, 
especially in accordance with a definite plan [128] 
 
A particular way of doing something [129] 
 
Technique 
A way of doing an activity that needs skill [130] 
The body of specialized procedures and methods used 
in any specific field, especially in an area of applied science [131] 
A systematic procedure, formula, or routine by which a task is accomplished [132] 
 
Figure 4.1 captures the relationship between methodologies, methods, and techniques.  
 
 
 
The terms research methodology and research methods are clarified next. 
Research Methodology 
The process used to collect information and data for the purpose of making business decisions. 
The methodology may include publication research, interviews, surveys and other research 
techniques, and could include both present and historical information [133] 
“A systematic way to solve a problem. It is a science of studying how research is to be carried 
out. Essentially, the procedures by which researchers go about their work of describing, 
explaining and predicting phenomena are called research methodology. It is also deﬁned as the 
study of methods by which knowledge is gained. Its aim is to give the work plan of research.” 
[134] 
Research Method 
Methods Methodologies Techniques 
Figure 4-1: Association between methodology, method, and technique 
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“Procedures, schemes, tools, and techniques used for various activities in the process of 
conducting research. They include theoretical procedures, experimental studies, numerical 
schemes, statistical approaches, etc. Research methods help us collect samples, data and ﬁnd a 
solution to a problem.” [134] 
 
It could be observed that from the perspective of research, the research methodology is 
a collection of steps taken and specific methods used to arrive at a solution.  
The term Research itself is defined in many ways [135]. The common theme that runs 
across these definitions is that research is a systematic quest for undiscovered 
knowledge. It is usually planned, organized, and has a specific goal. However, as the 
author states, in the strictest sense research can be pursued for the sake of knowledge 
without a specific goal or a problem to solve. A classic example of this type of research 
is exemplified by the work of Marie Curie whose research focused on studying the 
phenomenon of radioactivity. Irrespective of the type of research endeavor (goal 
oriented, problem solving etc.) the essential aspects of the research undertaking include 
observations, theorization, experiments, research surveys, arriving at new conclusions 
and results, reporting, and sharing knowledge. Research is classified and differentiated 
in many ways in the literature. Figure 4.2 shows a snapshot of types of research 
discussed in the literature [136].  
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Figure 4-2: Types of research 
 
Table 4.1 describes the essential characteristics of these types of research. The table 
includes two additional research types: mixed methods, and pragmatic in addition to the 
generally known research types shown in Figure 4.2.  
Table 4-1: Characteristics of research types 
Research Type Characteristics Comments 
Basic 
Improve knowledge generally 
without any application in 
mind [137].  
Basic research  can be 
quantitative and/or qualitative 
Natural Sciences research in 
the last few centuries 
exemplifies this type of 
research 
 
Applied 
Designed from the start to 
apply its findings to a 
particular situation [137].  
Applied research  can be 
quantitative and/or qualitative 
Study of applications of 
uranium to make atom bomb 
in 1945 is an example. Most 
research studies in computer 
science and engineering 
exemplify this approach 
Quantitative 
The emphasis is on 
observing, collecting and 
analyzing numerical data 
[138]; it concentrates on 
measuring the scale, range, 
frequency etc. of phenomena 
Also known as traditional, 
positivist, experimental, or 
empiricist [139]. Use 
statistical analysis tools for 
large quantities of data. 
Research 
Basic 
Applied 
Descriptive 
Analytical 
Quantitative 
Qualtitative 
Conceptual 
Empirical 
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[137]. 
Classified further into: 
inferential, experimental, and 
simulation 
Qualitative 
Subjective in nature than 
quantitative research and 
involves examining and 
reflecting on the less tangible 
aspects of a research subject, 
e.g. values, attitudes, 
perceptions [137]; collects 
non-numerical data; 
Collection and analysis of 
textual data like surveys, 
interviews, focus groups etc. 
[140]. 
Also known as 
phenomenological, 
subjectivist, humanistic, or 
interpretative [139]  
Often combined with 
quantitative analysis in terms 
of data collection and 
analysis. 
Descriptive 
Fact finding inquiries and 
surveys of what is and what 
has happened; describes a 
phenomenon; researcher has 
no control over variables as in 
analytical [136]; relies on 
researcher’s observation as a 
way to gather/collect data 
[141]. 
Also known as Ex post facto 
research in business and 
social science research [136].  
Quantitative techniques are 
most often used to collect and 
analyze the data for reporting. 
Analytical 
Critical thinking to find out 
facts about a given topic. 
After evaluation of facts, the 
answers drive the activities of 
proposing new ways of 
addressing the topic. Facts 
and data drive critical 
evaluation [136];  
Clearly defined topic helps in 
analytical research. 
Involves exploration and 
evaluation. 
 
Conceptual 
Related to abstract ideas or 
theory. Used to develop new 
concepts or re-interpret 
existing ideas [136].  
Often used by formal thinkers 
and philosophers. 
Focuses on developing a 
theory to explain behaviors 
and phenomena 
Empirical 
Emphasis is on observation 
and experience of researcher.  
Data gathered to set up 
hypothesis and conduct 
experiment [136] 
Useful in contexts where it 
has to be shown that 
controlling some variable 
leads to meeting certain 
objectives 
Mixed Methods 
Combination of approaches 
including quantitative and 
qualitative approaches [142] 
Most of today’s research is 
based on mixed methods 
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Pragmatic 
Focus is on “what” and “how 
to” research based on desired 
consequences [139].  
Individual researchers are 
free to choose the methods, 
techniques, and procedures 
of research that best meet 
their needs and purpose [139] 
 
Pragmatism justifies the 
methodology of using a 
combination of research 
methods as exemplified by 
mixed methods.  
Implies different forms of data 
collection and analysis 
 
The subject area of research types, methodologies and techniques is an active research 
in itself. The notions of ontology, epistemology, axiology, rhetoric, and methodology are 
considered in discussing the many ways of understanding and classifying research 
paradigms and the associated methodologies. Detailed insight into these topics are 
covered in [139], and [141].  The next section details of the research methodology 
adopted for this research. 
 
4.2 Adopted Research Methodology 
In order to put the adopted research methodology in perspective, the relevant aspects 
of this research are presented. First, the researcher’s background is presented. Second, 
the characteristics of the problem are discussed. Third, the research objectives and the 
research questions are discussed. These will provide insights into the appropriate 
research methodologies selected to further enable this research. 
 
4.2.1  Researcher’s Background 
One of the factors in choosing the research methodology was influenced by the 
experience of the researcher in the chosen subject area. Both analytical and pragmatic 
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research methodologies imply this characteristic. The industry background of the 
researcher is in the fields of information security, change management, Mergers & 
Acquisitions (M &A) onboarding, and product and application development including IT 
integration. The experience includes analysis, design, and development of role based 
access control systems for financial reporting, facilitating partner onboarding integration 
activities in the context of M&A, development and knowledge sharing in integrating 
software security across product development lifecycle and facilitating collaboration 
activities in the context of implementing enterprise solutions. This firsthand experience 
provides practical insights into numerous aspects of collaboration processes and 
access control management. Additionally, the experience suggests that there is 
potential for further investigation to improve the access control management in inter-
enterprise collaboration. 
 
4.2.2  Characteristics of the problem 
The context of this research is Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) and more specifically it 
is onboarding acquired companies. In M&As, when a company acquires another 
company, there is inter-enterprise collaboration between the companies involved. The 
nature of collaboration in the context of acquisitions is such that the people who come 
together to manage the acquisition and onboarding come from different functional units, 
different organizations, and they have different processes, methods, and tools that they 
use. Figure 4.3 depicts inter-enterprise collaboration in onboarding acquired companies. 
The figure illustrates the following:  
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1. There are different functional groups in the acquiring as well as the acquired 
company, depicted as circles with the names like HR, IT etc. 
2. In each of these companies; there is collaboration between the groups 
through their own collaboration space that may include many different types 
of collaboration processes, methods and tools. This is depicted by the double 
arrows going from the circle to the collaboration cloud. 
3. In the process of onboarding there is inter-enterprise collaboration among the 
respective functional groups in the acquiring and the acquired companies. For 
example, in the Figure 4.3, this is depicted by the double arrows going from 
HR group in the acquiring company to the HR group in the acquired company. 
Likewise, the Figure 4.3 shows double arrows going between the other 
functional groups respectively. 
Engg. 
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Figure 4-3: Inter-enterprise collaboration 
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4. The Figure 4.3 depicts the inter-enterprise collaboration cloud; it further 
reflects this aspect by depicting double arrows from the arrows that denoted 
such collaboration (point 3 above). In addition, the figure also illustrates that 
this type of collaboration uses a logically separate collaboration cloud that 
includes people, processes etc. from both the acquiring as well as the 
acquired company.   
 
In this scenario, an important consideration is the aspect of security because many 
business sensitive documents, processes and other artifacts are shared among 
collaboration teams belonging to different organizations. For example, the collaboration 
space may include product roadmaps, intellectual property, sales pipeline, customer 
lists, financial documents, strategic marketing documents etc. This scenario warrants 
access control management so that it is ensured there is no unauthorized and 
unwarranted access to information in the inter-enterprise collaboration space. This 
research is focused on studying the access control management aspects of such inter-
enterprise collaboration.  
 
4.2.3  Research Issues 
Key findings from the literature review include: 1) access control management continues 
to evolve with changing technology paradigms, 2) role based access control continues 
to evolve to address new collaboration processes and infrastructures, 3) a combination 
of organization defined policies and community based trust management is integral to 
dealing with access control management in collaboration environments spanning both 
intra-enterprise and inter-enterprise 4) change management is not necessarily 
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addressed as integral to new access control management models, and 5) access 
control management in inter-enterprise collaboration in the context of onboarding is not 
directly addressed. 
This research will leverage insights from the literature review like the need for having a 
well-defined set of security requirements, dynamic collaboration, trust management, and 
self-organized systems.  
4.2.4  Research Question 
Generally, all research begins with a question or questions derived from a general topic 
that a researcher is interested in. This interest in topic may be due to numerous reasons 
like the researcher’s academic or industry experience, exposure to new fields through 
lectures and attending conferences, discussions with peers, inter-disciplinary 
collaboration etc.  The desirable attributes of a good research question as discussed in 
[143] are the following: 
1) Relevant 
The question must be relevant in the context of the research topic selected. 
2) Interesting 
The topic selected must be interesting to the researcher so that there is self-
motivation to investigate the topic and the question. 
3) Focused and Specific 
The question must be narrow enough to show focus with potential for specific 
outcomes. However, to begin with, it can start from a broad topic and 
narrowed down through criteria like a specific aspect of the topic, a time 
period, an event, geography, gender, culture, age group, industry etc.  
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4) Researchable 
The topic and the research question must be such that the researcher has 
access to relevant literature like journals, conference proceedings, technical 
reports etc. in order to understand what has been accomplished, the progress 
of the field based on technology advances and paradigm shifts, the still 
unanswered questions, the gaps in the solutions, and potential for further 
contribution to theory and practice. In addition, depending on the topic, the 
researcher must have access to industry practitioners as well to understand 
the research topic and questions from a practical perspective. 
 
In essence, a research question investigates a specific component of a broader topic 
area.  As discussed in [144], it is a formal statement of the goal of study. It will clearly 
imply what the study will investigate or attempt to solve. As the author says, the 
research question is a logical statement that progresses from what is known or believed 
to be true (as determined by literature review) to that is unknown and requires 
validation. In the paper by Lipowski [145], a research question is defined as one that is 
narrow and challenging addressing an issue, a problem, or a controversy. This question 
is then answered with a conclusion based on further analysis and interpretation of 
evidence. 
 
4.2.5 Research Question -- Details 
The main question that this research is addressing is: 
 How can access control in inter-enterprise collaboration in onboarding be 
improved? 
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A sub-question that this research is addressing is: 
 How can change in administering access control management be managed? 
 
Figure 4.4 depicts the flow in terms of arriving at this question from the broad research 
topic: 
 
 
 
 
Applying the four desirable attributes of a good research question, as discussed in the 
beginning of this section, the question is relevant in the context of the broad research 
topic of information security as confidentiality and protect of information is of paramount 
importance for a business; the question is interesting to the researcher based on his 
background, experience, and accomplishments in this subject area, the question is 
focused and specific because it’s goal is to study only the access control aspect of 
security further narrowing the scope to inter-enterprise collaboration in onboarding; and 
Broad Topic 
Narrowing the 
topic 
Focusing on the 
topic 
Research Question 
Information security, collaboration, 
security management, enterprise security 
Confidentiality, information 
protection, collaboration, 
Access Control, inter-
enterprise collaboration, 
How to improve access control 
in inter-enterprise collaboration 
in onboarding? 
 
RQ 
Figure 4-4: The research question funnel 
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it is researchable as demonstrated by the extensive literature review conducted. Finally 
the question meets the criteria as discussed in [144] and [145] because it attempts to 
investigate and solve a problem. 
4.2.6  Selection of Research Methodology 
This research can be classified as applied research to begin with based on the criteria 
presented in [137] which says that applied research focus is to apply its findings to a 
particular situation. In the case of this research its findings will be applicable in the 
situation of inter-enterprise collaboration in onboarding. Further, this research can also 
be classified as Action Research. Action research is a form of applied research where 
the researcher attempts to develop results or a solution that is of practical value to the 
people with whom the researcher is working, and at the same time developing 
theoretical knowledge. Action research is discussed in [137], and [134]. This research 
has characteristics of both qualitative and descriptive methodologies as well. It is 
descriptive because it describes systematically the scenario and context of onboarding 
and the associated problems; while it is qualitative because it collects non-numeric data 
through surveys and interviews of small number of people, and further asks research 
question based on “how to”, “why”, “what” etc. This research also uses elements of 
analytical methodology because there is an aspect of critical thinking about the problem 
as the researcher participated in onboarding activities and made observations. Aspects 
of the pragmatic methodology are present in this research as it asks questions such as 
“how to” and “what” in investigating the topic further. The quantitative aspects of this 
research encompass data collected through survey which is subject to further analysis.  
In essence, this research is truly based on mixed methods research methodology where 
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it relies at the outset on applied, qualitative and analytical approaches supported by 
aspects of quantitative and action research methodologies. 
 
The mixed methods research methodology applicable to this research further provided 
insights into the methods used to proceed in terms of data collection and analysis. The 
action research influenced the selection of experiential project observations to 
documenting the relevant security issues observed in projects; the qualitative nature of 
the methodologolgy influenced the selection of expert interviews with M&A experts to 
gather the relevant field data; and both the qualitative and analytical aspect of this 
research influenced the selection of a survey design and its administration to the 
relevant industry and academic experts to gather substantial field data which is further 
subject to quantitative analysis. The next section provides further details of the overall 
research design. 
 
  
4.3 Research Design 
Research design is the conceptual structure within which research is conducted. The 
function of research design is to provide for the collection of relevant information with 
minimal expenditure of effort, time and money [136]. As discussed in the paper, the 
preparation of research design, appropriate for a particular research problem, involves 
the consideration of the following: 1) objectives of the research study, 2) method of data 
collection to be adopted, 3) source of information—sample design, 4) tool for data 
collection, and 5) data analysis. Figure 4.5 shows the overall process of this research 
undertaking. 
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It should be noted that Fig. 4-5  depicts a process flow, numerous activities within the 
process overlap and not necessarily executed in a strict sequential order. Iniatially, the 
general problem statement is defined. A preliminary research survey resulted in refining 
the research problem and research objectives. In the next phase, an extensive literature 
survey produced in depth secondary data that facilitated further refinement of research 
objectives based on the gaps found in the literature and insights about potentially 
leveraging and adapting some of the techniques from subject areas such as self 
organizing systems. The research methodology and research design phase enabled 
clarification of the research methodologies applicable for this research and the various 
tools and techniques that will be used in the phase of field work and data collection, and 
data analysis and intrepretation. The results from this phase will provide the basis for 
model development which would further be validated and refined accordingly. The final 
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Figure 4-5: Research process 
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step is the completion of dissertation. The field work details are presented next, followed 
by a discussion on some consideration for model development. 
4.3.1  Field Work, Data Collection, Analysis and Interpretation 
Experiential observations, expert interviews with Mergers and Acquistions specialists, 
and administration of a questionnaire on collaboration security form the basis for data 
collection. The purpose of the survey is two fold: 
1. Understand and assess the process of on boarding acquired companies 
2. Understand and assess the access control management in inter-enterprise 
collaboration 
 
A preliminary survey form, shown in Appendix A, was designed and tested with six 
people who are industry experts in M&A, IT experts and business stakeholders who 
participated in onboarding activities, and academic researchers with experience in 
design of surveys. The feedback sought included: 1) the structure and organization of 
the questionnaire, 2) content relevance and completeness, and 3) clarity of the 
questions. The feedback enabled the design of an updated questinnaire, shown in 
Appendix B, that was adminsitered to 25 people in the industry. The experience and 
background of the survey particpantse includes M&A specialization, Marketing and 
Sales, Learning and Development, Channel Support, Business Architect, and IT. The 
survey questinnaire was designed and administered using Google online survey tools. It 
was mailed to the participants using the tool. The participants received a link to the 
questionnaire. They clicked on the link and filled out the survey. The submitted 
responses were automaticlaly gathered by the Google online survey tool. Chapter 5 
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presents the details of the data collection, analysis, and interpretaion of survey results. 
The rationale for survey questionnaire design is discussed in the next section. 
4.4 Survey Questionnaire Design 
Designing the questionnaire right is a critical first step in collecting relevant data for 
research. The key objective of a questionnaire is getting a complete set of accurate 
answers which is representative of the population being sampled [146]. There are two 
types of questionnaires: 1) direct questionnaires are completed by interviewers in face-
to-face (or teleconference) contact with the respondents and 2) mail questionnaires are 
completed by the respondents themselves in their own time, typically administered 
using online survey tools available in modern times. Unless the number of respondents 
is relatively small, the cost overhead of direct questionnaires puts them beyond the 
scope of most projects. In this research online survey mechanisms were used to gather 
the data after the pilot phase. In the pilot phase, in addition to administering the online 
survey, a few telephone interviews were conducted to gain insights into the survey 
questionnaire design and to remove any ambiguities before the survey was sent to 
participants at large.  As discussed in [146], a mail or online administered survey 
questionnaire are vulnerable in following ways: 
1. The questions must be straightforward and easily understood as they stand, 
since there will be no opportunity to elaborate when the respondent reads the 
questionnaire.  
2. The answers have to be accepted as they stand since there will be little 
opportunity to seek clarification or to probe further unless this procedure is added 
to the process.  
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3. Respondents fill out questionnaires in their own time and can spend as much 
time as they want in considering their responses. This means that answers 
cannot be guaranteed to be spontaneous or independent.  
4. The identity of the respondent cannot be guaranteed. The questionnaire may 
state that it is to be filled in by the project manager but there is nothing to stop 
him or her from ’delegating’ this task to a secretary or a trainee.  
5. Questionnaires are filled in by those who want to fill them in and avoided by 
those who don’t. Since these groups are self-selecting, an incomplete set of 
responses introduces bias into the sample, and since nothing may be known 
about the non-respondents, except that they didn’t respond, it is not possible to 
compensate for this bias, so the best strategy is to try to minimize it by 
considering ways of improving the response rate. 
 
An important aspect of questionnaire design is that its purpose must be clearly stated at 
the beginning so that the respondents will know the researcher’s objectives of 
administering the survey. In addition, the respondents sample must be relevant to the 
survey being administered. The goal of questionnaire design is to frame the questions 
that meet the following criteria: 
1. Can the respondent understand the question? 
2. Can the respondent answer the question? 
3. Can the designer (or the surveyor) understand the answer? 
 
The answers sought by the researcher to survey questions fall under the following 
categories: 
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1. Open Questions. 
These are questions which invite a written answer. The respondents can say 
anything they like. The problem lies in comparing and combining what 
different respondents are saying since all the answers must be read and 
interpreted by the surveyor. Surveys frequently present the results of such 
questions by means of a few well-chosen ’typical’ and/or ’extreme’ quotations. 
This is necessarily subjective and qualitative. However, there is scope for 
some open questions in any questionnaire. The respondents are being asked 
to think deeply about subjects which may arouse their passions and it may be 
better to give them an opportunity to vent their feelings in writing rather than 
tearing up the questionnaire. 
2. Coded Questions 
These are open questions to the answers of which the surveyor applies some 
sort of coding once the questionnaires have been returned. This helps to 
make the interpretation of answers more systematic and may allow for some 
quantitative analysis. 
3. Pre-coded Questions 
By far the most popular form of questionnaire question is the familiar multiple-
choice question. These are useful both for soliciting comparable answers and 
for easy analysis. 
 
A good practice in conducting surveys is that the initial draft of a survey questionnaire 
should be piloted to check for ambiguities and mistakes. The pilot will provide insights 
into making the necessary modifications before the final survey is administered. This 
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practice has been followed in this research where a pilot questionnaire and its 
administration led to further refinement in the subsequent survey questionnaire. The 
next section discusses the steps taken in model development and validation.  
4.5 Model Development and Validation  
Multiple factors influence the development of the model though the essential elements 
address the primary purpose of access control management in inter-enterprise 
collaboration in the context of onboarding. development of the model. Both the literature 
review and survey analysis provided insights into factors that should be considered in 
model development: 
 Factors from literature review that contributed are: 
 Importance of security requirements 
 Collaborative sharing patterns 
 Trust management 
 Access control models 
 Self-organization in dynamic collaboration 
 Business process of Mergers and Acquisitions 
 
 Factors gathered from survey are: 
 Security requirements must be stated upfront 
 Collaboration onboarding process lifecycle 
 Security in managing onboarding 
 Formation of integration teams in the lifecycle 
 Enterprise Roles in access control 
 Governance and static access control policies 
 Change management 
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These factors are discussed in detail in Chapter 6 which focuses on model 
development. 
4.6 Summary 
This thesis is based on both primary and secondary research. Primary research typifies 
first hand observation and investigation of the subject; in this case the researcher’s 
experience and observations at workplace influenced the research. In this context, 
interviews and surveys are also influencing factors in the development of the 
appropriate access control model for inter-enterprise collaboration in onboarding. The 
secondary research examined the studies and literature on access control 
management, collaboration security, process of onboarding, self-organizing systems, 
and mergers and acquisitions. This chapter provided insights into the philosophy of 
scientific research and further discussed the various research methodologies and their 
characteristics. The section on the adopted research methodology presented the 
research problem in context and discussed the rationale for the mixed research 
methodology adopted for this research. The section on Research design presented a 
conceptual overview of the overall research process steps relevant to this study. 
Furthermore, this section discussed the survey questionnaire that this research used to 
collect the relevant data from the industry for analysis and interpretation. The section on 
model development and validation included the research considerations that are 
relevant in the development of the model.  
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5 Data Collection and Analysis 
“It is a capital mistake to theorize before one has data.” – Sherlock Homes 
5.1 Introduction 
While the literature review provides rich sources of secondary data for pursuing 
research, it is equally important to identify sources of primary data which provide first-
hand information to the researcher. Together, the primary and secondary data provide 
insights, direction, and a well-defined path to conduct research and contribute to both 
practice and theory of the chosen research domain. This research has collected data 
from:  
1) Field studies comprising of two experiential projects from the 
researcher’s direct participation and observations in onboarding 
collaboration for two cross-functional projects; 
2) Field studies comprising of interviews with two senior industry experts 
who facilitated mergers and acquisitions;  
3) Pilot survey design and administration; 
4) Modified survey design and administration.  
 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. First, the field studies data from 
experiential observations is presented. Second, the field studies data from interviews 
with industry experts is presented. Third, the pilot survey administration and the 
subsequent survey questionnaire design update are discussed. Fourth, the final survey 
administration is discussed. In this context, the profile of the companies and participants 
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is presented. Fifth, the data analysis from the survey is presented. Finally, the insights 
gained from the data analysis are presented along with the specific research issues that 
are addressed in the proposed model. 
5.2 Field Studies 
This section will present experiential data as well as through the interviews with industry 
experts in mergers and acquisitions (M&A). Together, they provide insights into the 
research issues addressed by the model. 
5.2.1 Experiential Project 1 
This researcher has participated in cross-functional and inter-enterprise initiatives in the 
high tech industry where his leadership and facilitation experience spans over 25 years 
in software development, change management, designing security solutions and access 
control models, leading the development of collaborative knowledge sharing 
environments, and conducting secure product development training worldwide. The 
focus of the field study discussed here is an onboarding initiative of a large high tech 
company in San Jose California which acquired a medium sized high tech company 
which is based in Europe.  
 
Researcher’s Role: Training Process Lead 
Responsibilities: Some of the key responsibilities included the following: 
 Worked with cross functional teams to understand the acquired company’s 
partner management tools; 
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 Analyzed and mapped the acquired company’s partner management tools and 
acquiring company’s partner management tools (which ran into more than 30 
tools);  
 Created a plan to integrate tools and training processes;  
 Developed e-learning content on top 20 tools and processes. 
 
Company Profiles: 
 Acquiring Company 
The company is in the business of providing networking hardware and software. 
They are a fortune 50 company in the world with over 50,000 employees 
worldwide. Besides the networking hardware and software, the company also 
sells multimedia virtual conferencing and collaboration solutions and is a market 
leader in virtual conferencing. The company’s business growth strategy includes 
acquisitions at regular intervals. The acquisitions over the last 10 years included 
very small private companies of less than 10 employees to medium to large 
companies of up to 1000 people or more.  
 
 Acquired Company 
The acquired company in this case is a global leader in video communications 
based in Europe, with over a thousand employees worldwide. It was a publicly 
trading company. They were acquired for over $3 billion. The motivation for the 
acquiring company is to become a market leader in the field of collaboration 
which was expected to be over $35 billion in the coming years.  
 
The acquisition legally closed in the second quarter of the year 2010. The process of 
onboarding collaboration started just before the legal closure.  
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Onboarding Process 
At the highest level there is a corporate development integration team which initiates 
acquisitions. Some of the cross functional teams collaborating during onboarding were: 
 Business Architecture team – responsible for integrating business processes of 
the acquired and acquiring companies. These processes included sales, 
customer support, partner support etc.; 
 HR team – responsible for onboarding the acquired company’s employees which 
included role mapping, assigning employees to the respective organizations, 
creating new organizational structures etc.; 
 Partner Onboarding team – responsible for mapping the acquired company’s 
partners to the multi-tiered partner and distributor structures of the acquiring 
company; 
 Product Integration team – responsible for mapping and integrating products of 
the acquiring and the acquired company and assigning these product 
development streams to the respective product engineering business unit; 
 Sales Process integration team – responsible for onboarding the acquired 
company’s sales channel partners and creating the necessary accounts on sales 
enablement tools of the acquiring company; 
 IT Integration team – responsible for mapping and integrating the IT processes 
that enable business.  
 
During the onboarding process, the cross functional teams had access to a central 
collaboration repository which was organized by individual teams as well as a globally 
accessible repository which contained information assets accessible by all teams. Each 
team put their information assets in the repository. There was an overall project 
management office and each team had their respective project plans. The structure of 
the repository itself was not pre-determined and it changed during the course of 
onboarding.  
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Onboarding Challenges: 
 Delays in project timelines and deliverables; 
 Partner onboarding was not smooth because the partner account 
manager did not clearly understand their roles and responsibilities; 
 Partners had access to sensitive information as there was no well-defined 
process to protect intellectual property; 
 There was no well-defined overall onboarding process that everyone got 
trained on at the beginning of onboarding lifecycle; 
 Teams had access to many documents in the repository beyond their 
scope of work and beyond the completion of the process. 
5.2.2 Experiential Project 2 
Researcher’s Role: Post-Integration Analysis and Training facilitation on behalf of the 
business architecture team. 
Responsibilities: Some of the key responsibilities included the following: 
 Analyzed Acquisition process lifecycle for possible improvements; 
 Enhanced system and partner onboarding processes; 
 Created a plan to integrate partner support which included enhancing the role of 
partner account managers; 
 Created training process for partner onboarding in acquisitions. 
 
There was a central repository accessible to all members of the team with no access 
control enforced. The onboarding challenges provided a starting point for this project. 
The team itself comprised of members from more than three different functional 
organizations including members from the acquired company. The process 
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improvement suggestions were submitted to the corporate development integration 
team. 
 
Current Status 
The process of acquisition integration continues to evolve. Currently the relevant 
phases from the perspective of this research are the following: 
 Integration engagement and early discovery 
This phase starts during due diligence before the deal is officially closed. High 
level executive sponsors are briefed and preliminary integration strategy drafts 
prepared.  
 Integration Planning 
This phase starts just before the deal is legally closed. Integration kick-off 
meeting is conducted, various work streams are identified, detailed analysis and 
discovery sessions are conducted, detailed data analysis is performed, 
operational blueprint is defined, project plans are developed, day 1 + 90 day 
execution plan is created, and integration exit criteria are identified. 
 Integration Execution 
Multiple collaboration teams in all work streams work on integration. Employees, 
customers, partners, products, business processes etc. are integrated. 
Integration reviews carried out periodically, integration plans updated, work 
stream project plans reviewed and updated. Feedback from customers, partners, 
and employees collected, and project is closed out. 
 
The onboarding process comprises of over sixty steps so far and is still work in 
progress. The number of work streams, where each work stream is a cross-functional  
team responsible for executing one aspect of integration is over twenty; the number of 
participants is over hundred, and almost all functional units, such as HR, Engineering, 
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Sales, Technical Support, Marketing, Partner Support, and Training are involved in the 
onboarding effort. 
5.2.3 Key Insights and Observations from Experiential Projects 
This acquisition onboarding undertaking was accomplished over a period of almost 
eighteen months. It provided numerous inter-enterprise experiences and insights during 
its lifecycle. The key insights and observations made are the following:  
1. The onboarding process is a complex undertaking with multiple teams working 
on different aspects of integration.  
2. Project Management at multiple levels is a critical component of the entire 
process and it is a challenge to reconcile the dependencies, deliverables and 
timelines across multiple work streams.  
3. The process itself was not structured and well-defined at the beginning and it 
evolved as the integration progressed.  
4. New work streams were identified, existing work streams modified, and some 
terminated along the process lifecycle.  
5. The project closure was delayed by almost six months and budgets were 
negatively impacted upon.  
6. There was no integrated security strategy in place to guide access control 
management decisions.  
7. People had access to business sensitive information assets though their role did 
not entail such access.  
8. Roles and responsibilities were not clearly defined for everyone and often times, 
these were assigned in an ad hoc manner.  
9. Team members cited deficiencies in communication, coordination, and 
cooperation.  
10. There was no well-defined closure at the collaboration team levels and team 
members had access to sensitive information even after their participation ended. 
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For example, the access control and security challenges identified by one cross-
functional team included the following: (note: the acquiring company is replaced by XYZ 
to maintain confidentiality.) 
1. The lack of screening at registration allows competitor employees to register at 
XYZ.com and direct competitors to register as channel partners resulting in overt 
competitive intelligence gathering and theft of XYZ’s intellectual property. 
2. The lack of centralized user access content management for XYZ.com results in 
intellectual property leakage, increasing the risk for competitive advantage 
abuse. 
3. Lack of standardization across published content results in an unknown amount 
of improperly entitled content, increasing the risk for content to be leveraged for 
competitive advantage 
4. Without consistent governance, IP loss/abuse is not tracked, measured or 
monitored within or across all tiered levels at XYZ.com 
An actual log entry from the onboarding project is shown in Appendix A. From the 
perspective of this research, it is clear from these insights that access control in 
onboarding is an area that needs to be investigated further. In addition, there is scope 
for defining an onboarding process lifecycle for collaborating teams where security is 
built into the entire collaboration lifecycle beginning with the team formation until the 
team is dissolved and the data archived. 
5.2.4 Interview with an Industry Expert in M&A 
The interview was conducted with the principal founder of a consulting group which 
facilitates M&A. The founder has worked in team leadership roles in numerous 
companies managing acquisitions onboarding before he started his own M&A facilitation 
company. The essence of the interview is as follows: 
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1. What is your name? – left out for confidentiality 
2. Where do you work? – company name left out for confidentiality 
 I am the founder of a company that facilitates mergers and 
acquisitions 
3. How much experience do you have in M&A? 
 Over 20 years 
4.  What is your role in the acquisition process? 
 Team Leader  
5. Did you consider access control mechanisms in onboarding 
collaboration? 
 Yes 
6. Please explain how you handled access control management 
 Access control was set up after the initial due diligence 
 The concept of virtual data rooms was established 
 The data was classified by department such as financial data, sales 
data, product data etc. 
7. What tools did you use to manage access? 
 I used a variety of environments based on what a client has. One 
tool that I used is SharePoint where I statically defined access 
control 
8. How did you manage access to the target company? 
 The target company had limited access to virtual data rooms 
 DRM (Digital Rights Management) was put in place to control the 
actions that can be performed on files accessed. For example, print 
capability was disabled in some cases when I deemed it necessary. 
9. At what level did you specify access control? 
 I set it up at the folder level; data come sporadically. 
 When someone uploads files, they inform me and I will take care of 
setting the access rights to files. 
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10.  How do you know if someone leaves a target/acquired company or the 
acquiring company? 
 When I am informed by the responsible people, I go change the 
access control accordingly. 
11.  When someone requests access via email what actions do you take? 
 Usually I grant them access to Folder level only so that they can 
see the folder and get some information about the information 
contents of the folder. If they need access to the actual information 
then I get another request for them and I take the appropriate 
action. 
12.  Was the acquisition onboarding process on the projects that you 
worked on well-defined? 
 It has not been well-defined and so it was not repeatable. I came up 
with a manual to make this process repeatable that I use for client 
engagements 
13.  When does integration start in your expert opinion? 
 Integration starts before the deal closes.  
 Due diligence is a step where the acquiring company and the 
acquired company work together in small team. Integration is part 
of due diligence process. 
14.  What teams are involved in acquisition onboarding? 
 HR, IT, Finance, Sales, etc. 
15.  What is the length of time for completing acquisitions onboarding? 
 For small deals (startups with 10 to 20 people) it is usually up to 3 
months 
 For big deals (medium and large companies in excess of 500 
people), up to 2 years to complete. In the first year, 80% work is 
done. In the second year there is about 20% remaining like aligning 
sales teams etc. 
16. In your experience how was access control managed in most deals 
where you were not responsible for setting these up? 
  
106 
 
 In most deals, it was not managed upfront. Instead when I came 
onboard I tried to put together access control management. 
17. What are your suggestions regarding onboarding acquisitions? 
 Security must be addressed right up front. 
 Communication is important with respect to access to information 
as files are put in the repository during the entire onboarding 
lifecycle. 
5.2.5 Interview with an Industry Expert in M&A 
1. What is your name? – left out for confidentiality 
2. Where do you work? – company name left out for confidentiality 
I am a senior VP of a company that facilitates mergers and acquisitions. 
3. How much experience do you have in M&A? 
More than 15 years in managing acquisitions onboarding at multiple 
companies. I have experience in acquisitions of small companies and big 
companies. 
4. What is your role in acquisition process? 
 Leading the corporate strategy process and developing the M&A 
strategy. 
 Leading due diligence teams, facilitating the internal and external 
processes  
o Internal processes 
Getting buy-in from executives, operations management of the 
process, building the business case for acquisition, 
presentations for exec team and the board. 
o External processes 
Work with the acquired company, interface with the necessary 
financial and legal teams outside of the company etc. 
 Three key work streams initiated in due diligence: 
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1) Commercial – looking at operations, integration issues, and 
synergies between the two companies. Assign work stream 
leaders.  
2) Legal 
3) Financial 
 In onboarding, Five to Fifteen work streams in HR, IT, Sales and 
Marketing, Product Management, Engineering etc. are initiated. 
5. Do you consider access control mechanisms in onboarding collaboration? 
 Yes 
6. Please explain how you handled access control management 
 Access control was set up beginning with due diligence. 
 Folders were created for multiple work streams and for each folder 
access control was defined. Access to these folders was set up by 
function. 
 Each functional team also assigned access control to files in their 
folders 
 For information pertaining to confidential employee information like 
salary very high access control was set up. 
7. What tools did you use to manage access? 
 Used a variety of tools like Merril, Share Point, Drop Box, Box etc. 
8. How did you manage access to the target company? 
 Communication was established with the functional teams between the 
two companies 
 These functional teams collaborated using the collaboration tools. 
9. At what level did you specify access control? 
 Roles and responsibilities influenced access control 
 The entire deal team list was maintained. It included all participants 
involved in the acquisition. They all had to sign an internal NDA. 
 The access control was then set up at folder and file level. Use email id 
was used as an access control mechanism. 
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10. How would you know if someone leaves a target/acquired company or the 
acquiring company? 
 Internally, there are multiple touch points that will ensure propagation 
of this information.  
 The acquired company has to maintain their own processes to manage 
this. 
11. When someone requests access via email what actions do you take? 
 If it is at my level of responsibility I look at their role and responsibility 
and take the necessary action 
 I also delegate the decision to the corresponding functional team 
12. Is the acquisition onboarding process well-defined? 
 Big companies where I was involved usually have some process that is 
defined satisfactorily but that could be improved.  
 The small to medium size companies do not have this process well-
defined. 
13. When does integration start in your expert opinion? 
 Integration starts before the deal closes. 
 The term sheet is a good starting point to consider as integration 
starting point because it has an integration plan in theory 
 Integration plan is signed off as part of deal closure. 
14. What teams were involved in acquisition onboarding in your experience? 
 HR, IT, Product Management, Engineering, Finance, Legal, Sales, etc. 
15. What is the length of time for completing acquisitions onboarding? 
 For small deals (startups with 10 to 20 people) it is usually one to three 
months 
 For big deals (medium and large companies in excess of 500 people), 
it is from six to eighteen months. The back office integration (all 
processes except product integration) is usually done in about nine 
months. The product integration is anywhere from six to eighteen 
months. 
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16. In your experience how was security managed in most deals where you 
were not responsible for setting these up? 
 Access control was managed by the deal leads and was controlled at 
the functional level. 
 Trust management was essentially at the level of functional lead. 
17. What are your suggestions regarding onboarding acquisitions? 
 Security is a people issue and one has to trust people. 
 Insider list which contains all people involved in onboarding should be 
maintained. They have to sign NDAs when they come onboard. 
 Access control should be established based on roles and 
responsibilities and determined at the functional level. 
 Dynamic access control decisions should be  at the functional level 
 An onboarding collaboration process should be defined to manage 
security. 
 
The next section presents a discussion on pilot survey administration and insights. 
  
5.3 Pilot Survey Administration 
The pilot survey was administered to a small group of four people (two of them played 
the role of team leader, two of them played the role of team leader/integration manager; 
and two of these are also industry experts who facilitate mergers and acquisitions).  It 
was also used as a means of interviewing two industry experts to ensure that the survey 
objectives, type of questions and the content are appropriate for collecting the data 
suited for this research. In addition, it also provided insights into the access control 
management challenges that require further research and investigation. The pilot 
questionnaire is shown in Appendix B.  The key insights from the survey are as follows: 
1. Role and Responsibilities  
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Only three of them “completely agreed” that their roles and responsibilities 
were clearly defined, while the other “somewhat agreed”. 
2. Collaboration Team 
Two of the participants did not have a clear understanding of their immediate 
collaboration team members 
3. Information Control and Access Control Management 
Only one participant checked “completely agree” that information sharing and 
access control management in onboarding was explained in the beginning 
while the other three only checked “somewhat agree”.  
4. Method of sharing documents 
A combination of email, drop box, and internal collaboration space are used 
by all participants. 
5. Access Control set up for documents shared 
While two of the participants (one a team leader while the other a team leader 
and integration manager) specified access control for the documents that they 
shared, the other two did not. 
6. Access to onboarding related documents 
All of them had access to all the documents in the repository 
7. Requesting access to documents 
While three of the participants said that they receive emails from other 
onboarding team members requesting access to their documents, only one 
participant cited that their internal collaboration system has features that allow 
other to request access to documents. 
8. Granting access to documents 
Two of the participants email documents requested in addition to using 
collaboration workspace to grant access. The other two participants use 
collaboration workspace to grant access. 
9. Accessing other documents in collaboration workspace 
While only one participant said that they did not open other documents, the 
reaming three said that they often opened other documents to gain a broader 
understanding. 
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10.  Clarity of onboarding process 
All the survey participants said that they had complete clarity of the process. 
Beginning and Ending of Role in onboarding  
11. Only two thought that they had complete clarity as to when their role begins 
and ends in onboarding lifecycle while the other thought they only had partial 
clarity. 
12. Inter-enterprise collaboration process is defined completely and accurately 
Only two participants completely agreed, while the other two somewhat 
agreed. 
13.  Risk Management Strategies to manage project timelines and personnel 
changes 
While two participants completely agreed that these were well-defined, the 
other two only agreed partially. 
14.  Access to onboarding documents when a person’s role terminated 
All participants said that when a person’s role was terminated, they still had 
access to documents in the repository sometimes even after the onboarding 
project was complete. 
15.  Onboarding project closure 
Only one participant complete agreed that project closure was defined clearly. 
One participant somewhat disagreed that it was defined clearly. The other two 
only agreed partially that project closure was defined clearly. 
16.  Assignment of roles and access control 
Only two participants thought that assignment of roles and access control is 
defined clearly while the other two only agreed partially with this statement. 
17.  Trust management in access control 
Two participants said they use trust management schemes dynamically to 
grant access, one participant said that they only use statically defined access 
control, while the other participant said that they email documents when they 
trust a person. 
18.  Notifications 
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Only one participant said that the system notifies everyone when a document 
is added. The other participants said that sometimes they receive emails from 
individuals who put documents in the repository. 
19.  State your opinion on how effectively collaboration security in terms of 
access control is managed in onboarding  
One participant said that this question is phrased in a confusing manner. One 
opined that it is essentially not done effectively. The other two participants 
said that measures such as signing non-disclosures, setting up clear security 
mechanisms, new team members endorsed by team leader, and some 
central control are required to have effective collaboration security in 
onboarding. 
 
These results show that the areas of improvement in managing access control in 
dynamic collaboration in onboarding encompass process, statically defined security 
mechanisms, dynamic access control schemes based on trust, procedures such as 
NDAs, and a proper set of activities from beginning to the closure of the onboarding 
lifecycle. This research is focused on development of a process and access control 
model to address these issues. Based on this preliminary survey and the feedback that 
the respondents provided about the clarity of questions, the questionnaire was modified 
and administered to 25 participants. The results of the survey from this list of 
participants and the insights are presented in the next section. 
 
5.4 Updated Survey Administration 
The pilot survey questionnaire administration has resulted in modifying the 
questionnaire accordingly to ensure that questions are clear without any ambiguity, and 
the choices more appropriate. For example a question on risk management in the 
questionnaire used for pilot is: 
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Risk Management strategies were well defined to manage project timelines and 
personnel changes 
Mark only one oval. 
o completely agree 
o somewhat agree 
o somewhat disagree 
o completely disagree 
 
This question turned out to be ambiguous from the respondents’ answers. On reflection, 
it was understood that in the case of project timelines the respondents may answer one 
way but in the case of personnel changes it could be different. In the final survey 
questionnaire, the above question was split into two questions, one for project timelines, 
and the other for personnel changes. Another example that illustrates the types of 
wording changes is the choices given for answers to a question. For example a 
question from the pilot survey questionnaire was: 
My roles and responsibilities are clearly defined in on boarding * 
Mark only one oval. 
o completely agree 
o somewhat agree 
o somewhat disagree 
o completely disagree 
 
This was changed to the following in the updated survey questionnaire as: 
My roles and responsibilities are clearly defined in onboarding * 
Mark only one oval. 
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o strongly agree 
o mostly agree 
o somewhat disagree 
o strongly disagree 
 
The phrase completely agree in pilot questionnaire suggested that a participant agrees 
100%. This is changed in the updated questionnaire to strongly agree which resonated 
better with participants. The updated survey was administered to 25 participants in the 
industry. Appendix C shows the survey form.  
 
The results of the survey are shown in Appendix D. It shows the summary analysis of 
each of the survey questions. It also includes their comments in the open questions. It 
should be noted that the summary questions where the participants expressed their 
thought and opinions shows a few grammatical and spelling errors which are left as is to 
maintain the integrity of the survey. Additional details of the survey are as follows: 
1. Company Profiles 
The participants worked in large companies including high tech, health care 
and pharmaceutical industries, retail, IT services, and ecommerce. In addition 
participants also came from medium sized companies in high tech, IT 
services, and training organizations. Finally, the survey participants included 
industry experts who facilitated mergers and acquisitions through their 
consulting organizations. 
2. Survey Participants background  
The participants on average have more than 15+ years of experience in the 
industry. The survey participants list includes CTOs, senior managers and 
executives of Engineering, Marketing, Sales, and IT, technical and business 
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leads, learning and development executives, specialists in mergers and 
acquisitions, and project managers. 
3. Follow Up 
The survey further enabled identifying a short list of participants who will be 
approached for model validation. 
 
The next section presents a further analysis and interpretation of the survey results 
which will influence the development of the model. 
5.5 Analysis and Interpretation 
Research investigation typically includes primary data collection and analysis phase. 
This step provides a researcher with additional insights that complement the data 
gathered through secondary research data collection like literature review. The survey 
conducted provided insights that enable the development of a model to address the 
security issues in onboarding collaboration. This section provides an analysis and 
interpretation of results and discusses the insights that will influence the development of 
the access control model. 
The results are analyzed and interpreted under the following categories: 1) roles and 
responsibilities, 2) access control, 3) risk management, 4) trust management, 5) 
onboarding collaboration process, and 6) opinions. 
1. Role and Responsibilities 
 30% of the participants thought that their roles and responsibilities were 
not clearly defined. However, the team leaders thought that their roles and 
responsibilities were clearly defined. 24% of the participants thought that 
they did not have a clear understanding of the roles and responsibilities of 
their collaboration team members. 
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 20% of the participants did not have a clear idea about when their role 
begins and ends, while 56% had partial idea about when their role begins 
and ends. 
 
The issue here is that when people were brought into teams during the 
course of onboarding their given roles and responsibilities were not defined 
comprehensively and their relationship with respect to rest of the team 
members lacked clarity and understanding. Also, from the view point of 
security, if there is no clarity about when a role begins and ends, it will lead to 
vulnerabilities which in turn may pose information leakage risks. 
 
2. Access Control  
 Only 20% agreed that information sharing and access control 
management was explained to them clearly, while 48% partially agree. 
32% percent disagreed that information sharing and access control was 
defined clearly.  
 Only about 33% used internal collaboration space for sharing documents 
but almost all used mechanisms such as email, Google drive etc. to share 
documents. 
 While the participants said that they specify access control  to the 
documents that they shared (either they set it up or work with the team 
leader), 56% of them also said that they had access to all documents in 
the repository during onboarding 
 21 % of participants said that they email documents to people when they 
request access while the others use the internal collaboration space and 
approval of team leaders to grant access 
 
The issue here is that access control is something that is not consistent 
across different teams and different organizations. While there was some 
form of access control, there was lack of well-defined process and sustained 
effort to enforce access control during onboarding collaboration.  
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3. Risk Management 
 75% of the respondents said that they accessed other documents in the 
repository either to find out if they needed the document or to gain a 
broader understanding. 
 Almost 33% participants said that risk management strategies were not 
well-defined. 
 68% of participants had access to documents in the collaboration 
repository even after their participation ended. 
 The issue here is that inadequate measures were put in place for risk 
management in controlling who had access to information assets, and not 
having defined procedures to manage access. 
 
4. Trust Management 
 20% of the participants shared documents based on their individual 
trust while another 20% said that they used trust management 
techniques to grant access dynamically during the onboarding 
lifecycle. 44% said that all access control is determined through 
statically defined policies. 
 
The issue here is that most of the access was determined through 
statically defined policies upfront while sharing in dynamic collaboration 
was not yet a well-defined process because these were shared based on 
individual trust outside of the collaboration space. 
5. Onboarding Collaboration Process 
 32% thought that the process is poorly defined while a further 64% 
partially agreed that the process is well-defined. 
 About 33% thought that process milestones, metrics for measuring project 
progress, and project closure were inadequately defined. About 60% 
partially agreed that these are defined adequately. 
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 Almost 75% respondents only had partial idea about when their role 
begins and ends during the onboarding process. 
 
The issue here is that one of poor process which in turn led to inadequate 
security. The fact that people did not have a clear understanding of their 
roles, responsibilities, when their role begins and ends, and what access 
control management is in place, there was potential for security lapses with 
negative consequences. 
6. Opinions 
 Almost all opinions of the participants suggest that onboarding 
collaboration process, access control mechanisms, dynamic trust 
management must be addressed (the complete list of opinions are in 
Appendix D). 
 
5.6 Insights and Observations 
The previous section has given insights in the context of analysis and interpretation of 
results. The survey reinforced that access control in onboarding is an area that needs to 
be researched further. At the outset, two critical issues are identified: 1) onboarding 
collaboration process, and 2) access control in dynamic collaboration. In the onboarding 
process, people should have a clear understanding of their roles and relationships with 
their collaboration team members, and they should have clearly defined access to 
collaboration repository. A good process on onboarding collaboration provides a 
foundation for managing access to collaboration space. The key access control 
objective in the context of onboarding is one of confidentiality and integrity. Enforcing 
confidentiality prevents leakage of business sensitive information. The survey clearly 
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showed that there is leakage of information when access control is poorly designed. In 
this context the data analysis showed that the individuals use their personal trust to 
share access to their documents. Instead trust should be managed dynamically in 
onboarding based on certain criteria defined by the collaboration team. The factors that 
the model will consider from the survey are as follows: 
 Security requirements must be stated upfront 
 Collaboration onboarding process lifecycle must be defined 
 Security in managing onboarding must be addressed 
 Formation of integration teams in the lifecycle must be considered 
 Enterprise Roles in access control must be defined 
 Governance and static access control policies must be defined 
upfront 
 Change management must be addressed 
5.7 Summary 
This chapter has presented the details of the data collection and analysis. The case 
study, pilot survey, and the final survey provided insights into the research issues that 
need to be addressed. Tow specific aspects of onboarding collaboration are the 
collaboration process and access control. The next chapter presents an access control 
model in onboarding which also addresses trust management in dynamic collaboration.  
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6 Access Control in Onboarding 
"Simplicity is the ultimate sophistication" -- Leonardo da Vinci 
6.1 Introduction 
The industry experience, research review, data collection through survey administration, 
interviews, and the subsequent critical analysis reinforced the need for addressing 
access control in onboarding where inter-enterprise collaboration is the means through 
which the integration and assimilation of acquired company is completed. In today’s 
competitive business world, information leakages whether malicious or accidental could 
potentially harm companies and organizations. The negative consequences could 
include anything from financial losses, losing competitive advantage, legal lawsuits, 
brand getting tarnished and even insolvency. In essence protecting information assets 
should not be an afterthought; it must be integral to the conduct of a business. In the 
opinion implied by this research and reinforced by industry experts, information 
protection is a way of life in the conduct of a business. This approach implies that when 
a company acquires another company, it must integrate all aspects of security including 
access control during the lifecycle of onboarding until the acquired company is 
integrated and assimilated into the company and the project is officially closed. 
 
The literature review revealed that 1) access control management in inter-enterprise 
collaboration in the context of onboarding is not directly addressed, 2) role-based 
access control continues to evolve to address new collaboration processes, and 3) trust 
plays a role in access control management in dynamic environment. The data 
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collection, analysis, and survey results revealed that 1) access control in onboarding is 
an area that needs to be researched further, 2) there must be well-defined onboarding 
collaboration process model, 3) there must be clearly defined roles and responsibilities 
in dynamic collaboration,  and 4) security must be addressed throughout onboarding 
collaboration.  These insights lead to the development of an onboarding collaboration 
process model and further lead to integrating security across the process model. 
 
This chapter presents an access control model based on this research undertaking. 
First, it begins with a discussion of the foundational element on which the model rests: 
onboarding collaboration process. The process provides a reference to discuss security 
aspects of collaboration. Next, a discussion on the concepts of enterprise roles and 
collaboration roles is presented. Every person involved in the collaboration has these 
two roles because of their association with their own company to which they belong to 
and because of the fact that they collaborate during the onboarding process. The notion 
of trust is introduced and concepts such as weak trust and strong trust are discussed. 
These concepts influence the dynamic access control decisions influenced by trust. The 
notion of security touch points is introduced to essentially show the interfaces and 
points in the process lifecycle of onboarding where information security must be 
addressed in order to prevent either accidental or malicious leakage of information. In 
the context of security touch points, the idea of security requirements is presented as 
well. The concept of self-organizing systems is discussed to show how in this model, 
the access control distributed knowledge base evolves as new information and 
knowledge is gained in the onboarding lifecycle. During the process of collaboration, 
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information assets are added, updated, or deleted. A discussion on change 
management is included to show the ramifications of administering the proposed access 
control management solution. The section on change management includes a 
discussion on publish/subscribe mechanism for secure collaboration. An illustrative 
example scenario of onboarding is discussed to showcase the inner-working of this 
access control model.  
6.2 Secure CODA (Create, Operate, Dissolve, Archive) Onboarding 
Collaboration Process Model -- SCODA 
The chapter on onboarding (Chapter 2) presented representative works in the literature 
on onboarding processes in the context of mergers and acquisitions such as those 
discussed in [2] and [20]. While they describe the process from the view point of a 
strategy for business growth, this research focuses on specific aspects of onboarding a 
company that has been in principle acquired. This is the starting point for this process. 
This starting point is characterized by certain attributes which will be discussed in detail 
in this section. Likewise, while the M&A literature describes the legal closure of 
acquisition process, this research narrowly focuses on closure with its own set of 
characteristics that signify closure. Between the starting point and the closure, there are 
processes related to creation and operation of necessary collaboration teams to 
onboard people, processes, technologies etc. This section provides reference process 
steps for discussing collaboration security. In addition to closure, this research proposes 
and defines the concept of archiving to ensure that once onboarding comes to a closure 
all the information assets shared by collaboration is systematically archived from the 
perspective of collaboration security. 
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Collaboration signifies a team of at least two entities. The definition of an entity from the 
perspective of this research is as follows: 
Definition: Entity 
The entity could be a person, process, business unit or department, or an 
organization as a whole. 
 
In the context of the global process of M&As where acquisitions are part of an overall 
business strategy, different internal teams are formed within an organization to perform 
various tasks aligned with business strategy. This part of the global process is not of 
concern to this research. Instead, the process discussed in this research is only in the 
context of teams formed comprising of people from both the acquiring and acquired 
companies. This is often characterized by the formation an Acquisition team. Figure 6.1 
shows the starting point of this process. The chapter on onboarding describes this 
global process in more detail. In all approaches at some point in the overall acquisition 
lifecycle an acquisition team is formed and this is the reference point for this research. 
The steps shown in Figure 6.1 are based on the discussion in [2].  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It depicts three inter-enterprise collaboration teams at the highest level: 1) Acquisition 
team, 2) Integration Planning team, and 3) Integration team. These three teams further 
Starting point 
Business 
Plan 
Acquisition 
Strategy 
First contact Shortlist 
Acquisition 
team 
Integration 
planning team 
Legal Close Integration 
team 
Evaluation 
Figure 6-1: Starting point for inter-enterprise collaboration in onboarding 
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drive the rest of the process activities in onboarding the acquired company. This 
research proposes a secure onboarding collaboration process model, called SCODA, 
for onboarding collaboration activities among the inter-enterprise teams. The model 
emphasizes a four phase collaboration lifecycle that begins with a creation phase where 
collaborating teams are created. Security is built-in in all phases of the model (hence 
the name SCODA). These inter-enterprise teams work together on a collection of 
activities in the context of onboarding. This working together is characterized by the 
operations phase. Once the task of onboarding is accomplished, the team is dissolved 
characterized by the dissolve phase. The information assets of the project are then 
archived in the archive phase. Figure 6.2 shows the SCODA model and puts it in 
perspective with the collaboration teams formed during the onboarding lifecycle.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Every team that is formed during the onboarding should adhere to the SCODA process 
model to streamline security and access control so that information assets are protected 
Acquisition team Integration Planning team Integration team 
Create 
Operate 
Dissolve 
Archive Security 
Figure 6-2: SCODA process model 
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during and after onboarding is complete. Security is something that should be built into 
the process lifecycle right from the beginning of the process until it ends, just as how 
quality must be built-in to any process. This model implies that it can be integrated 
seamlessly into any well-defined onboarding process model that companies may have 
because this model overlays during their process at points where collaboration teams 
are formed during the onboarding lifecycle. The model also suggests that the three key 
collaboration team forming stages as shown in Figure 6.1 are where access control 
should be addressed. 
 
6.2.1.1 Create 
This phase triggers the beginning of the inter-enterprise collaboration of the respective 
teams in the onboarding lifecycle. While some teams may exist from the beginning of 
the onboarding process, other teams may be formed during the specific time intervals in 
the overall project scope. Irrespective of when a team comes into existence, every team 
must perform a certain set of collaboration starting activities which this research defines 
as Baseline Collaboration Tasks.  
Definition: Baseline Collaboration Tasks 
A collection of tasks performed by the collaboration team when it first comes into 
existence. 
The set of tasks performed at creation may vary by the team and their charter. 
However, the set of baseline tasks that every team must perform, when they come into 
existence, include the following: 1) identify enterprise roles, 2) define collaboration roles, 
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3) identify the baseline information content in the collaboration work space, and 4) 
identify security requirements from the viewpoint of access control to information assets. 
 
The enterprise role and the collaboration role enable the identification of the 
responsibilities of the team members. An enterprise role further allows insights into the 
access privileges to information. The collaboration role access privileges are baselined 
in the creation phase as a community activity where the team determines what those 
privileges are. The details of the concepts of enterprise role and collaboration are 
discussed in the following section. It is also in this phase that the team sets a baseline 
of security requirements in terms of who has access to information repository. This is an 
iterative community driven process between the collaboration roles, access privileges 
and security requirements.  
6.2.1.2 Operate 
This phase is characterized by a collection of tasks performed by the respective 
collaboration team members. This phase could be called an active phase of onboarding 
lifecycle where participants are constantly interacting, requesting and sharing 
documents, requesting access to applications, processes etc. It is also characterized by 
the fact that the team composition itself may be subject to change. Access control 
becomes a critical issue. The security requirements defined in the Create phase provide 
a foundation for determining access. However, in the active working environment in this 
phase, access decisions are governed by statically defined policies and also the 
dynamic access policies as characterized by trust relationships. The concepts of trust 
and trust relationships are defined in the following sections. Later in the chapter, a 
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simulated example will demonstrate how these concepts come together to manage 
access control in inter-enterprise collaboration.  
6.2.1.3 Dissolve 
This phase is characterized by the completion of tasks associated with a collaboration 
team. From a security and access control management viewpoint, a systematic 
collection of tasks need to be performed in order to ensure that information assets are 
protected and are not available to the collaboration team members beyond a specified 
time. Key tasks in this phase include: 1) signing off the completion, 2) reviewing access 
privileges to assess who further requires access to information assets for some length 
of time, 3) taking end-of-life decisions to terminate/restrict access of roles and people 
and 4) reviewing the roles, responsibilities, and security requirements with reference to 
baseline and documenting the necessary continuous process improvements. For 
example, the dynamic collaboration may have shown that some additional information 
assets must have been put in the repository at the beginning; collaboration roles may 
have been updated with additional tasks, some additional access rights may have been 
added, some access rights may have been found to be either redundant or not required 
etc. 
 
6.2.1.4 Archive 
This is a step that is critical to business security. The survey results indicated that most 
people had access to the information assets well beyond the closure of the acquisition 
onboarding. This could potentially lead to either accidental or malicious leakage of 
business sensitive information. In the SCODA model, this phase of the collaboration 
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lifecycle is mandatory. The key tasks in this phase include: 1) archiving the information 
assets based on the overall enterprise security framework and data management, 2) 
having a designated process to restore archived data in the future for any purpose 
including denoting the enterprise role that is required to request retrieval of archived 
data. 
 
6.3 Roles in Onboarding Collaboration 
Role based access control is a well-known paradigm as discussed in the literature 
review of this research. In 1992, Ferraiolo and Kuhn [147] , integrated the then features 
of existing application-specific approaches such as the discretionary access control and 
mandatory access control policies into a generalized role-based access control (RBAC) 
model. The model went through subsequent iterations and in 2001 a reference model 
for role based access control was proposed [148]. RBAC model addressed the security 
management challenges associated with Discretionary and Mandatory access control 
models. Discretionary Access Control (DAC) is very flexible and allows incorrect and 
wrong behaviors in organizations that are poorly managed, while Mandatory Access 
Control (MAC) is suited for organizations connected with high security or for 
government organizations such as US Department of Defense where multiple levels of 
security clearances are required. There was a need to support subject-based security 
policies, such as access based on competency, conflict of interest rules, or access 
based on a strict concept of least privilege. At the same time it was important to work 
within the context where there is a hierarchy of roles. RBAC model fulfilled these needs. 
A key feature of this model is that all access is through roles. A role is essentially a 
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collection of permissions, and all users receive permissions only through the roles to 
which they are assigned. Figure 6.3 depicts a simple conceptual model of RBAC. Users 
are assigned to roles and roles have permissions. Permission is an approval to perform 
an operation on one or more RBAC protected objects. For example, if the object is a 
file, operations on the file include read, write, and update. If an object is a database 
table, the operations on the table could be insert, delete, and update. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The RBAC model continued to evolve with numerous variations and extensions to 
address issues like the administrative overheads of role management [149], granularity 
of permissions at attribute level [150], different hierarchical relations between roles [151] 
etc.  The change management issues associated with RBAC model from a security 
management perspective is discussed by this researcher in [7]  wherein it is proposed 
that a clear distinction be made between an enterprise role and functional role. This 
distinction allows for smaller set of enterprise roles which further simplifies RBAC model 
based security management. 
 
From the perspective of this research, three types of roles are important for access 
control in inter-enterprise collaboration: 1) Enterprise Role, 2) Functional Role and 3) 
Collaboration Role. The person participating in collaboration belongs to an organization 
m n m n Users Roles 
Permissions 
Operations Object
Figure 6-3: A simple conceptual model of RBAC 
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where they have assigned enterprise and functional roles in different groups within the 
enterprise. For example, one person could be classified in an enterprise role as 
Manager and have a functional role IT Manager in the function group IT operations, 
while another person could be assigned an enterprise role Engineering and he/she may 
be performing a functional role of product engineer in a functional group producing 
tablet PCs. In addition to these roles a person plays specific roles in inter-enterprise 
collaboration. For example, a person could be team leader in collaboration while also 
playing the role of IT architect. In the context of this research the concept of a resource 
is also relevant. This concept is similar to the concept of objects (shown in Figure 6.3) 
but more specifically defined in the context of this research. The definitions and 
examples of resource, an enterprise role, functional role and collaboration role are 
discussed next. 
 
6.3.1  Resource 
The concept of a resource is a foundation element in the SCODA model developed in 
this research. The model relies on the concepts of users, roles, and resources. Figure 4 
depicts the relationships between users, roles, and resources. Resources exemplify the 
processes, applications and data that users have access to when performing their roles. 
Users may be assigned to one or more roles. A user will have access to a range of 
applications and data as part of fulfilling a role. In other words, access control is 
established in the context of roles. For example, user “John”, assigned to the role “sales 
manager”, will have access to sales applications and associated data. The same user 
assigned to the role “marketing manager” will additionally have access to marketing 
applications and associated data. If John were assigned the role “sales manager — 
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Asia” he would only have access to the sales applications and data relating to Asia. The 
formal definition of a resource is as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
Definition: Resource 
A resource is a tuple Res (ObjName, DataSet), where ObjName is the resource 
name and DataSet is the collection of atomic data (metadata).   
Example: a resource could be “customer tracking system” (CTS), comprising of 
customer name, address and status. It is expressed as:  
Res (CTS, {customer name, customer address, customer status…}). 
 
The definition of resource is used in the subsequent definition of various roles. It should 
be noted that the roles are mapped to resources in this role based access control model 
unlike in the RBAC model shown in Figure 6.3. The permissions as to what operations 
can be performed on objects by a given role are best denoted as attributes of the 
access relationship between a role and a resource. Furthermore, the notion of a 
resource provides a higher level of abstraction in terms of the semantics as it denotes 
classes of information unlike an individual object. Such a representation provides an 
User Role 1 Resource 1 
Role 2 
Role n 
User 2 
User n Resource n 
Resource 2 
Figure 6-4: Adapted RBAC (see Figure 6.3): Users, Roles, and Resources 
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advantage in terms of understanding access control at a higher level of abstraction 
before delving into fine-grain access control at individual object level. 
 
6.3.2 Enterprise Role 
The definition of an enterprise role is in the context of a business. In large organizations, 
the human resources function typically defines enterprise-wide roles. These are job 
categories, such as “CEO”, “VP”, “Engineering”, “Sales”, etc., typically characterized by 
the collection of responsibilities and tasks that are performed by the individual who is 
assigned the role. A distinguishing characteristic of such a role is that it is general in 
scope and allows an organization to abstract and categorize cohesive sets of job 
responsibilities. 
Definition: Enterprise Role 
An enterprise role is a tuple ERole (ERName, Rlist), where ERName is the 
enterprise role name and Rlist is a named collection of tasks/responsibilities.  
Example: an enterprise role “customer relationship manager” can be defined as: 
ERole (customer relationship manager, {customer needs analysis, track 
Projects…}). 
In this example, the role “customer relationship manager” is the ERName, and 
the role list (Rlist) comprises tasks performed by users assigned to that role. 
In this definition of enterprise role there is no specification of the actual resource/data 
access control rules. Enterprise roles should capture only the essence of job functions 
without any consideration of resource/data visibility rules.  
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6.3.3  Functional Role 
Like the enterprise role, a functional role is in the context of a business. It can be viewed 
in terms of day-to-day functions that an individual performs within a functional unit in an 
organization. For example, at enterprise level an individual may have a role such as 
“engineer”. Within a specific department, the individual’s role may be “analyst”, 
“program manager” etc. The greater specificity implies not only the specific tasks that 
the individual performs but also the specific information, applications, processes to 
which the individual has access to. Detailed access control is pertinent in a functional 
role where the tasks are defined at a finer granularity that entails accessing specific 
resources with privileges such as read, write, update, execute, etc. The definition of a 
functional role is as follows: 
Definition: Functional Role 
A functional role is a tuple FRole (FRname, ERName, Res, PrivSet), where 
FRname is the functional role name, ERName is the enterprise role name, Res is 
the resource and PrivSet is the set of privileges accorded to this role on the data 
set associated with the resource. 
Example: Consider a customer tracking system (CTS). Here, a functional role 
associated with this system could be: 
FRole (site manager, customer relationship manager, CTS, {(customer name, R), 
(customer address, U), (customer status, R)}). 
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In this example, a functional role site manager is defined, and users assigned to 
this role can only read (R) customer name and customer status and update (U) 
customer address. It further specifies that this role is associated with the 
enterprise role customer relationship manager.  
 
6.3.4  Collaboration Role 
Onboarding collaboration is a process with an outcome. Teams are created which 
include members from both the acquiring and acquired company. There is starting point 
of this collaboration and an ending point as characterized in SCODA model discussed in 
this chapter. During the course of collaboration roles and responsibilities are assigned 
to members of the collaborative team in the creation phase. These roles are called 
collaboration roles. The properties of these collaboration roles are: 
 Collaboration roles are transient. These roles exist in the context of 
collaboration. Once the onboarding is complete, these roles are 
deactivated. 
 Collaboration roles are weak or secondary roles and can only exist along 
with the corresponding primary enterprise roles in the context of 
onboarding.  
The property of a weak role is akin to the concept of a weak entity in Entity-Relationship 
modeling [152]. It exists only in the context of the primary enterprise role and it is a 
transient role which gets deactivated once onboarding collaboration ends. Later in the 
chapter, the consequence of having an associated enterprise role is further examined in 
making dynamic trust based access control decisions. The definition of a collaboration 
role is as follows: 
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Definition: Collaboration Role 
A collaboration role is a tuple CRole (CRname, {ERName,Org_name}, Res, 
PrivSet), where CRname is the collaboration role name, {ERName,Org_name} 
provides the enterprise role name associated with the respective organization, 
Res is the resource added to the collaboration workspace and PrivSet is the set 
of privileges accorded to this role on the data set associated with the resource. 
 
Example: Consider an inter-enterprise IT collaboration team formed to integrate 
customer databases of two companies ABC, and XYZ. Here, a collaboration role 
associated with this system could be: 
CRole (Team_Lead, {IT Lead, ABC }, CIS, unrestricted). 
 
In this example, a collaboration role Team_lead is defined, and user assigned to 
this role is an IT Lead with ABC organization with unrestricted access to the 
resource CIS (Customer Information System). 
The SCODA model, the adapted RBAC model emphasizing access control privileges as 
attributes of relationship between a role and resource, and the definitions of resource, 
enterprise role, functional role, and collaboration role will pave the way for rest of the 
discussion in this chapter. 
6.4 Security across CODA 
In Section 6.2, in the context of discussing the SCODA model (Figure 6.2), it is stated 
that security must be built into the entire onboarding lifecycle. In this section, this aspect 
of the process model will be elaborated. First, a discussion on security requirements 
provides insight into what security means in the general context of undertaking any type 
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of project – product development, application development etc. This is followed by a 
discussion on collaborative sharing patterns and access control requirements in 
dynamic collaboration. Finally, this section discusses how to build security in across the 
onboarding collaboration life cycle. 
6.4.1  Security Requirements 
There is no general consensus about the definition of security requirement in the 
literature. The term security itself is an overloaded term because it means many 
different things to academic researchers, practitioners, businesses, end users, and 
government. In today’s uncertain world, characterized by terrorism, the word security is 
tagged to everything from national security, energy security, food security, economic 
security, financial security, etc. These terms have become particularly prevalent in this 
society after the unfortunate disruptions caused by hackers, international information 
espionage, terrorists, and the alleged government sponsored network breaches. The 
nuances of security are presented here because they bring out some fundamental 
characteristics of what security implies to people, organizations, governments, and the 
global world we live in. Figure 6.5 lists the essential characteristics embodied in the 
various forms in which security is discussed.  
 
Loss of Lives Disruption Harm 
Financial Loss Liability Privacy Compromise 
Denial of service Shutdown of systems Unwarranted 
disclosure 
Figure 6-5: Common characteristics of security 
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Underlying these characteristics is a sense of losing something that was not intended. 
In order to prevent such losses, security requirements must be captured right at the 
beginning of any undertaking so that they can be designed, developed, and monitored 
across the entire project lifecycle, be it in product or application development, or in 
undertakings such as onboarding acquisitions. In [153], the author observes that 
security is a poorly addressed topic in product development and suggests that it should 
be addressed in the context of functional requirements. Firesmith [154] argues that most 
engineers and developers are inadequately trained to elicit, analyze, and specify 
security requirements. Haley [155] observes that standards like US National Institute of 
Standards and Technology computer security handbook recommend that security 
requirements be documented in terms of security mechanisms which are essentially 
treated as functional requirements. The author also argues that defining security 
requirements as functional requirements leaves out other critical information: what 
objects need protecting and why the objects need protecting. The author makes a case 
for treating security requirements as constraints on functional requirements rather than 
being functional requirements themselves. Tondel et. al [153] present additional insights 
into various approaches suggested in the literature to capture security requirements 
based on use cases, misuse/abuse cases, security goals, information assets, process 
planning etc. 
For this research the definition of security requirement begins with the question: 
What does security mean to an organization? 
This is the approach discussed by the well-known security researcher Matt Bishop in his 
paper [156]. It is self-evident that security has the nuances depicted in Figure 6.5, but 
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what this question implies is that organizations may have certain requirements that 
should be met. For example, consider an educational institution that provides courses 
online and also access to a student information system that includes grade and other 
student pertinent information. They probably require that this system be accessible 
online via the internet to students and faculty. They may also require that confidentiality 
and integrity of grades and other data, which is student specific, be maintained. For 
them this is a security requirement. Contrast this to a highly secretive government 
organization like an intelligence department. This department may require that 
confidentiality of all data is maintained and they may further require that internet access 
and telecommuting be prohibited. They may not want their staff working remotely to 
download confidential data into their home computers which may not meet the security 
standards of the intelligence department.  
These examples illustrate why security requirements are really about what security 
means to an organization. In order to define a security requirement from the perspective 
of this research, another attribute is considered, the notion of Risk. From a practical 
perspective, risk provides a way to quantify and take a meaningful decision about 
whether a requirement is really a requirement or not. In addition it also provides 
additional insights into the type of security mechanisms that should be put in place to 
secure the object of interest. ISO 31000 (2009)/ISO Guide 73:2002 define risk as 
follows: 
Definition: Risk (ISO 31000 (2009) /ISO Guide 73:2002) 
Effect of uncertainty on objectives.  Uncertainties include events (which may or may 
not happen) and uncertainties caused by ambiguity or a lack of information. It also 
includes both negative and positive impacts on objectives. 
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In the context of this research, risk has a negative connotation as is characterized in the 
information security research. This definition of risk is as follows: 
 
Definition: Risk (ISO/IEC 27005:2008)  
The potential that a given threat will exploit vulnerabilities of an asset or group of 
assets and thereby cause harm to the organization. 
 
The definition of security requirements is as follows: 
 
Definition of Security Requirement 
A security requirement characterizes what the organization wants to achieve in 
terms of protecting its information along with an assigned risk (extended from [156]). 
 
It should be noted that this definition is an extension of the notion of the security 
requirement as discussed in [156]. When a collaboration team comes together, they 
discuss the roles and responsibilities along with what information assets are put in the 
collaboration repository. In this context, when they evaluate the risk levels associated 
with certain information assets, it will allow them to put the necessary security measures 
in place. 
 
In this research, when designing secure collaboration systems, security is characterized 
by four components, three of which are adapted from [156], while the fourth component 
is a contribution of this research. 
 Requirements (adapted from [156]) 
Define security objectives. They answer the question: “what do you expect 
security to do for you?” 
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 Risk (contribution of this research)) 
Characterizes the loss when security is compromised either in quantifiable 
or qualitative terms.  
 Policy (adapted from [156]) 
A logical design to implement the meaning of security. It answers the 
question: “what steps do you take to reach the goals set by security 
requirements?”  
 Mechanisms (adapted from [156]) 
Implement and manage policies. They answer the question: “what tools, 
procedures, and other ways do you use to ensure that above policies are 
followed and adhered to?” 
 
This research also adopts the viewpoint that security requirements are not functional 
requirements. Instead, they occur only in the context of functional requirements and 
qualify these with constraints pertaining to what security objectives an organization 
wants to achieve in the context of implementing the functional requirements. In essence 
security requirements are contextual in nature. Without a context, there is no reference 
within which meaningful security requirements can be captured.  
 
6.4.2 Collaboration Patterns and Sharing Requirements 
 
Collaboration Patterns 
Collaboration occurs in many domains and varies in scale, size, duration, number of 
people, etc. On one end of the spectrum is the collaboration that happens in the 
development of open source software characterized by thousands of people 
participating, sharing documents, code, etc. On the other end of the spectrum is 
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collaboration teams of two (by definition collaboration requires two entities/people). 
From another perspective, there is collaboration between educational institutions, 
government, industry and university partnerships etc. Underlying all these types of 
collaboration some distinctive patterns emerge both in terms of the nature of 
collaboration, organization, relationships, and sharing. The purpose of this section is to 
discuss these collaborative sharing patterns and put this research in perspective. These 
classifications are based on insights from this research. 
 
Open vs. Closed  
 An open collaboration is characterized by the fact that anyone (an 
organization or an individual) can participate in collaboration with minimal 
restrictions or criteria to join the collaboration efforts. Examples of open 
collaboration include open source development, crowd sourcing, 
government sponsored research activities and numerous community 
driven efforts to improve lives of people around the world.  
 A closed collaboration is characterized by specific collaboration 
relationships between two or more entities, most often to accomplish 
specific objectives. For example, companies collaborate for joint product 
development, countries collaborate to counter terrorism, and educational 
institutions collaborate to offer joint programs. 
Structured vs. Dynamic 
 Structured collaborations are characterized by well-defined processes, 
procedures, access control management etc. where collaboration 
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relationships are defined and stable over a period of time. An example of 
this is GRID based collaboration in virtual organizations. 
 Dynamic collaborations are characterized by their ad hoc, spontaneous 
interactions and usage patterns. An example of this is organizations 
coming together to work on a joint initiative, typically characterized by a 
fixed short time duration.  
Stable vs. Transient  
 Stable collaborations typically have a longer duration and characterized by 
established access and trust relationships over a longer period of time. 
For example, organizations which have defined access policies for their 
defined and established roles fall under this category. 
 Transient collaborations are characterized by the temporary nature of 
collaboration, typically short duration, or with no pre-established trust 
relationships.  
 
Based on the classification of collaboration patterns, the nature of inter-enterprise 
collaboration in onboarding considered in this research is classified as closed, dynamic 
and transient.  
6.4.3 Sharing Requirements 
Collaboration by definition implies sharing of information. In dynamic collaboration the 
participants share artifacts. The nature of collaboration is such that certain requirements 
must be in place for successful collaboration. During the course of the collaboration, 
participants are either added to the collaboration team or they are removed and 
information assets are constantly added, deleted, or updated. The relationships 
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themselves are continuously changing with new relationships identified, and existing 
relationships modified. Due to the dynamic nature of this collaboration it is not possible 
to define all these systematically at the beginning of collaboration. The essential 
collaboration sharing requirements identified by this research include: 
 
 Each information asset should have a designated owner so that in the course of 
collaboration the owner can be included in managing access to the assets. 
 Information asset owners should have the capability to define collaboration 
relationships and access control criteria when they publish the asset into the 
collaboration space. 
 A process for publishing and subscribing to information assets in collaborative 
space should be established. This will allow that participants a systematic way of 
publishing information assets into collaboration space and also allow them to 
request access to information assets. 
 A process for managing notifications should be established. During collaboration 
when changes happen like adding and deleting information assets, personnel 
changes etc. the notification process is followed. 
 
This set of requirements pertain to the scenario of sharing of information assets, 
creating the awareness about an information asset inclusion or deletion in the 
collaboration work space, and ability for participants to request access to information 
assets. The next section presents access control requirements in dynamic collaboration. 
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6.5  General Access Control Requirement in Dynamic Collaboration 
Access control requirements in dynamic collaboration have been investigated by 
several researchers. One of the early research papers in early 1990s [98] summarized 
access control requirements in the context of computer supported Cooperative Work 
(CSCW) as follows: 
 Access control models must be easy to use and transparent for end users. 
 Access control-produced effects on the rest of the system must be clear and 
easy to understand. 
 Access control models must allow us great expressiveness (taking into 
account aspects such as roles, execution tasks, access request data, etc.) 
and these models should enable us to specify complex access policies at 
different levels of detail. 
 Models must be dynamic so as to enable specification, delegation, revocation 
and management of access policies in runtime (Meta Access Control). 
As new paradigms of dynamic collaborations have evolved, access control 
requirements to support these environments have evolved too. Additional access 
control requirements have been discussed in [97], where the author discusses the 
importance of integrating security elements in the initial models used to understand and 
describe the system functionalities. A summary of access control requirements for 
collaborative systems as discussed by various researchers is presented in [153]: 
 Access control must be applied and enforced at a distributed level. 
 Access control models should be generic and enable access rights to be 
configured to meet the needs of a wide variety of cooperative tasks and 
enterprise models. 
 Access control for collaboration requires greater scalability in terms of the 
quantity of operations than tradition single user models. 
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 Access control models must be able to protect information and resources of any 
type and at varying levels of granularity. 
 Access control models must facilitate transparent access for authorized users 
and strong exclusion of unauthorized users in a flexible manner that does not 
constrain collaboration. 
 Access control models must allow high level specification of access rights, 
thereby better managing the increased complexity that collaboration introduces. 
 Access control models for collaboration must be dynamic, that is, it should be 
possible to specify and change policies at runtime depending on the environment 
or collaboration dynamics. 
 Performance and resource costs should be kept within acceptable bounds. 
 
This research agrees with these observations about access control requirements in the 
context of dynamic collaboration. However, from the perspective of this research the 
most desirable access control requirements are the following, some of which are above 
requirements that are reinterpreted and/or restated. 
 Security goals should be documented and they in turn drive access control 
decisions. 
 Higher level of abstractions to specify access control should be defined since the 
abstractions at the participant level only may be difficult because of the challenge 
of documenting all participants in inter-enterprise collaboration. 
 Access to resources should be determined dynamically since statically defined 
access policies may not necessarily apply due to the dynamic nature of adding 
new information assets and the transient nature of participants. 
 Access control requirements must specify what objects need protection, why they 
need protection, and an associated risk factor. 
 Access to an object controlled by community of participants need to be 
determined. 
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 Denial of object access for certain roles need to be determined. This pertains to 
explicit denial of access. 
 Escalation path for access control need to be determined. 
 Publish/Subscribe mechanism for information assets need to be determined. 
 
The next section discusses how to build security in using the SCODA model for inter-
enterprise collaboration. The abstractions of enterprise, functional, and collaboration 
roles, the collaboration sharing requirements, and the access control requirements 
discussed thus far are integral to building the appropriate access control framework in 
onboarding. 
 
6.6  Building Security in CODA 
This section builds on the preliminary discussion on SCODA in section 6.2. It shows the 
process steps that will enable collaboration teams to discuss roles, responsibilities, 
security objectives, security requirements in the creation phase. It further shows the 
steps for access control and management in the operational phase, incorporating the 
security knowledge discovery (of the operations phase) in the dissolve phase, and 
taking the necessary security and access control decisions in the archive phase. 
6.6.1 Security in the Create Phase 
The create phase is characterized by a set of baseline collaboration tasks as discussed 
in Section 6.2. Figure 6.6 depicts the activities in this phase. The details of these steps 
are as follows: 
 Form a team 
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This is the beginning step for inter-enterprise collaboration to onboard the 
acquired company. The SCODA model shows three higher levels of abstraction 
for the team: Acquisition team, Integration planning team, and Integration team. 
Each of these teams has a specific purpose in onboarding.  
Acquisition Team – this team is usually formed when the acquiring company and 
the to-be acquired company sign an agreement (often called the term sheet in 
the M&A literature). This team is responsible for conducting due diligence before 
final approval of the acquisition and the legal close. 
Integration Planning Team – this team is usually formed once the legal closure 
happens. This team is responsible for conducting integration analysis of the two 
company’s products, processes, employees, customers, partners etc. They 
typically define the various project team tracks and also define the processes, 
methods, and tools that the onboarding teams use for the entire onboarding 
lifecycle. 
Integration Team – this team is responsible for the actual execution of integration 
plans. Multiple teams come into existence to execute integration of numerous 
products, processes, etc. While the integration planning team defines the overall 
team tracks, the tracks themselves are populated with team members, shared 
information assets etc. 
 Identify Roles and Responsibilities 
The collaboration roles and the tasks are established. 
 Identify Information assets 
The set of information assets that the collaboration team needs are specified. 
 Specify access control requirements 
Define the access control policies pertinent to the collaboration team.  
 Conduct Risk Analysis 
Identify risks associated with the information assets. The risk levels could be 
qualitative such as High, Medium, and Low. Alternatively, it could be based on 
whatever the risk analysis schemes that were defined at the enterprise level. The 
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key insight provided by this step will enable identification of assets that the team 
is willing to publish for dynamic access control in the community.  
 Identify information assets for dynamic access management 
These are the information assets that the team is willing to publish for dynamic 
access control where other community members could gain access to these 
assets based on community driven trust. 
 Publish information assets 
Put the information assets in the collaboration space and publish. 
 
Figure 6-6: Create phase activities 
 
6.6.2 Security in Operate Phase 
The operate phase is characterized by the teams undertaking the specific onboarding 
tasks assigned to the team. For example, assume the team comprises of the sales 
Form a team 
Identify Roles and 
Responsibilities 
Identify Information Assets 
Specify Access Control 
Requirments 
Risk Analysis 
(Specify Risks) 
Identify Information Assets for 
dynamic access management 
Publish Information Assets 
Publish and 
Subscribe 
System 
Repository 
of security 
objectives 
Notification 
System 
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personnel from the acquired and the acquiring company. One of the operational tasks 
for this team is to assimilate the information of the sales business process of the 
acquired team such as the list of customers, sales pipeline data, etc. In the course of 
the operate phase new discoveries could be made such as the need to add new 
information assets into the repository, invite other members to join the team, forming 
new relationships with other teams, etc. Addressing security must be integral to all 
these activities in the operate phase. Figure 6.7 depicts the activities in this phase.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note that for simplicity, the figure does not show the global repository of security 
objectives, publish and subscribe system, and the notifications systems. They are 
available as necessary for activities throughout the SCODA lifecycle. In the operate 
Yes 
No 
Add Participant 
Does the participant 
qualify to be in the team? 
Notify participants 
Assign Role and 
perform the relevant 
create phase activities 
Update team roster 
Escalate 
Publish Resource 
Specify Access Control 
Requirements 
Risk Analysis 
(Specify Risk) 
Specify if the resource is managed 
by dynamic access control 
 
Publish Resource & update 
resource list 
Notify participants 
Figure 6-7: Operate phase: publish resource and add participant 
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phase, two other activities are the deletion of a resource from a repository and 
termination of team members. These should be handled similarly to what has been 
depicted in Figure 6.7.  
6.6.3 Security in Dissolve Phase 
This phase essentially signifies terminating the team as soon as their onboarding tasks 
are completed. Terminating a team is critical from a security viewpoint because 
termination implies that the team will not have access to business sensitive documents 
beyond the required time. Figure 6.8 shows these activities.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Review projects tasks and 
sign-off completion 
Review Access Privileges 
 
Document findings in Continuous 
Process Improvement Repository 
 
Assign designated Person to Archive 
Role 
Notify Collaboration Teams 
Who needs extended 
access? 
Identify access privileges; assign 
appropriate collaboration role 
Terminate access to team (other than 
for designated archive person 
Figure 6-8: Dissolve phase activities 
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This phase of the SCODA process addresses the concern expressed by survey 
participants that access to collaboration space has not been terminated promptly after 
their role ended. In addition, this phase emphasizes the importance of documenting 
findings of the team in a continuous process improvement repository. The team would 
have gained knowledge in the course of their collaboration about the collaboration roles 
and responsibilities, which type of documents were accessed in dynamic collaboration, 
and which roles may have been added after the team began operations, etc. All this 
knowledge is useful for future onboarding collaboration endeavors.  
The designated archivist in each team is granted extended access at the time of team 
dissolution. This will facilitate the proper execution of activities in the archive phase 
where the archivist collaborates with the enterprise IT team. 
6.6.4 Security in Archive Phase 
The concept of archive is that something is stored away and is not accessible in real 
time. To gain access to the archived information there will be some processes and 
procedures to restore and make it available for real time access. In the SCODA model, 
this is the phase where once the team is dissolved, it is still important to archive the 
information assets so that they are not available for real time access. The security 
activities in this phase include identification of a role that has authority to restore 
archived information assets, determining if a particular information asset need to be 
archived etc. From the viewpoint of the SCODA model this phase is a recommended 
step for all collaborating teams. However, the actual archiving authority may rest with 
one designated team in the overall onboarding process lifecycle. In this case, when a 
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team dissolves, the authorized archive person has to collaborate with the designated 
archive team.  
This section discussed how to build security across the onboarding collaboration 
lifecycle. It emphasized how organizations must define what security means to them in 
onboarding collaboration. This will further drive identification of security requirements. 
The concept of risk and risk analysis is integrated in security requirements. This will 
provide guidance to the collaboration team to identify those information assets that they 
could possibly publish and let other teams in collaboration access dynamically without 
statically defined access policies. The next section discusses how these information 
assets are accessed dynamically based on the concept of Trust. 
 
6.7 Trust in Dynamic Collaboration 
Trust is a mechanism studied in the information security literature in making access 
control decision in dynamic collaboration. It is often not possible to define all access 
control policies up front because of the dynamic nature of collaboration where people 
from different organizations collaborate dynamically toward achieving a goal. In the 
context of dynamic collaboration, when a person requests access to a resource, the 
decision to either grant or deny is based on trust. This section discusses how trust is 
integrated into the SCODA model in dynamic collaboration. The concept of trust is 
discussed first and its general characteristics are presented. Security deals with the 
concept of Risk. The relationship between trust and risk is explored. Finally, the role of 
trust and its context in the SCODA model is discussed. 
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6.7.1  What is Trust?  
Trust is defined in similar terms in both the oxford dictionary [157] and in the online 
dictionary [158] as follows: 
Definition: Trust  
Firm belief in the reliability, truth, ability, or strength of someone or something 
[157]. 
Reliance on the integrity, strength, ability, surety, etc., of a person or thing; 
confidence [158]. 
From a human collaboration viewpoint, trust is a subjective notion and implies an 
individual’s opinion of another. It could be based on evidence available to the individual. 
Also, trust is asymmetric in the sense that two individuals need not have similar trust in 
each other [159]. Numerous research disciplines have explored the concept of trust and 
how to design, implement, and reason about trust in an objective manner. In the social 
sciences discipline, the paper [160] describes trust as something a cognitive agent has 
with another agent in the context of goals and beliefs. An agent trusts another relative to 
a goal. In the words of the author “Trust is a mental state, a complex attitude of an 
agent x towards another agent y about the behavior/action relevant for the result (goal) 
g.” When an agent X trusts another agent Y in the context of a goal “g”, X has belief that 
Y will perform some action “α”. The notion of delegation is implied in trust. Trust plays a 
key role in ecommerce. The specification of trust in such applications is discussed in 
[161]. The buyers must trust suppliers in their competencies, honesty etc., while the 
suppliers must trust buyers that they can pay for goods or services. In their model, the 
components of a trust relationship are: 1) trustor – subject that trusts a target entity 
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trustee, 2) trustee, 3) a specific context with associated level of trust, and 4) the 
conditions under which this relationship becomes active.  The authors define trust as a 
quantified belief by a trustor with respect to the competence, honesty, security and 
dependability of a trustee within a specified context. Trust is not symmetric, so this 
belief by the trustor does not imply any similar belief by the trustee. They developed a 
specification notation called SULTAN (Simple Universal Logic-oriented Trust Analysis 
Notation) to specify, analyze and manage trust relationships for Internet applications.  
There is no universally accepted definition of what trust is or how trust should be 
managed [162]. It has been defined from the perspective of social sciences and 
cognitive psychology, e-commerce, business management, etc. The attributes 
associated with the notion of trust include reliability, competence, dependability, 
availability, honesty, truthfulness and security. The characteristics of trust relevant for 
this research in the context of onboarding collaboration are as follows: 
 trust is a relationship between two or more entities. 
 trust is not a symmetrical relationship between entities. 
 there are different levels or abstractions of trust relationships in the context of an 
enterprise, and inter-enterprise collaboration. 
 trust is context sensitive. 
 it is governed by conditions under which the trust relationships become active. 
 trust and risk are integral to making access control decisions. 
 trust evidence in dynamic collaboration build over a period of time and is used to 
make access control decisions. 
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This research considers trust in the context of collaboration and defines it as follows: 
Definition: Collaboration Trust  
Quantifiable relationship between trustor and trustee entities; it includes actions 
allowed on the shared resource and the associated risk.  
This notion is captured as follows: 
Collaboration trust is an ordered tuple: CT (Trustor, Trustee, Resource, Actions, 
Risk). 
6.7.2  Risk vs. Trust 
This research has discussed the notion of risk in the context of security. Security can 
also be viewed as risk management because the goal of security is to essentially 
protect information assets while risk analysis provides insights into the costs associated 
with breach of protection like accidental or malicious leakage of confidential information, 
denial of service, etc. When an entity trusts another entity the assumption is that the 
trustee is expected to behave in a certain way to execute the actions. For example, 
consider collaboration between sales organizations in acquirer company A and 
Company B, the company being acquired. Their collaboration requires sharing of 
sensitive information such as top customers, sales processes, etc. The expected 
behavior in this collaboration is that people from both companies would not divulge such 
sensitive information to anyone outside of this collaboration team. Risk quantifies the 
negative consequences if this expected behavior is compromised. The SCODA model 
proposed in this research integrates security in all phases and takes the view point that 
when trust relationships are defined they must also include the risk so that the 
appropriate dynamic access control decisions can be taken. 
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6.7.3 Trust taxonomy in Onboarding 
Collaboration occurs at different organizational layers, both within an enterprise and 
across inter-enterprise domains. Accordingly the trust relationships must be defined to 
model these types of intra-enterprise and inter-enterprise collaborations. This research 
has identified the following types of trust relationships: 
 intra-enterprise peer to peer trust between employees of the same functional 
unit.  
 intra-enterprise trust between peers of the same organization within an 
enterprise. 
 inter-enterprise peer to peer trust within the context of same functional unit. 
 inter-enterprise peer to peer trust between the enterprises at the organization 
level. 
 community trust. 
For the purpose of this research two key trust abstractions, strong trust and weak trust 
are defined in the context of onboarding:  
1. For two entities, X and Y in a collaboration strong trust is denoted by 
X              Y; where X and Y belong to the same company 
2. For two entities, X and Y in a collaboration, weak trust is denoted by 
X              Y; where X and Y belong to the two different companies 
Consider a set of two entities: {X, Y}. Consider an entity Z which requests access to 
collaboration space shared by X and Y. The possible trust relationships are:  
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Case 1: X              Y; Y             Z ; implies X, Y and Z belong to the same     
company 
Case 2: X              Y; Y             Z ; implies X and Y belong to the same     
company; Z is in the other company and Y and Z have a weak trust 
relationship 
Case 3: X              Y; Y             Z ; implies X and Y belong to different 
companies; Y and Z belong to the same company 
Case 4: X              Y; Y             Z ; implies X, Y, and Z belong to three different 
companies; useful in the context of a three way M&A (not considered in 
this research) 
 
The strong and weak trusted relationships modeled are level 1 trust relationships based 
on whether the collaborating entities are within one company or they are from different 
companies. The concept can be extended further by considering other attributes like, for 
example, if the entities belong to the same functional unit with a company or not. These 
additional dimensions will lead to different levels of abstraction for trust relationships. 
Cases 1, 2, and 3 are useful for understanding how trust is handled in the SCODA 
model. For simplicity, an entity represents a collaboration team member for the rest of 
this discussion. 
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6.8   Trust Management in the SCODA model  
6.8.1 In the context of onboarding, these trust relationships must be defined for 
better security management. The emphasis of this research is on 
illustrating the importance of trust management in onboarding where there 
is dynamic collaboration. Apriori, as discussed earlier, it is not possible to 
define access control policies statically in the dynamic environment of 
onboarding lifecycle. New teams form dynamically, team members are 
added and deleted, new documents are published in the repository, and 
sometimes team members need access to resources and documents 
dynamically for which no access control policies have been defined earlier. 
In this context, defining trust relationships will facilitate streamlining of 
access control decisions. The rest of the section illustrates how trust can 
be addressed in the various phases of the SCODA model. The discussion 
emphasizes the role of trust and it provides high level guidance to teams in 
terms of managing access in dynamic collaboration. For the purpose of 
this research and to facilitate the trust management discussion, only two 
levels of trust, strong and weak trust, have been defined in narrow scope. 
In practice, the teams could use the discussion presented here as a basis 
to extend the trust model that better suits their dynamic access control 
management needs in onboarding. Finally, an illustrative example of how 
trust is used in dynamic access management in onboarding is presented in 
section 6.8.2.Create Phase 
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Trust management is initiated in this phase of the SCODA lifecycle. Collaboration teams 
are formed and information assets are put in the collaboration repository. The trust 
relationship cases 1, 2 and 3 guide the automatic assignment of trust relationships 
among the collaboration team members. By default, there will be strong trust 
relationships among members of the same organization while weak trust relationships 
are automatically assigned to inter-enterprise relationship between the collaboration 
team members. 
 
6.8.2 Operate Phase 
In this phase, the following events must be addressed by trust management: 
 A member requesting to be added to collaboration team 
The activities shown in Figure 6.7 (add participant) in section 6.6.2 is applied with 
the additional task of creating new trust relationships among all participants. 
 A member deleted from collaboration team 
Trust relationships must be updated so that there are no trust relationships 
pointing to the deleted team member. The rest of the activities of the Operations 
Phase when a member is deleted are executed as discussed in section 6.6.2. 
 Another collaboration team member requesting access to some information asset 
that has been designated for dynamic access  
This situation occurs because after a collaboration team publishes its information 
assets, members of other collaboration teams may sometimes need access to 
these assets in the context of their responsibilities. It should be noted that the 
members requesting access are not being added to the team; they are just 
requesting access to specific information asset. Granting access is determined 
by the following factors:  
1) Requesting team member must have a trust relationship with at least 
one of the members of the collaboration team,  
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2) The collaboration team member who has the trust relationship must 
sponsor the requestor,  
3) The collaboration team votes either to grant or deny access,  
4) Requestor gets notified,  
5) Relationship between the different collaboration teams noted from a 
lesson learned perspective. 
 
Consider the following example to illustrate the case of dynamic access control based 
on trust relationships. Table 6.1 shows the onboarding collaboration roles for company 
1 (C1) and company 2 (C2) (acquired company). The following trust relationships are in 
place to begin with: 
Collaboration_Trust_rel (Bob, Sarah) because they both have responsibility for 
finance domain. Let this team be named Coll_team_Finance. This is denoted by: 
 Bob             Sarah 
Collaboration_Trust_rel (Mary, John) because they both have responsibility for 
Legal domain. Let this team be named Coll_team_legal. This is denoted by: 
Mary              John 
Trust_rel (Bob, Mary) because they both belong to same company. This is 
denoted by: 
Bob               Mary 
Trust_ rel (John, Sarah) because they both belong to the same company. This is 
denoted by: 
John               Sarah 
Table 6-1: Onboarding collaboration assignment 
Emp Company Ent. 
Role 
Coll Role Content 
domain 
Bob C1 Finance Principal 
Finance 
Finance 
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Lead 
Mary C1 Legal Principal 
Legal 
Lead 
Legal 
John C2 Legal Legal Legal 
Sarah C2 Finance Finance Finance 
 
Now let us assume that John in company C2 would like to access the finance data 
which happens to be an information asset held in collaboration team responsible for 
financial data of which Bob and Sarah are the team members. Since he does not have 
access to this data he needs to go to his trusted relationship with Sarah and request her 
to sponsor him for access to the finance data. If Sarah agrees to sponsor him then she 
will bring up this request to her community which will vote on the request.  
6.8.3 Dissolve 
In this phase, the emphasis is on deleting the trusted relationships established in the 
context of the collaboration team, and updating the trusted relationships repository so 
that for future endeavors of onboarding new insights are available for relationships that 
need to be established in the Create phase. 
6.8.4 Archive 
There is no direct activity related to trust management in this phase other than to 
archive the relationships that are established during the course of onboarding. 
This section discussed the characteristics associated with trust and defined a trust 
taxonomy with reference to onboarding. It has formally defined the concepts of strong 
trust and weak trust which reflect intra company trust and inter-company trust among 
collaboration team members. Additionally, the section has discussed how dynamic trust 
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management is integrated into the SCODA model. The next section discusses how 
dynamic collaboration can be viewed as a self-organizing system so that as knowledge 
is acquired during the course of onboarding, the access control management system 
integrates this new knowledge for further access control decisions. 
 
6.9 Self-Organization in Dynamic Collaboration 
That Systems are large and complex is an observation made by researchers since the 
beginning of time as we know it. In the 1950s there was a concerted effort to design a 
general systems theory to understand the large and complex systems [163]. General 
systems theory attempts to formulate a theory which abstracts the discipline-driven 
theories like the theories in biology, physics, chemistry etc. [164]. Self-organization has 
been actively studied in the context of systems theory. Since then self-organization has 
been recognized as a pervasive phenomenon and has been used to study simple 
physical and chemical systems to large and complex social and cultural systems [165]. 
The concept of self-organizing systems is difficult to define precisely because a given 
system may be viewed as self-organizing at one level of abstraction while it may be 
viewed otherwise at another level of abstraction. Intuitively, self-organization suggests 
systems that appear to organize themselves without external direction, manipulation, or 
control [166]. Self-organization has been defined as a process in which the internal level 
of organization of a system increases automatically without being guided or managed 
by an outside source [167].  In cell biology it has been defined as the capacity of a 
macromolecular complex or organelle to determine its own structure based on the 
functional interactions of its components [168]. Common characteristics of the self-
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organized systems studied are the complexity and dynamicity of the problem domains. 
Computer Science and IT enabled systems use self-organization as a modeling tool to 
understand the requirements of complex internet-driven applications and design 
solutions that are self-organizing. This is because it is impossible to know apriori all the 
possible interactions, relationships, and outcomes in the complex environment of inter-
enterprise collaborations which are geographically spread. Self-organization has been 
investigated in information security (as discussed in the literature survey in this thesis) 
in managing access in ad hoc networks, distributed management of contextual data etc. 
Case studies of self-organization in computer science are discussed in [115].  The 
dynamic collaboration that this research discusses has the characteristics of self-
organizing systems. The rest of the section presents general characteristics of self-
organizing systems, and the characteristics of trust based dynamic collaboration. This 
leads to a comparative analysis of common features of self-organizing systems and 
dynamic collaboration. Finally, it discusses the application of self-organization in 
SCODA model. 
6.9.1  Characteristics of Self-Organization 
Many disciplines have studied self-organizing systems. A summary of characteristics of 
self-organizing systems discussed in the literature are the following [169]: 
 The appearance of structure or a pattern without any external agent imposing it. 
An example is the crystallization where there is an appearance of symmetric 
patterns from a random collection of molecules. It is as if the system of molecules 
knows how to arrange itself into some ordered pattern.  
 A multitude of initially independent components that end up working together in 
some cohesive manner. An example is neural networks where all neurons work 
independently but are also connected and together make sense of the input to 
  
164 
 
the brain. Another example of collective behavior is found in the animal world of 
herds and swarms. 
 Absence of centralized control. For example, there is no centralized control in the 
brain and the connected neuron network makes the decisions collectively. 
 Adaptation to changing environment. Examples of this include biological 
systems, adaptation to environment changes, etc. 
 Global Order from local interactions. An example in physics is the scenario of 
magnetization where it is shown how a dis-organized set of magnetic pins 
becomes organized at cooler temperature. 
 Distributed control. The brain is an example of distributed control. Though there 
are specialized regions of the brain no region is responsible for the overall 
functioning of the brain. 
 Positive and Negative feedback. Magnetization is an example where under the 
influence of external magnetic field has influence on the spins of the magnetized 
iron which align themselves according to the strength of the magnetic field. 
 Dynamic. An example of this from the business world is where markets correct 
themselves based on numerous financial factors. 
 Internal level of organization of a system increases automatically without being 
guided or managed by an outside source. 
 
6.9.2 Characteristics of Dynamic Collaboration 
The dynamic collaboration in onboarding exhibits the following characteristics 
 Apriori, one cannot conceive of all possible configurations, purposes, or problems 
that the collaboration environment may be confronted with.  
 Access control decisions cannot be pre-determined completely at the beginning 
of the onboarding lifecycle. 
 Access control decisions are made independently by various collaborating 
teams. 
 There is a feedback loop into the access control system as and when new 
access control decisions are made by independent collaborating teams. 
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 There is a feedback loop into a knowledge gathering system for future 
instantiations of onboarding collaboration. 
 Adaptation of access control by various participants throughout the onboarding 
lifecycle. 
 
In essence the dynamic collaboration in onboarding exhibits many similarities in 
characteristics with respect to self-organizing systems. Self-organizing systems theory 
provides a perspective for studying systems and for designing, building, and controlling 
systems. A critical component of any such system is the concept of feedback and 
learning. As the system evolves, the knowledge gained from a collection of independent 
but co-operating entities is fed into a global repository which in turn facilitates new 
structures and processes in future instantiations. The next section illustrates self-
organization in the SCODA model. 
 
6.9.3  Self-organization in SCODA Model 
The inter-enterprise onboarding collaboration displays all the characteristics of self-
organizing systems described in the previous section. The following activities reflect the 
self-organization in the SCODA model: 
 Create Phase 
In the create phase, the self-organization principle of “seeding” the initial 
system is applied in terms of creating the necessary roles, responsibilities, 
collaboration relationships, adding information assets to the repository, and 
setting up access control policies. From the perspective of an “observer”, the 
system appears to be organized to begin with, as some self-organization 
researchers claim is a necessary aspect of such systems. 
 Operate Phase 
  
166 
 
It is in this phase that all characteristics of self-organizing systems are 
observable. The dynamicity of the system is reflected in the interaction and 
changes in terms of adding and deleting members, establishing new 
spontaneous collaborative relationships, creating new access control paths 
through community based decisions, the positive and negative feedback 
provided in the context of community based access control decisions, the 
distributed access control decisions of multiple collaboration teams and finally 
the knowledge assimilation of dynamic changes to the global access control 
framework. 
 Dissolve Phase 
The self-organization is evident in this phase when collaboration teams 
dissolve. There is dynamic change in terms of terminating roles, entities, and 
access to information assets. These changes are propagated throughout the 
other collaboration teams which subsequently organize themselves in terms 
of available relationships and paths to information access to continue the 
onboarding. 
 Archive Phase 
In this phase, it is not evident as to how the concepts of self-organization 
apply. One of the reasons that the perspective of self-organization is not 
applicable in this phase is that archiving is not a concept associated with self-
organizing systems. For natural self-organizing systems such as the stars, 
galaxies, biological systems there is no “end-of-life” state and they are in a 
state of organization in perpetuity. 
 
This section has shown how self-organization is a perspective that one could apply to 
understand the dynamic collaboration in onboarding. Perspectives, paradigms, models, 
etc. facilitate understanding of problem domains in well-defined abstractions and 
concepts. This in turn will enable the design, development, implementation, and 
operations of systems, a majority of which are driven by software in today’s world. One 
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of the important aspects of such environments is change. Change is an integral 
component of any enterprise. As an enterprise continues to operate, there will be 
changes in people, business processes, technologies etc. The next section discusses 
change management in the context of the onboarding lifecycle. 
6.10  Change Management in Onboarding 
The theoretical foundations of change management were based on the mathematical 
branches of theory of groups and theory of logical types [170]. These theories explained 
first order and second order changes. The first order changes focused on improving the 
processes and procedures of existing systems, while the second order changes focused 
on activities when the system itself is changed. For example, shifting the strategic focus 
of a business, or automating business processes is a first order change. An example of 
second order change is the process of withdrawing money from an ATM, ordering 
books online, etc. As the literature evolved new theories were proposed in between the 
two extremes of the first order and the second order. In addition, theories from 
psychology, sociology, etc., were combined to propose new change management 
perspectives which considered attributes such as motivation in an individual’s behavior 
[171].  
 
In the context of onboarding acquisitions, change management deals with changes at 
an enterprise level as well as changes within the context of dynamic collaboration itself. 
At the enterprise level changes occur in terms of assimilating and integrating the 
acquired company’s people, processes, technologies, customers, partners, and 
vendors. One of the key aspects of change management is not just the change itself but 
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the pace of change that can potentially inhibit successful onboarding [172].  Change 
management is viewed as a process by which an organization gets to its future state, its 
vision. While traditional planning processes delineate the steps on the journey, change 
management attempts to facilitate that journey. The main focus of change management 
in this research is about how to manage changes in dynamic collaboration. These 
changes encompass changes in roles, responsibilities, access control policies, etc., 
during the dynamic collaboration in onboarding. Change management in this context 
must also capture the lessons learned from a continuous process improvement 
perspective.  A secondary focus is to provide insights into change management at a 
holistic level of enterprise level integration of an acquisition. This will provide a context 
to the change management discussion in the SCODA model. 
6.10.1  Enterprise Level Change Management in Onboarding Lifecycle 
Change is constant. Organizational change management is an approach that an 
enterprise adopts to ensure that changes are implemented in a well-defined manner 
and that they have long lasting benefits. Management researchers, behavioral and 
social scientists, and researchers in software engineering, information systems, 
computer science, and information technology continue to investigate the topic of 
change management. There are many enterprise change management models 
proposed in the literature such as Kotter’s eight steps to change [173], Bridge’s 
transition model [174], Roger’s five step process for technology adoption [175], Kubler-
Ross change curve model based on the five stages of the grieving process [176], 
Prosci’s ADKAR model [177]. Change management at the enterprise levels deals with 
changes in: 1) processes, 2) systems, 3) organizational structures, and 4) job roles. The 
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main objective of change management is to move a company from its current state to a 
future state that is aligned with the business strategy. To make the change there should 
be a structured set of activities. Project management provides the tactical structure to 
make the change happen. At the enterprise level change management initiatives, 
project management focuses on the tasks while change management focus on the 
people that are impacted by the change [177]. Figure 6.9 depicts components of change 
management in onboarding. It reflects onboarding acquisitions because it takes the 
company from an existing state to a future state in a systematic way through an 
onboarding lifecycle that includes both project and change management.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This research views change management in onboarding with different semantics than 
what the author defines in [177]. The semantics attributed to change management 
include the impact of changes during the onboarding lifecycle in roles, responsibilities, 
access control, knowledge assimilation and feedback into the collaboration knowledge 
vault, etc. In other words, change management, as discussed here, is not about people 
management only, as suggested in [177]. This research viewpoint of change 
Current State 
Transition State 
(onboarding) 
Future State 
Change Management 
Project Management 
Figure 6-9: Change management components in onboarding 
  
170 
 
management is prevalent in adopting technology solutions [7]. The next section 
discusses details of change management in dynamic collaboration in onboarding. 
6.10.2  Change Management in Dynamic Collaboration 
Figure 6.10 shows a domain model of onboarding an acquisition which includes 
collaboration teams, an information assets repository, a project management office, a 
dynamic collaboration learning system, a publish and subscribe system, a trust 
management system, and a security management system. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Project Management Office (PMO) is responsible for project execution. They are 
responsible for maintaining the overall project plan for all onboarding activities and for 
managing change from the perspective of maintaining information about resources, 
  PMO  
Acquisition 
Team 
Integration 
Teams 
Information Assets Repository 
Collaboration 
Learning 
System 
Publish and 
Subscribe 
System 
Trust 
Management 
System 
Security 
Management 
System 
Change 
Management  
Figure 6-10: Domain model of onboarding collaboration 
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timelines, deliverables, team communications and executive communications. In 
essence they are responsible for coordination, communication, and facilitating 
cooperation among all onboarding participants.  
The collaborating teams themselves will deal with change during the onboarding 
lifecycle. When new roles are created or existing roles are modified, this new 
information is transmitted to the collaboration learning system. In addition, when a 
collaboration team makes a dynamic access control decision using the trust 
management system, this information is also updated in the collaboration learning 
system. When a participant leaves a team, the access control management system is 
accordingly updated. When a collaborating team either adds or deletes information 
assets this information is transmitted to the collaboration learning system.  In addition, if 
a team identifies an information asset as available for dynamic access control, this 
information is transmitted to the publish and subscribe system so that other teams 
become aware of the newly added information assets. In a nutshell, this briefly 
describes the interaction between the various components of the onboarding 
collaboration domain model. Change management is integral to the overall access 
control management in onboarding collaboration. Instead of being prescriptive in its 
discussion, the objective here is to raise the awareness of the importance of change 
management in ensuring security across the entire onboarding lifecycle. 
6.11  Summary 
This chapter has presented a new access control model that emphasizes building 
security across the entire onboarding lifecycle. To begin with, it defined an onboarding 
collaboration model SCODA that every onboarding collaboration team should follow. In 
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this model, every collaboration team goes through a process lifecycle of: Create 
Operate, Dissolve, and Archive. It defined the concepts of enterprise, functional and 
collaboration roles as a means of addressing security. Next it discussed how security is 
addressed in all these phases of collaboration through the necessary algorithms. Trust 
and Risk are integral to security. This chapter defined and discussed how these are 
incorporated in managing security in dynamic collaboration to determine access 
dynamically through community trust. A key idea presented in this context is the 
importance of collaboration teams identifying information assets that are released for 
dynamic access. The chapter defined the concepts of strong and weak trust and 
discussed how these apply in determining dynamic access to information. The role of 
self-organization in understanding dynamic collaborations is discussed and it is shown 
that onboarding collaboration shares similar characteristics with self-organizing 
systems. Finally, the chapter presents a discussion on change management and further 
shows how change management is viewed from the perspective of this research.  
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7 Model Validation and Update 
“The expert knows more and more about less and less until he knows everything about nothing.” 
-- Mahatma Gandhi 
7.1 Introduction 
Verification and Validation are concepts extensively discussed in the computer science 
domain. They are independent procedures for checking that a product, system, model, 
or a service meets the requirements and specifications and that it fulfills its intended 
purpose [178]. The Project Management Book of Knowledge (PMBOK) guide, an IEEE 
standard, defines validation and verification as follows [179]:  
Validation 
The assurance that a product, service, or system meets the needs of the 
customer and other identified stakeholders. It often involves acceptance by and 
suitability for external customers.  
Verification 
The evaluation of whether or not a product, service, or system complies with a 
regulation, requirement, specification, or imposed condition. It is often an internal 
process.  
In practice, validation is associated with the question: are you building the right thing? 
And verification is associated with the question: are you building it right? In addition, 
these two terms are often used interchangeably. In the literature, the terms verification 
and validation are sometime preceded by the term “independent” to signify that these 
are performed by disinterested/independent third parties. This independent verification 
and validation is often denoted by the acronym IV&V.  In the context of this research the 
proposed approach and model was subject to expert validation which resulted in further 
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refinement. Expert validation was the chosen method because it provided an 
opportunity for numerous people associated with executing mergers and acquisitions 
such as M&A facilitators, business stake holders different functional units, IT architects, 
and Integration experts to review the proposed approach and model from the 
perspective of addressing collaboration security in onboarding an acquired company. 
The rest of the chapter discusses the details of expert validation. 
7.2 The Validation Method  
The new approach and model proposed in addressing access control in onboarding is 
of practical significance because of its intended usage in onboarding acquired 
companies. As a result, it was deemed appropriate to solicit review and feedback from 
industry experts to validate the proposed solution. It was further determined that at least 
five to seven experts who have experience in different aspects of onboarding are 
appropriate for providing the review and feedback on the proposed approach and 
model. The process used for validating the model with the experts is the following: 
1. Identify the validation experts 
The list of survey participants was analyzed to identify experts with 
backgrounds in different aspects of onboarding. The selected participants 
included people who managed acquisitions, integration planning, IT 
architects, security experts, academic professionals who are experts in 
process modeling, and business stakeholders involved in onboarding 
acquisitions. As discussed in Section 7.4, a total of 10 experts were selected. 
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2. Email the thesis to the experts. 
The experts’ tasks were the following: 
o Read the abstract to get an overview of the research 
o Review the approach and the model discussed in Chapter 6 
o Provide feedback, comments, and suggestions for improvement 
o Optionally read the other thesis chapters and provide any other 
feedback if they wish 
3. After one week, reached out to the experts to set up in person meetings 
o The meetings usually lasted between 1 and 2 hours on average.  
o The experts usually commented on the overall scope of the research, 
the structure of the thesis, the research methodologies and methods 
selected 
o The experts provided specific feedback solicited vis-à-vis the approach 
and model as discussed in Chapter 6. 
4. Once the model was refined based on the experts’ feedback, one final review 
was carried out by three experts and they have concurred with the 
refinements.  
The model was first validated with two experts which resulted in preliminary refinement. 
It was further validated with ten experts and resulted in further refinement. The rest of 
the chapter details the validation efforts, feedback from the experts in the industry, and 
the final refinement of the approach and the model. 
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7.3 The First Refinement 
The approach and model was evaluated by two researchers whose expertise is in 
business information systems, process modeling, and Total Quality Management 
(TQM). The reviewers’ feedback included the following key observations: 
 The SCODA model as shown in Figure 6.2 in Chapter 6 signifies unintended 
sequential flow from archive phase to create phase where the semantics of 
the flow is not well defined. 
 The “archive” phase discussion implies incorrectly that each team is doing its 
own archiving of data after the team’s work in onboarding is complete 
 The discussion in Chapter 6 implies that the output of this research and the 
processes and models described should together be labeled as “approach 
and model”. 
Figure 7.1 reflects the changes to the SCODA model based on the input from the first 
set of experts. It shows that every team during onboarding collaboration goes through 
the phases: 1) create, 2) operate, 3) dissolve, and 4) archive. The archive phase 
activities are more clearly defined in the final refinement discussed in Section 7.5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Onboarding 
Collaboration 
Teams 
Team Lifecycle 
Operate Create 
Archive Dissolve 
Security 
Figure 7-1: SCODA Model: First Refinement 
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7.4 The Experts Feedback 
The approach and model as discussed in chapter 6 was subjected to expert review in 
the industry. A total of ten experts were included in the review. The roles played by 
these experts in onboarding undertakings included two industry experts in mergers and 
acquisitions, two integration leaders, three functional leaders in marketing, vendor 
management, and partner management respectively, product development and 
engineering leader, three enterprise architects, two business leaders, and three IT 
architects. 
The feedback, observations, and comments gathered from these expert reviews are as 
follows: 
1. Information dissemination and declassification occurs during 
onboarding. In addition, information travels at different speeds and to 
different levels of stakeholders. During this process, the sensitivity of 
information changes. This characteristic could perhaps be reflected in 
the activities associated with the phases: create, operate, and dissolve. 
2. The SCODA model as depicted in Figure 6.2, Chapter 6, could be 
redrawn to show that each team goes through the stages of creation, 
operation, dissolution, with archiving coming as a last step where a 
designated team member will be responsible for initiating archiving of 
team artifacts. 
3. The archiving is not the responsibility of each of the teams. Instead, 
they initiate the process of archiving artifacts as the last activity where 
perhaps a designated IT team is responsible for performing the 
activities of archiving and restoring data. 
4. The acquisition team is alive until the acquisition integration is 
complete. 
5. There can be multiple integration teams during onboarding. 
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6. The model could in the future be generalized beyond acquisitions 
onboarding. In the general context the terminology could be changed to 
reflect two roles: 1) a role to reflect an existing entity, and 2) a role 
which represents an entity joining an existing entity. 
7. Show the activities reflecting that SCODA is self–organizing by 
depicting a feedback loop and monitoring. 
8. Specify who is responsible for archiving and monitoring of the archive. 
9. The trust levels should include at least one more level to characterize 
the scenario within the same enterprise where collaboration members 
belong either to the same functional unit or different functional units. 
10. Voting is an interesting idea but most often the team leader decides 
access rights in today’s environment. However, tying the concept of risk 
in making access control decisions dynamically should be explored as it 
speeds up decision making. 
11.  Mapping acquired company roles to acquiring company’s role is an 
important activity in determining access control. 
12.  There is a philosophy of “learn as you go” in integration. As a result the 
access control policies and decisions do change dynamically. 
13. New data is constantly generated during the onboarding as both 
companies are still operational. So, access control policies are 
constantly updated. 
14.  HR data access control policies are imposed by external security 
standards, while the business data access control policies are dictated 
by policies at the company level and easily controllable. 
15. Securing historical data is another facet of onboarding an acquisition. 
The feedback has provided insights into some of the issues that need to be addressed 
in the context of this research and in future work to enhance the applicability of this 
research in the general subject area of dynamic collaboration in other contexts. In the 
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next section, the updated approach and model based on experts’ feedback is 
presented.  
7.5 The Final Refinement 
Three aspects of the approach and model are refined based on experts’ feedback and 
suggestions: 1) refinement of the SCODA onboarding collaboration process model, 2) 
the activities associated with the four phases of the SCODA model, and 3) extending 
the trust taxonomy to model two different types of trust relationships in an enterprise. 
The details of these three refinements are presented in this section. 
7.5.1 Updated SCODA Onboarding Collaboration Process Model  
Figure 7.2 depicts the updated SCODA model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dissolve 
 
Integration Planning Team 
Team Lifecycle 
Operate Create 
Archive 
Security 
Acquisition Team 
Enterprise IT Security Team Enterprise Archival Team 
Other Collaboration Teams 
Integration Execution 
Teams 
Figure 7-2: Updated SCODA model 
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The key aspects of the model are as follows: 
1. The Acquisition team is called out to reflect the fact that this is a team that 
has the longest persistence in the entire onboarding lifecycle. 
2. The Archive Team is called out because it is responsible for all archival 
activities. In the archive phase, the team member responsible for archiving 
the team artifacts will work with the archival team which is a central resource. 
3. The Security team is called out to reflect the fact that all collaboration teams 
must address security and they need to collaborate, cooperate, and 
coordinate with the security team. 
4. The Integration Planning team is called out since they are responsible for the 
overall integration planning and they also project manage multiple streams of 
integration execution teams. 
7.5.2 Building Security in CODA (Create, Operate, Dissolve, Archive) 
The experts’ feedback resulted in updating the activities in each of the phases of the 
SCODA model. The details are the following. 
7.5.2.1 Building Security in Create Phase 
The updated activities in the create phase are shown in Figure 7.3. Data classification 
acquires importance in the context of dynamic access control management in 
onboarding collaboration. Data classified as subject to outside the enterprise policies, 
for example the human resources data regulated by federal and health care standards, 
is not something that would normally be assigned access automatically based on trust 
and voting schemes. Instead, when one requires access to such information, they may 
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have to submit their request to information security office and follow the corresponding 
policies and procedures. 
 
Figure 7-3: Security in create phase 
 
Form a team Identify Roles 
(enterprise, functional, collaboration) 
Identify shared 
information assets 
Classify Data 
Data governed by 
external compliance 
policies (ex: HR data) 
Business data (security 
policies established and 
controlled by enterprise) 
Specify access control 
requirements  
Perform risk analysis  
Identify information assets for 
dynamic access management  
Publish information assets in 
collaboration repository  
Onboarding Security 
Repository  
Collaboration  
Repository  
Publish and  
Subscribe system  
Notification 
System  
Self-Organizing Learning 
system  
  
182 
 
It should be noted that the proposed model does not impose this restriction.  It just 
suggests that this type of information requires closer scrutiny in terms of dynamic 
access control. The onboarding security repository will include all information pertaining 
to enterprise, functional, and collaboration roles, their access information, the 
information subject to dynamic access based on trust, and policies and procedures to 
grant access to information assets that could be requested during the onboarding 
collaboration.   
7.5.2.2 Building Security in Operate Phase 
In the operations phase, while the team is actively working on the onboarding tasks, 
additional data is generated, new information resources are added, new members may 
be included in the team, etc. It is imperative that access control be formally addressed 
for these dynamic scenarios where there is constant change in data and other 
resources, changes to team, changes to roles etc. Figure 7.4 shows how the SCODA 
model guides the activities of publishing new data resource and/or changing security 
requirements for existing data resource. The experts’ feedback helped in identifying that 
classification of data is an important element of addressing security in this phase. 
Another facet of operations phase is information distribution aspect as it ages over time 
and the risk associated with its dissemination changes. Over the period of onboarding 
collaboration, information is usually known to only a small set of people in the beginning 
stages and as the integration progresses, it is made available to the appropriate 
stakeholders and other participants. This implies that the onboarding security repository 
is constantly updated to reflect changed access control policies.  
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Figure 7-4: Adding a data resource and/or changing data security 
 
Figure 7.5 shows essential steps in adding member to an existing collaboration team. In 
this case, the important aspects of security is to assign the appropriate enterprise, 
functional, and collaboration role, specify the trust relationship if new collaboration role 
is established, update the team roster, and notify participants. For simplicity, not all the 
globally available resources such as the onboarding security repository are depicted. 
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Figure 7-5: Adding a member to collaboration team 
 
The activities in the dissolve and archive phase are similar. The key aspect in the 
dissolve phase is to identify a team member who will be the interface with the archival 
team. Once the archival request is sent to the appropriate entity/person, the team’s 
access to the collaboration repository is disabled and the onboarding security repository 
is updated. 
7.5.3 A Trust Taxonomy 
The experts’ feedback reinforced the ideas of this research that the concept of trust and 
risk are important considerations in dynamic access control in onboarding. The concept 
of strong and weak trust combined with assessment of risk in granting access is a viable 
option in access control in onboarding collaboration. The suggestion given by experts is 
to enhance the trust taxonomy to include three levels: 
Add Participant 
Does the participant 
qualify to be in the 
team? 
Notify participants 
Assign Role and 
Access 
Update team roster 
Escalate 
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1. Strong Trust – between collaborating team members within an enterprise 
where they belong to the same department or functional unit. 
2. Medium Trust – between collaborating team members within an enterprise 
and they belong to different departments/functional units. 
3. Weak trust – between collaborating team members who belong to different 
enterprises, one the acquiring company and the other is the company that is 
being acquired. 
This research accepts these recommendations. However, it should be noted that the 
key aspects of trust and risk proposed in this research is not prescriptive in nature. 
Different organizations can adapt the notions of trust taxonomy and risk discussed here 
to suit their needs in implementing access control in onboarding.  
7.6 Summary 
The experts review and their feedback validated the new approach and model 
discussed in this research. They agreed that this research will lead to a systematic 
approach in managing security in onboarding companies. The constructive feedback 
and suggestions provided the guidance to refine the approach and the model to better 
reflect the practice of onboarding collaboration in mergers and acquisitions. The critical 
aspect of security suggested by experts included the notion of data and information 
classification based on the externally guided security policies and the business driven 
policies. This distinction provides insights into determining the information assets that 
may be candidates for dynamic access management without pre-defined security 
policies. Finally, the enhanced trust taxonomy will facilitate better modeling of dynamic 
access control based on risk. 
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8 Conclusions 
“A journey of a thousand miles must begin with a single step.” – Lao Tzu 
 
 
8.1 The Journey 
This research undertaking is a consequence of insights gained from many different 
sources. The work experience in the industry encompassing information security, 
onboarding, and change management has enabled the identification of possible gaps 
that need to be addressed in collaboration security. The literature review enabled the 
identification of relevant security issues in the realm of information security, dynamic 
collaboration, and onboarding. Detailed surveys with industry experts and practitioners 
further enabled narrowing of the research topic. It became clear that systematically 
addressing access control in onboarding is an important research area with both 
practical and theoretical implications. The pursuit has allowed for advancing the field of 
access control in dynamic collaboration and it enabled the formulation of an approach 
and model that could be adapted in the industry in the context of onboarding. The rest 
of the chapter presents the contributions of this research and future directions. 
8.2 Research Contributions 
This research is a step forward in systematizing access control in onboarding. It is also 
a step forward in formulating access control in the general context of dynamic inter-
enterprise collaboration. The research began with understanding the characteristics of 
the problem in onboarding an acquired company. This is a typical scenario in mergers 
and acquisitions where a company acquires another company for numerous reasons 
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including expanding their market reach, complementing their solutions, gaining 
customers, and increasing revenues. The context is one of inter-enterprise dynamic 
collaboration. Though access control had been addressed by researchers and 
practitioners in dynamic collaboration, it has not been addressed in onboarding which 
provides a different perspective of inter-enterprise collaboration. Many business 
sensitive documents, processes and other artifacts are shared among collaboration 
teams belonging to different organizations and this engenders a security risk.  
This research made the following key contributions in the context of onboarding: 
1. Developed the SCODA secure onboarding collaboration process model to 
address security systematically. In this model, the team collaboration is 
viewed from the perspective of a lifecycle that includes four phases: create, 
operate, dissolve, and archive. The creation phase is when the team is 
formed; operation phase is where the team works on a collection of activities 
related to onboarding; dissolve is a phase where the team wraps up their 
collaboration and designates a person to archive the collaboration artifacts 
that the team shared; and archive is the phase where the designated team 
member collaborates with the onboarding security office and archiving team 
(typically an IT function) to bring a closure to the collaboration while ensuring 
that all information assets are safely archived, and access control to team 
members is disabled. 
2. Developed a mechanism to address security as an inherent activity built into 
the lifecycle of dynamic collaboration in onboarding. The set of activities that 
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should be performed and the issues that need to be addressed in terms of 
access control in each phase are presented. 
3. Integrated the concept of trust in managing access in dynamic collaboration. 
The taxonomy proposes three levels of inter-enterprise trust in onboarding 
which can be adapted by enterprises.  
4. The concept of risk analysis is introduced in addressing dynamic access 
control. In this context, the research proposes that dynamic access control 
based on trust relationships is contingent upon identifying the risks associated 
with the information assets. Depending on the risk tolerance, these 
information assets could be made available for access dynamically without 
pre-defined static access control policies. Instead access for such information 
assets is granted dynamically based in trust relationships and community 
voting. 
5. The perspective of self-organizing systems is presented as a way to gather 
feedback on secure access control during the onboarding lifecycle and 
update the collaboration security repository. This self-learning loop further 
enables dynamic access control.  
6. Change management is addressed as an integral component of onboarding 
process. 
In addition to these key contributions, the research introduced new ways in defining 
security requirements, enterprise, functional and collaboration roles, collaboration 
patterns, and reinterpreted access control requirements in collaborative sharing. The 
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next section discusses the possibilities of using this research as a basis for further 
contributions in both theory and practice of access control in dynamic collaboration.  
 
8.3 Future Research 
Any research undertaking usually results in identifying further scope for extending the 
research results in future endeavors in the chosen domain. It is also not unusual to seek 
possible adaptation of the research in other scientific, academic, and industry domains. 
In the spirit of this observation, there are several aspects in which this research could 
be pursued further. 
One aspect of this research is that the new approach and model is not adopted or 
adapted widely though the industry experts have validated the model and unanimously 
agreed that this is a promising approach for them to use. There is valid scope to use 
this in numerous onboarding projects in the future. The resulting data from these 
undertakings should provide insights into enhancing the model and making it an integral 
component of enterprise architectures and security. Many organizations have enterprise 
security frameworks as part of their overall enterprise frameworks. It will be useful to 
extend this research to include these enterprise wide frameworks so as to provide one 
holistic and consistent framework to address all aspects of managing a business. 
Dynamic collaboration continues to be an active research area. Grid computing based 
models of collaborations are actively discussed. From the literature review in this space, 
it is not clear how dynamic access control could be addressed systematically while not 
addressing data classification as discussed in this research. Trust management and 
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community based voting is another active area of research where the concepts of data 
classification, business driven policies, externally driven mandated policies must be 
integrated in proposing solutions. This is an area that will be investigated further.  
Though this research context is onboarding, more specific areas of onboarding models 
can be considered in the future. For example, there are numerous scenarios such as a 
big company acquiring a small company, merger between two similarly sized 
companies, and a company acquiring another company that spans international 
boundaries.  
Finally, the future research considerations may include the scenario of extensive data 
generation during long onboarding cycles while both the companies are operational. In 
this scenario, granting access to new information being generated dynamically in either 
organization is a topic that warrants further research. 
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Appendix A: Log Entry from Experiential Project 
Example: This is a case entered by an internal team and its focus is on access control 
management. The text in the box is from the log and not the wording of this research. 
The acquiring company is denoted by “XYZ”, and other companies involved in the 
acquisition onboarding are denoted by similar symbols to protect the confidentiality of 
the companies. 
 
Partners 
Team  
Preventing Access for Competitors at Registration 
Business 
Function  
Channel Partner Support 
Lessons 
Learned  
Case Summary 
The Channel Partner Onboarding team, Channel Partner Competitive 
Office, Channel Partner Data Strategy and Governance team, Brand 
Protection team and Corporate Learning Office (CLO) collaborated to 
investigate two problem areas. First, our company XYZ allows direct 
competitors and their subsidiaries to register as channel partners. This 
allows registered competitors unrestricted access to partner level, XYZ 
confidential Intellectual Property including pricing strategies and discount 
promotions, marketing materials, and software downloads. Secondly, XYZ 
allows individuals who work for direct competitors to create and use XYZ 
IDs on XYZ.com. With over 1000 overt ABC, DEF, and GHI employees 
identified with active ID's, competitors have used the XYZ.com site to gather 
competitive intelligence. Other cross-functional stakeholders, including 
Legal, Export Control Team, Channels Data Enablement, Strategic 
Marketing Organization, and Services Entitlement were engaged to confirm 
the issues and uncover additional improvement actions. 
The investigation led to several process-related recommendations around 
decision-making, ownership, documentation, communications, and 
governance to drive consistency in the prevention of direct competitors 
gaining access to XYZ intellectual property, marketing, and strategy 
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roadmaps. 
Criticality and Risk 
Allowing named direct competitors and individuals who work for direct 
competitors to register as channel partners and XYZ guest user results in 
exposure to IP loss, reduced competitive advantage, and unethical use of 
insider information to gain market share. 
Lessons Learned 
1. The lack of screening at registration allows competitor employees to 
register at XYZ.com and direct competitors to register as channel 
partners resulting in overt competitive intelligence gathering and theft of 
XYZ’s intellectual property. 
2. The lack of centralized user access content management for 
XYZ.com results in intellectual property leakage, increasing the risk 
for competitive advantage abuse. 
3. Lack of standardization across published content results in an 
unknown amount of improperly entitled content, increasing the risk 
for content to be leveraged for competitive advantage 
4. Without consistent governance, IP loss/abuse is not tracked, 
measured or monitored within or across all tiered levels at XYZ.com 
Recommendation: Establish a governance review team for XYZ.com 
content management. Determine feasibility for identification of content 
based on category and level access across XYZ.com and establish a 
process to review / pull exposed information.  
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Appendix B: Collaboration Security Survey – Pilot 
 
In Mergers and Acquisitions, when a company acquires another company, there is inter-
enterprise collaboration. The purpose of this survey is to gain insights into the following 
in this context. 
1. Understand and assess the process of on boarding acquired companies 
2. Understand and assess the access control management in inter-enterprise 
collaboration 
* Required 
1. Name * 
State your name 
2. Can I follow up with you? If so give your email address and contact number 
3. Your organizational role *  
(Which department you belong to? Mark only one oval.) 
o HR 
o IT 
o Sales and Marketing 
o Channels and Partner Support 
o Business Functional Unit 
o Learning and Development 
o Other 
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4. What is your role in acquisition integration? * 
What specific role you play in on boarding acquisitions (select one or more 
options). Check all that apply. 
 Team Leader 
 Integration Manager 
 HR Integration 
 IT Integration 
 Sales and Marketing Integration 
 Channel Partner Integration 
 Business Unit Integration 
5. At what stage of on boarding is your first involvement? * 
Mark only one oval. 
o Immediately after deal close and acquisition integration begins 
o Acquisition integration team requests my participation during the on boarding 
process 
o Just before acquisition integration is complete and signed off by stakeholders 
6. My roles and responsibilities are clearly defined in on boarding * 
Mark only one oval. 
o completely agree 
o somewhat agree 
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o somewhat disagree 
o completely disagree 
7. I have a clear understanding of my immediate collaboration team member with who I 
interact with on an almost daily basis * 
Mark only one oval. 
o completely agree 
o somewhat agree 
o somewhat disagree 
o completely disagree 
8. Information sharing and access control management in on boarding explained to the 
team clearly * 
Was it clear to you about what you can share and how you can share when you 
participate in onboarding? 
Mark only one oval. 
 completely agree 
 somewhat agree 
 somewhat disagree 
 completely disagree 
9. What was the method of sharing documents? * 
Check all that apply. 
  
213 
 
 email 
 internal collaboration workspace 
 Google Drive 
 Dropbox 
 internal collaboration workspace 
 Other: 
10. Did you set up access control management for granting access to the documents 
that you shared? * 
Mark only one oval. 
o yes 
o no 
11. Did you have access to all on boarding related documents in the collaboration work 
space or central repository? * 
Mark only one oval. 
o yes 
o no 
12. How would someone request access to your documents in the shared workspace? * 
Check all that apply. 
 everyone has access to all documents in the work space 
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 they send me a request by email to grant them access to my document in the 
work space 
 the collaboration system has mechanisms to request access 
13. How do you grant access to documents? * 
Check all that apply. 
 Everyone has access to all documents in the work space 
 I grant access using the mechanisms of the collaboration work space 
 I email them the documents that they requested 
 I seek approval of my on boarding team lead 
14. Did you access documents in the collaboration work space which were not directly 
related to your on boarding role? * 
Check all that apply. 
 sometimes opened documents accidentally 
 never accessed unrelated documents 
 sometimes opened documents to find out if I needed them 
 I opened other documents to gain broader understanding 
15. Did you have clarity about process life cycle of on boarding acquisitions? * 
Mark only one oval. 
 I had complete clarity of process 
 I had about 75% clarity of the process 
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 I had less than 50% clarity of process 
 I think the process was not clear at all 
16. I know when my role in the on boarding begins and ends * 
Mark only one oval. 
o completely agree 
o somewhat agree 
o somewhat disagree 
o completely disagree 
17. For each process step in on boarding acquisition, the roles and responsibilities were 
clearly defined * 
Mark only one oval. 
o completely agree 
o somewhat agree 
o somewhat disagree 
o completely disagree 
18. The inter-enterprise collaboration process is defined completely and accurately * 
Mark only one oval. 
o Completely agree 
o Somewhat agree 
o Somewhat disagree 
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o Completely disagree 
19. The milestones and measurement of process quality were satisfactory * 
Mark only one oval. 
o completely agree 
o somewhat agree 
o somewhat disagree 
o completely disagree 
20. Risk Management strategies were well defined to manage project timelines and 
personnel changes * 
Mark only one oval. 
o completely agree 
o somewhat agree 
o somewhat disagree 
o completely disagree 
21. When a person's role ended during collaboration their access to collaboration space 
was terminated? * 
Mark only one oval. 
o access terminated immediately and team got notified 
o there was a time lag in terminating access 
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o people had access to collaboration work space even after the on boarding was 
completed 
o the information about whose role ended was not available 
22. The on boarding project closure was defined clearly * 
Mark only one oval. 
o completely agree 
o somewhat agree 
o somewhat disagree 
o completely disagree 
23. I had access to collaboration work space even after the project officially closed * 
Mark only one oval. 
o My access still existed at least one month after closure 
o My access terminated on the day of closure 
o I had access for up to a week after closure 
o Access was never terminated 
24. Anyone can put documents in the collaboration work space * 
Mark only one oval. 
o yes any team member can put documents in the workspace 
o only team leader can put documents in the work space 
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25. The assignment of roles and access control is clearly defined * 
Mark only one oval. 
o completely agree 
o somewhat agree 
o somewhat disagree 
o completely disagree 
26. Do you use any trust management schemes to grant access to documents in work 
space? * 
Mark only one oval. 
o No, all members have access to documents 
o Yes, we use trust management schemes to determine access dynamically 
o access control is determined by statically defined policies 
o if someone does not have access but I trust them I share the documents 
27. I get notifications when new documents are put in the collaboration workspace * 
Mark only one oval. 
o always because the system notifies to everyone 
o sometimes because the individual who put the document can specify the people 
who should be notified 
o the system does not have automatic notification mechanisms 
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28. In your opinion how effectively collaboration security in terms of access control is 
managed in on boarding acquisitions? * 
Please write your thoughts based on your experience 
29. What process improvement suggestions you may have for onboarding acquisitions * 
 
  
220 
 
Appendix C: Collaboration Security Survey – Final 
 
Thank you for your participation in this survey which is part of my PhD dissertation. All 
of your information will remain anonymous and the survey results will be discussed in 
my dissertation in aggregate form. If you have any questions, please contact me at 
pratap@lensoo.com.  
In Mergers and Acquisitions, when a company acquires another company, there is inter-
enterprise collaboration. The purpose of this survey is to gain insights into the following 
in this context. 
1. Understand and Assess the process of on boarding acquired companies 
2. Understand and Assess the access control management in inter-enterprise 
collaboration 
* Required 
1. Name 
State your name 
2. Your organizational role * 
Which department do you belong to? Mark only one oval. 
o HR 
o IT 
o Sales and Marketing 
o Channels and Partner Support 
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o Business Functional Unit 
o Learning and Development 
o Other 
3. What is your role in acquisition integration? * 
What specific role you play in onboarding acquisitions (select one or more 
options)? Check all that apply. 
 Team Leader 
 Integration Manager 
 HR Integration  
 IT Integration 
 Sales and Marketing Integration 
 Channel Partner Integration 
 Business Unit Integration 
4. At what stage of on boarding is your first involvement? * 
Mark only one oval. 
o Immediately after deal close and acquisition integration begins 
o Acquisition integration team requests my participation during the on boarding 
process 
o Just before acquisition integration is complete and signed off by stakeholders 
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5. My roles and responsibilities are clearly defined in onboarding * 
Mark only one oval. 
o strongly agree 
o mostly agree 
o somewhat disagree 
o strongly disagree 
6. I have a clear understanding of my immediate collaboration team members * 
Mark only one oval. 
o strongly agree 
o mostly agree 
o somewhat disagree 
o strongly disagree 
7. Information sharing and access control management in on boarding explained to the 
team clearly * 
Was it clear to you about what you can share and how you can share when you 
participate in onboarding? Mark only one oval. 
o strongly agree 
o mostly agree 
o somewhat disagree 
o strongly disagree 
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8. What was the method of sharing documents? * 
Check all that apply. 
 email 
 internal collaboration workspace 
 Google Drive 
 Dropbox 
 internal collaboration workspace 
 Other: 
9. Did you set up access control management for granting access to the documents that 
you shared? * 
Mark only one oval. 
o yes 
o no 
10. Access control to the documents that I shared is set up by * 
Check all that apply. 
 myself - I determine who gets access 
 IT admin -- I give them the list of people who can access 
 my team leader -- I give him the list of potential people who can access 
 everyone gets access to all documents during the course of onboarding 
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11. Did you have access to all onboarding related documents in the collaboration work 
space or central repository? * 
Mark only one oval. 
o yes 
o no 
12. How would someone request access to your documents in the shared work space?* 
Check all that apply. 
 everyone has access to all documents in the work space 
 they send me a request by email to grant them access to my document in the 
work space 
 the collaboration system has features to request/grant access 
 
13. How do you grant access to documents? * 
Check all that apply. 
 everyone has access to all documents in the work space 
 I grant access using the features of the collaboration system to grant/request 
access 
 I email them the documents that they requested 
 I seek approval of my onboarding team lead 
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14. Did you access documents in the collaboration work space which were not directly 
related to your onboarding role? * 
Check all that apply. 
 sometimes opened documents accidentally 
 never accessed unrelated documents 
 sometimes opened documents to find out if I needed them 
 I opened other documents to gain broader understanding 
15. Did you have clarity about process life cycle of onboarding acquisitions? * 
Mark only one oval. 
o I had complete clarity of process 
o I had about 75% clarity of the process 
o I had less than 50% clarity of process 
o I think the process was not clear at all 
16. I know when my role in the onboarding begins and ends * 
Mark only one oval. 
o strongly agree 
o mostly agree 
o somewhat disagree 
o strongly disagree 
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17. For each process step in onboarding acquisition, the roles and responsibilities were 
clearly defined * 
Mark only one oval. 
o strongly agree 
o mostly agree 
o somewhat disagree 
o strongly disagree 
18. The inter-enterprise collaboration process is defined completely and accurately * 
Mark only one oval. 
o strongly agree 
o mostly agree 
o somewhat disagree 
o strongly disagree 
19. The milestones for onboarding process are defined satisfactorily * 
Mark only one oval. 
o strongly agree 
o mostly agree 
o somewhat disagree 
o strongly disagree 
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20. The metrics for measurement of onboarding process progress are defined 
satisfactorily * 
Mark only one oval. 
o strongly agree 
o mostly agree 
o somewhat disagree 
o strongly disagree 
21. Risk Management strategies are well defined to manage project timelines * 
Mark only one oval. 
o strongly agree 
o mostly agree 
o somewhat disagree 
o strongly disagree 
22. Risk Management strategies are well defined to manage personnel changes during 
onboarding process * 
Mark only one oval. 
o strongly agree 
o mostly agree 
o somewhat disagree 
o strongly disagree 
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23. When a person's role ended during collaboration their access to collaboration space 
was terminated? * 
Mark only one oval. 
o access terminated immediately and team got notified 
o there was a time lag in terminating access 
o people had access to collaboration work space even after the onboarding was 
completed 
o the information about whose role ended was not available 
24. I had access to collaboration space even after the onboarding project officially 
closed * 
Mark only one oval. 
o my access existed for at least one month after close of project 
o my access terminated on the day of onboarding project closure 
o I had access for up to a week after onboarding project closure 
o access was never terminated 
25. The onboarding project closure is defined clearly * 
Mark only one oval. 
o strongly agree 
o mostly agree 
o somewhat disagree 
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o strongly disagree 
26. Anyone can put documents in the collaboration work space * 
Mark only one oval. 
o yes any team member can put documents in the workspace 
o only team leader can put documents in the work space 
27. The assignment of roles and access control is clearly defined for onboarding 
process lifecycle * 
Mark only one oval. 
o strongly agree 
o mostly agree 
o somewhat disagree 
o strongly disagree 
28. Do you use any trust management techniques to grant access to documents in work 
space?* 
Mark only one oval. 
o No, all members have access to documents 
o Yes, we use trust management techniques to determine access dynamically 
o access control is determined by statically defined policies 
o if someone does not have access but I trust them I share the documents 
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29. I get notifications when new documents are put in the collaboration workspace * 
Mark only one oval. 
o always because the system notifies everyone 
o sometimes because the individual who put the document can specify the people 
who should be notified 
o the system does not have automatic notification mechanisms 
30. In your opinion how effectively collaboration security (in terms of access control) is 
managed in onboarding acquisitions?* 
Please write your thoughts based on your experience 
31. What process improvement suggestions you may have for onboarding acquisitions? 
32. Anything else you would like to share in terms of onboarding process and 
collaboration security? 
33. May I follow up with you? If so, please give your contact number and email. 
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Appendix D: Survey – Final Summary Responses 
Name 
Removed for confidentiality 
Your organizational role 
HR 2 8% 
IT 5 20% 
Sales and Marketing 4 16% 
 Channels and Partner Support 1 4% 
Business Functional Unit 7 28% 
Learning and Development 3 12% 
Other 3 12% 
 
What is your role in acquisition integration? 
 
Team Leader 5 17% 
Integration Manager 0 0% 
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HR Integration 3 10% 
IT Integration 6 20% 
Sales and Marketing Integration 5 17% 
Channel Partner Integration 5 17% 
Business Unit Integration 6 20% 
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At what stage of on boarding is your first involvement? 
 
Immediately after deal close and acquisition integration begins 6 24% 
Acquisition integration team requests my participation during the on boarding process 16 64% 
Just before acquisition integration is complete and signed off by stakeholders 3 12% 
My roles and responsibilities are clearly defined in onboarding 
 
strongly agree 5 20% 
mostly agree  13 52% 
somewhat disagree 4 16% 
strongly disagree 3 12% 
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I have a clear understanding of my immediate collaboration team members 
 
strongly agree 7 28% 
mostly agree 12 48% 
somewhat disagree 6 24% 
strongly disagree 0 0% 
Information sharing and access control management in on boarding explained to the team clearly 
 
strongly agree 5 20% 
mostly agree 12 48% 
somewhat disagree 7 28% 
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strongly disagree 1 4% 
What was the method of sharing documents? 
 
email 16 18% 
internal collaboration workspace 32 36% 
Google Drive 2 2% 
Dropbox 4 5% 
internal collaboration workspace 32 36% 
Other 2 2% 
Did you set up access control management for granting access to the documents that you shared? 
 
yes 16 64% 
no 9 36% 
access control to the documents that I shared is set up by 
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myself - I determine who gets access 8 24% 
IT admin -- I give them the list of people who can access 14 41% 
my team leader -- I give him the list of potential people who can access 12 35% 
everyone gets access to all documents during the course of onboarding 0 0% 
Did you have access to all onboarding related documents in the collaboration work space or central 
repository? 
 
yes 14 56% 
no 11 44% 
How would someone request access to your documents in the shared work space? 
 
everyone has access to all documents in the work space 1 3% 
they send me a request by email to grant them access to my document in the work space 14 44% 
the collaboration system has features to request/grant access 17 53% 
How do you grant access to documents? 
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everyone has access to all documents in the work space 1 3% 
I grant access using the features of the collaboration system to grant/request access 18 55% 
I email them the documents that they requested 7 21% 
I seek approval of my onboarding team lead 7 21% 
Did you access documents in the collaboration work space which were not directly related to your 
onboarding role? 
 
sometimes opened documents accidentally 2 6% 
never accessed unrelated documents 6 18% 
sometimes opened documents to find out if I needed them 13 39% 
I opened other documents to gain broader understanding 12 36% 
Did you have clarity about process life cycle of onboarding acquisitions? 
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I had complete clarity of process 3 12% 
I had about 75% clarity of the process 13 52% 
I had less than 50% clarity of process 5 20% 
I think the process was not clear at all 4 16% 
I know when my role in the onboarding begins and ends 
 
strongly agree 6 24% 
mostly agree 14 56% 
somewhat disagree 3 12% 
strongly disagree 2 8% 
For each process step in onboarding acquisition, the roles and responsibilities were clearly defined 
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strongly agree 4 16% 
mostly agree 12 48% 
somewhat disagree 7 28% 
strongly disagree 2 8% 
The inter-enterprise collaboration process is defined completely and accurately 
 
strongly agree 1 4% 
mostly agree 16 64% 
somewhat disagree 6 24% 
strongly disagree 2 8% 
The milestones for onboarding process are defined satisfactorily 
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strongly agree 4 16% 
mostly agree 15 60% 
somewhat disagree 5 20% 
strongly disagree 1 4% 
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The metrics for measurement of onboarding process progress are defined satisfactorily 
 
strongly agree 1 4% 
mostly agree 16 64% 
somewhat disagree 6 24% 
strongly disagree 2 8% 
Risk Management strategies are well defined to manage project timelines 
 
strongly agree 3 12% 
mostly agree 13 52% 
somewhat disagree 8 32% 
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strongly disagree 1 4% 
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Risk Management strategies are well defined to manage personnel changes during onboarding process 
 
strongly agree 4 16% 
mostly agree 13 52% 
somewhat disagree 6 24% 
strongly disagree 2 8% 
When a person's role ended during collaboration their access to collaboration space was terminated? 
 
access terminated immediately and team got notified 8 32% 
there was a time lag in terminating access 9 36% 
people had access to collaboration work space even after the onboarding was completed 5 20% 
  
245 
 
the information about whose role ended was not available 3 12% 
 
  
  
246 
 
I had access to collaboration space even after the onboarding project officially closed 
 
my access existed for at least one month after close of project 4 16% 
my access terminated on the day of onboarding project closure 5 20% 
I had access for up to a week after onboarding project closure 5 20% 
access was never terminated 11 44% 
The onboarding project closure is defined clearly 
 
strongly agree 3 12% 
mostly agree 14 56% 
somewhat disagree 6 24% 
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strongly disagree 2 8% 
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Anyone can put documents in the collaboration work space 
 
yes any team member can put documents in the workspace 16 64% 
only team leader can put documents in the work space 9 36% 
The assignment of roles and access control is clearly defined for onboarding process lifecycle 
 
strongly agree 3 12% 
mostly agree 17 68% 
somewhat disagree 4 16% 
strongly disagree 1 4% 
Do you use any trust management techniques to grant access to documents in work space? 
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No, all members have access to documents 4 16% 
Yes, we use trust management techniques to determine access dynamically 5 20% 
access control is determined by statically defined policies 11 44% 
if someone does not have access but I trust them I share the documents 5 20% 
I get notifications when new documents are put in the collaboration workspace 
 
always because the system notifies everyone 1
0 
40
% 
sometimes because the individual who put the document can specify the people who should 
be notified 
1
1 
44
% 
the system does not have automatic notification mechanisms 4 16
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% 
In your opinion how effectively collaboration security (in terms of access control) is managed in 
onboarding acquisitions? 
This is an immature area. We use Sharepoint for sharing documents and folders. Mostly for ongoing 
teams. Once a folder is created and role based access is defined, it remains the same. Onboard and 
offboarding processes are not yet linked to the collaboration space access protocols. There are some SOX 
access guidelines, where each quarter, the owner of a folder has to certify the list of users who are no 
more with the company and remove those who are not with the company. The management is not very 
mature. Though processes exist and can be managed automatically, a certain amount of manual discretion 
is used. Not very strong I dont think companies manage access control effectively when managing 
onboarding acquisitions We use tools for configuration management and collaboration. These tools 
provide robust security and access controls. So we are able to manage the collaboration security very 
effectively. not effectively at all. I would use a high, medium, and low framework. I would rate the 
security as medium. reasonably effective very important In my experience with the XXX acquisition of 
YYY, collaboration Security was very effectively managed based on XXX's well established processes 
and procedures. Reasonably well Most of the time it works As part of IT our access to Acquisition 
documents is controlled at a Team level who has access to all documents pertaining to Acquisition from 
an IT perspective. The security aspect may not be that much at this time because acquisition decision has 
already been taken and IT is already involved. The companies I did were less than 200 people on each 
side. Thus, security actually went very well if the teams wanted to get together. It is like getting married 
to your counter-part. It gets very personal. Outsiders from other departments that do not have need to 
know will not be able to get into non-appropriate "clicks". The clicks get very tight. If anything getting to 
the needed information was the issue, because the clicks on the two sides will have somewhat different 
boundaries. In my opinion, the collaboration security was poorly managed in onboarding acquisitions. It 
has mostly been effective. Perhaps, too much caution is used when granting access. These type 
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environments always run somewhat loose, as is with access control. It's a priority in the thought and docs, 
but not always implemented in real life. it is not as thought out as it should be at my company In any 
acquisition process, data is present in two different organizations. Some Employees from either 
organization need to access data from both sources. Making data available to these audience can be 
managed effectively. User groups and stakeholders are determined before the collaboration and 
engagement process is kicked off, allowing for clear visibility of users that will need access to the data 
and documents There are a set of steps that are expected to be performed when onboarding acquisitions; 
however, "access control" requirements are not proactively defined. Usually, this requirement is driven by 
the program manager in business development that is handling the acquisition. It's important to note that 
the way such access control is defined does vary from one program manager to another. security was 
managed only at the level of who needs access Satisfactory managed. In my experience, there was no 
collaboration security in place during the acquisition that I was involved in. Very effectively 
 
What process improvement suggestions you may have for on boarding acquisitions? 
Automated integration of new teams onboarded during acquisition and set up the levels of access to the 
shared folders using a tool. Currently, it is manual. Some training to the personnel involved in the 
acquisitions on best practices and any software to be used. Well defined roles and responsibilities. Better 
version controls and access control 1. Clearly define the onboarding process and create an onboarding 
roadmap 2. Integrate onboarding with overall acquisition process 3. Extend onboarding to the first six 
months of the acquisition 4. Replace paper and spreadsheet based processes and use an automated system 
that includes forms management, tasks managements, and socialization in the company culture. 4. Create 
an onboarding roadmap in order to establish a long-term strategic plan for the onboarding process. Clearly 
defining the process steps and communicating that to all the stakeholders is very important. a workflow 
service should be set up to manage the process directly with all members when events happen (based on 
the event) Provide a clear project management plan that outlines all key stakeholders from the start. Do 
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not rush the merger since that creates more problems regarding the on-boarding--in short give key 
stakeholders enough time to plan out the work so everyone is successful. none more regular and 
structured mtgs with deliverable and action items Communication with the employees in terms of 
Integration Update. Better dashboards Clearer definitions ahead of the process commencement. Clearer 
methods to include people quickly that can view and edit docs. IT should be involved from the beginning 
to make sure IT infrastructure is aligned to the overall Acquisition process. Many times IT gets involved 
at a later stage with a particular deadline approaching. IT may not have enough time and resources to do 
its job. Rent an apartment at the other location and rotate the staff often. Each person should go back 
multiple times as they ramp up their learning curve. Shorter, longer, shorter. The biggest learning is in the 
middle. Kill off one of the accounting departments. There can only be one set of agreed upon "numbers". 
Put key members on consulting contracts when they leave - and then actually use the time. *** Above all 
else protect the computers and networks in engineering, manufacturing and sales. There is no way to 
rebuild them exactly. A customer support call even 2 years later may require you to turn on the computers 
to find the answers. Leave special equipment connected!. If you move equipment around you break 
software licenses and custom in-house scripts. 1. Roles and responsibilities of every team/member 
involved in onboarding should be identified. 2. The process should be streamlined further to understand 
the sequence of activities, clear handoffs between teams and the activities that can run in parallel. 3. 
Personal information of the newly onboarded team/members should be properly secured. 4. While 
granting access control to information and documents, it should be clearly identified in advance as to who 
should get what information and in which format. 5. Training the newly onboarded members should be 
done more effectively so that the new members understand how the training is relevant to them. 6. 
Maintaining an effective time line is important in onboarding the new team members. There seems to be a 
certain amount of fear if you're the company who has been acquired. Putting to rest those fears first would 
be ideal. Keeping and revisiting the documented processes/procedures identified in initial goals, timelines 
and requirements. define what type of acquisition it is, than have a clear handbook in processes and 
operating model. There are opportunities to improve in the areas of Collaboration Security. To put an 
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automated system in place to walk stakeholders through the process, showing clearly what has been done, 
what has begun, and the KPIs around each step. Develop a consistent process protocol that is simple to 
initiate and monitor. The application should "encourage" periodic validation to ensure that the access 
control requirements are still applicable. the team leader should be able to maintain a team roster Better 
communication between all the different team players. Clarify the team and roles Choose strong decisive 
team members that see the value in the process Define goals, objectives, metrics for onboarding Develop 
a timeline Use a dashboard to map progress Have executive sponsors to support the program Be realistic 
in setting expectations about company culture integration as this takes a long time If budget is available 
provide culture conditioning for the acquired entity if it is significantly smaller than the new parent 
company 
 
Anything else you would like to share in terms of onboarding process and collaboration security? 
The authentication information (such as Active Directory) should be used as a reference periodically (e.g. 
daily) against the current user list of a collaboration system to create delta list, and create tasks for 
adding/removing those users to manage the delta list. Using a tool based approach is very important - 
especially in a multiple acquisition environment. A strong executive sponsorship is needed to make this 
overall process successful. tracking is key and we do not have visibility to it NA I was involved in the 
onboarding process when XXX acquired YYY. XXX has a good track record and experience in m&a and 
has well defined process for it. None How to minimize duplication of information by proper 
categorization. How to have a chart of docs / tree that shows the layout of docs and categories. This 
survey's design vastly under estimates the amount (a) of paper transported back and forth (many hundreds 
of pounds+ per department), (b) the vast number of hours of the phone, skype, etc. A lot of talking goes 
on. Many business procedures, practices, and knowledge are not written down. Verbal knowledge can be 
1/3rd or more of the stuff you bought. (c) the amount of face-to-face time. It is normal for key people to 
live at the other places for several weeks. You have to "do it" yourself to really understand. Sale and 
  
254 
 
marketing still takes face time to build trust and deep understanding. If you don't understand the live 
human behavior and interaction - you will make mistakes. A webcam is not a substitute for a late night 
beer. ~ There are situations where sensitivity around the on boarding details should be secured, depending 
on the how much of the acquisition specifications have been defined and socialized. Tighter security may 
be required during this Pre-Onboarding / Acquisition phase. There is still much to be gained for 
improving collaboration security. Ease of use, effectiveness in ensuring that those given access are the 
only individuals are allowed to view content. no My on-boarding experience occurred in my previous 
companies, not my current company 
May I follow up with you? If so, please give your contact number and email. 
Deleted for confidentiality 
 
 
